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Race and the Core Curriculum in
Legal Education
Frances Lee Ansleyt
Controversy about the value and meaning of a canon of traditional

western culture has been raging on American university campusesfor some
time. ProfessorAnsley argues that in light of the history of the Constitu-

tion, the legal academy should be in a better position than the rest of the
university to achieve broad.consensus on an issue that has proved divisive

elsewhere: the centrality of race to our discipline and its core texts. She
elaborates by narrative,describing some of her experiences with teaching
about race and sharing the reflections of her students as they encountered

racially charged texts and interactionsin the law school classroom. The
deep racialdivisions that presently exist throughoutsociety, coupled with
the discomfort and ignorance that tend to characterize our infrequent
attempts to communicate about matters of racial difference, will complicate easy consensus about whether and how to more explicitly recognize

race in the law school's core curriculum. She nevertheless argues that the
rewards of such integration are worth the difficulties and concludes that
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. A.B. 1969, Harvard-Radcliffe; J.D.
1979, University of Tennessee; LL.M. 1988, Harvard.
Relevant in my view to the issues I will be discussing in this Essay are some additional pieces of
biographical information that do not reveal themselves from the dates and sources of my academic
degrees. I am a white woman in my mid-forties, Southern by heritage, birth, and rearing. On one
side of my family I am a second-generation college graduate, fourth-generation on the other. For
eight years after law school I was a plaintiff's personal injury litigator in Knoxville, Tennessee. I
returned to the legal academy to teach in 1988. For a critique of the notion that you as a reader
should find any of this race-, class-, and gender-related information relevant to your reading, see
Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards:Some Lessonsfrom the Patent
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2065 (1991) ('lilt is time to step away from labels and categories, time to stop
worrying about who is writing from what perspective," id. at 2085).
I want to thank the many people who were kind enough to read earlier drafts of this Essay, who
fed me pieces of information, or who otherwise inspired or offered help and support for the teaching
efforts that I describe below. These people include Derrick Bell, Pat Cain, Joe Cook, Kim
Crenshaw, Alan Freeman, Nina Gregg, Pat Hardin, Camille Hazeur, Chuck Lawrence, Howard
Lesnick, Toni Pickard, Glenn Reynolds, John Sebert, Jim Sessions, Barbara Stark, Greg Stein, Mark
Tushnet, Dick Wirtz, and Marilyn Yarbrough. I also am grateful for the research assistance
provided both in fat times and lean by Kelly Bryson, Mary Copeland, Patricia Crotwell, John
Goergen, Robin Miller, and Ernestine Thomas. Finally, of course, this Essay could never have come
to be without the students in my Discrimination class of fall 1989, many of whose thoughtful and
lively words you will be reading below. Other students in my Race and Gender in American Law
seminars, in Women and the Law, and in my spring 1991 Discrimination class have also taught me
much that helped inform this Essay at every stage, and I thank them too. The final product is, of
course, my own responsibility.
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mattersof racialjustice, bothpast andpresent, arean indispensablepartof
minimal cultural literacyfor American lawyers and legal scholars.
I
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE CANON DEBATE

A.

Introduction: The Thesis'

Even those of us in law schools, with our often loose and provisional
relationship to the rest of the academy, cannot fail to notice the controversy now raging in the larger university about "the canon." 2 The contest is both heated and far-reaching.'
Some participants in this debate fear that the inherited wisdoms of
the various disciplines are suffering erosion and disintegration due to
1. First names of authors and editors are included in footnotes throughout to provide a
method, albeit imperfect, for allowing identification of the gender of authors and editors cited.
2. Some sense of what I mean by "the canon" will emerge in the discussion that follows. In a
very general way, the term refers to a body of texts, perhaps of events, ideas, and nonverbal cultural
creations, that are held to form a core that either is or should be presented to the next generation of
learners as somehow central to, even definitive of, their heritage. The meaning of this core, whether
it does or should exist at all, and if so what exactly should be included in it, are all topics of hot
dispute.
3. See, eg., Karen J. Winkler, Organizationof American HistoriansBacks Teaching of NonWestern Culture and Diversity in Schools, Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 6, 1991, at A5, col. 2
(examining debate over multicultural education in public schools); Scott Heller, 'Entrepreneur'of the
Core Curriculum Fights the Devil on the Side, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 9, 1991, at A3, col. 2 (in
favor of a core curriculum, Carl Raschke argues that a core curriculum is not a "canon" and that a
core curriculum requires interdisciplinary thinking); W. Robert Connor, Milton as Misogynist,
Shakespeare as Elitist,Homer as Pornographer,Chron. Higher Educ., Dec. 5, 1990, at A48, col. 1
(arguing against treating literary works as products of historical and social contexts); FurtherDebate
on Core Curricula: a Parableon Upward Mobility, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 24, 1990, at A17, col.
1 (chairman of National Endowment for the Humanities believes that there is a false dichotomy
between process and content in core curriculum debate); Eugene M. Hughes, Commentary: Taking
Responsibilityfor CulturalDiversity, BLACK IssUEs HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 18, 1990, at 24 (favoring

culturally diverse curriculum at the university level); Eileen M. O'Brien, Debate Over Curriculum
Expansion Continues, BLACK IssuEs HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 23, 1989, at 1 (discussing debate over

contents of core curriculum); Scott Heller, Press for Campus Diversity Leading to More Closed
Minds, Say Critics, Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 8, 1989, at A13, col. 2 [hereinafter Heller, Pressfor
Campus Diversity] (discussing meeting where many attendees agreed that core curriculum should
focus on western civilization); Scott Heller, Model Curriculumfor Colleges Proposedby Humanities
Chief, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 4 (report by National Endowment for the
Humanities emphasizes western texts); Scott Heller, New Attempts Planned to Define Core
Curriculum, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 11, 1989, at A14, col. 1 (highlighting debate on merits of
structured general-education sequence); Scott Heller, Colleges Told to Stress Tradition and Shared
Views Even as They Bring More Diversity Into Curricula, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at A16,
col. 3 (university president urges educators to stress what is in common and not what is different);
Forum: Who Needs the Great Works?, HARPER'S, Sept. 1989, at 43 (colloquy on the canon and core
curriculum between E. D. Hirsch Jr., Gayatri Spivak, Roger Shattuck, Jon Pareles, and John
Kaliski); Elizabeth Greene, 'Teach the Conflicts, Teach the Conflicts,' Preaches This Humanist,
Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 8, 1989, at A3, col. 2 (a professor urges educators to teach about the
debate itself); James Atlas, On Campus: The Battle of the Books, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1988, § 6
(Magazine), at 23 (discussing debate over "canon" and "books that constituted the intellectual
heritage of educated Americans, that had officially been defined as great," id. at 25).
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thoughtless faddism and neglect. As a result, say these observers, today's
students are culturally illiterate and display alarming gaps not only in
their knowledge of our civilization and shared heritage but also in their
appreciation for the great universals that unite humankind. These
defenders of a traditional canon propose the definition and transmission
of a core of classic works as an antidote to this deterioration of American

education.4
Others perceive the inherited core celebrated by the defenders of the
canon as offering a false universality, deeply flawed-even oppressive-in

its largely unexamined exclusion or subordination of the female, the
colored, the nonwestern, the powerless. These critics say that the most
pressing need in curriculum development is not the retreat to and preservation of an elitist, white, male, parochial western core, but rather the
conscious bringing in of previously suppressed or ignored histories and
narratives, in the interest of greater justice for the disempowered and a

more effective education for all. 5
This Essay takes the position that legal education stands in a peculiar posture relative to this debate and the cluster of issues surrounding it,
a posture that puts us in some ways behind but in other ways ahead of
our colleagues in other disciplines. On the one hand, law schools are
behind the times in confronting the issues posed by the debate over the
4. "[We have missed] the opportunity of teaching young (and older) children the traditional
materials of literate culture ....The inevitable effect of this fundamental educational mistake has
been a gradual disintegration of cultural memory, causing a gradual decline in our ability to

communicate." E. D. HIRSCH,

JR., CULTURAL LrrERAcY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS To
KNow 113 (1987); see also ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987)

(deploring lack of cultural literacy in today's students); Lynne V. Cheney, Current Fashions in
ScholarshipDiminish the Value of the Humanities; Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 8, 1989, at A40, col. I
(arguing that classical humanities education enriches civic and personal life).
5. Dorothy Helly, for example, identifies as crucial the project to
transform [the] curriculum from the preserve of elite white males to a knowledge base that
both includes and reflects the experiences of women, in all their racial, ethnic, class, and
sexual variety. The remarkable aspect of [this project] is that it has taken place against a
background of restricted resources and resistant nostalgia for the "basics," the "core," and
the eternal verities of the 1950s.
Dorothy 0. Helly, Recent Books on Curriculum Integration, WOMEN'S STUD. Q., Summer 1985, at
24, 24; see also PAUL LAtrER, CANONS AND CONTEXTS (1991) (college curriculum that values and
focuses upon differences provides broader education for more students than does a narrowly
constructed canon). Other useful sources include the following materials available from the Center
for Research on Women at Memphis State University: Margaret L. Anderson, Denying Difference:
The ContinuingBasisfor Exclusion in the Classroom (1987) (keynote address delivered at the Third
Annual Workshop on Women in the Curriculum); Elizabeth Higginbotham, Integrating All Women
Into the Curriculum (1988); Elizabeth K. Minnich, Conceptual Errors Across the Curriculum:
Towards a Transformationof the Tradition (1986) (keynote address delivered at the Second Annual
Workshop on Women in the Curriculum); Sandra Morgen, To See Ourselves, to See Our Sisters: The
Challenge of Re-Envisioning Curriculum Change (1986) (keynote address delivered at the First
Annual Workshop on Women in the Curriculum). These papers were part of the Center's Research
Clearinghouse and Curriculum Integration Project.
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canon. Our basic core curriculum 6 stands astoundingly unchanged and
unexamined compared to that of the rest of the academy. On the other
hand, because of certain salient features of American legal history we
should find ourselves paradoxically advanced in our ability to reach provisional agreement on a crucial matter still deeply divisive for our nonlegal colleagues: the centrality of racial texts,7 racial issues, and racial
disputes to an educated understanding of our discipline and its heritage.
If the history of the United States Constitution and the American legal
system teaches us anything, surely one of its core messages is that race
has played a key role at many critical and formative junctures of our
development.
In the course of the following discussion I refer to selected scholarship in this area' but also draw on my experiences over the past two
years teaching courses on race and gender at a state law school in the
middle South. I use these teaching experiences both to explain the
rationale behind my position and to point to some difficulties and ambiguities associated with it.
B.

The Legal Core Curriculum

L

Its Backwardness
On one level, legal education appears to have been isolated from
trends in the rest of the academy in that the core curriculum remains
unchanged in all its monumental splendor, its feet firmly planted in the
6. I mean here by "basic core curriculum" the first-year common-law courses, criminal law,
and constitutional law. For one dissatisfied commentary discussing changes in that curriculum, see
Roderick A. Macdonald, CurricularDevelopment in the 1980s: A Perspective, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC.
569 (1982).
7. The ambiguity of this phrase is a demonstration of the socially constructed nature of race.
I intend for the phrase to include such overlapping categories of written and oral work as texts
produced by authors of color (for example, texts on the United States Constitution by Frederick
Douglass, Thurgood Marshall, and Sojourner Truth), texts that explicitly address racial matters (for
example, Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857) by Roger Taney, and The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) by Charles IL Lawrence III), and texts that
produce significant racial consequences, both those that do and those that do not refer explicitly to
race (for example, the United States Constitution, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 wall.) 36
(1873), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)).
8. Concomitantly, I hope this Essay can serve as something of a sourcefinder for those
interested in these issues, with a special emphasis on alerting readers to a varied and exciting body of
legal scholarship that is beginning to emerge around critical race theory. For discussions of this
new trend in legal scholarship from various vantage points, see Robin D. Barnes, Race
Consciousness. The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in CriticalRace Scholarship, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1864 (1990); Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really
Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95, 95 n.1, and passim (1990); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of
Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative
Action in LegalAcademia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J.
758; see also infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Randall Kennedy's view of critical
race scholars).
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first-year curriculum. Despite profound changes in constitutional, statutory, and common law, staggering centralization and elaboration of the
state and the economy, the development of a new demographic profile in

our student body and faculty, and radical alterations in the nature and
practice of American lawyering, the basic core curriculum endures. 9

In the "peripheral" areas of legal education (for example, in courses
concentrating on legislation, skills training, or cross-disciplinary
approaches) I° changes have been many. But compared with the bewildering diversity of required programs that have arisen over the past
twenty years or so in undergraduate programs around the country, legal

education is startling in its preservationism. Though occasional serious
attempts to restructure law school requirements have been mounted in

the past, 1 and although some provocative and interesting alternatives
are presently being tried, 12 the central courses have continued with
9. Kristine Strachan, Curricular Reform in the Second and Third Years: Structure,
Progression,and Integration, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 523, 523 (1989).
10. See Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School
Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1983) (describing legal curriculum as a hard core of
prepolitical, "private" law subjects surrounded by a periphery of secondary, political "public" law
subjects). As I read Kennedy's thesis, he would situate constitutional law toward the public
periphery of the curriculum, not in the private core. In one view, of course, the Constitution stands
as a great arbiter between the realms of public and private. However, my argument is simply that
constitutional law is firmly a part of legal education's core curriculum as that term is used in the
canon debates. No law student can graduate without it. Cultural literacy for an American lawyer
unequivocally requires some grounding in the United States Constitution.
11. See, eg., THE FACULTY OF LAW OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF STUDIES IN
LEGAL EDUCATION (Herman Oliphant ed. 1928). The late Fred Snyder shared this study and much
else with his Comparative Legal Education students, all in the most wry, sly, diffident, humane, and
cosmopolitan style. He will be missed.
12. Among the best known and most daring recent programs is that at City University of New
York Law School at Queens College, where first- and second-year students have encountered a
significantly reordered group of required courses: (1) Liberty, Equality, and Due Process in
Historical and Philosophical Context, (2) Law and a Market Economy, (3) Legal Research, (4) The
Work of a Lawyer, (5) Responsibility for Injurious Conduct, (6) Civil and Criminal Procedure, (7)
Law and Family Relations, (8) Public Institutions and Law, (9) Constitutional Structures and the
Law, and (10) Lawyering and the Public Interest. CUNY LAW SCHOOL AT QUEENS COLLEGE,

1990-91 CATALOG 10-13; see also John M. Farago, The Pedagogy of Community: Trust and
Responsibility at CUNY Law School, 10 NOVA L.J. 465 (1986) (describing how the issues of
responsibility and trust have affected all aspects of CUNY's program); Charles Halpern, A New
Direction in Legal Education: The CUNY Law School at Queens College, 10 NOVA L.J. 549 (1986)
(discussing CUNY's innovative approach to legal education).
Stanford Law School has recently embarked on an experiment in which students may elect to
participate in one (or even both) of two specialties: the Law and Business Concentration and the
Lawyering for Social Change Concentration. Of course, upper-division concentrations leave most of
the core matters of first-year courses and constitutional law untouched, so this may be an innovation
that proves the rule. See Stanford Law School, Public Interest Law at Stanford Law School I (May
7, 1990) (unpublished description of program on file with author); see also Gerald P. L6pez,
TrainingFuture Lawyers to Work With the Politicallyand Socially Subordinated:Anti-Generic Legal
Education, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 305, 360-86 (1989) (discussing practical effects and implications of
Stanford program). Harvard has experimented with one first-year section whose traditional core
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remarkable similarity and remarkably little serious challenge. 13
However, with the rise of new modes of discourse in legal scholarship, modes that challenge the legitimacy of long-unexamined assumptions, we may begin to see some of the same divergences, questions, and
instabilities in legal education that we have seen elsewhere. Critical legal
studies, law and economics, feminist theory, and most recently critical
race theory14 pose such challenges. At present, however, the core
remains.
One can easily be of two minds about this state of affairs. Many of
the criticisms launched against ideas of the canon in undergraduate programs can be launched against the standard law school curriculum.
Whose stories, needs, and interests are omitted, and whose heard? 15 Are
curriculum has been both broken and innovatively interconnected. See Todd D. Rakoff, The
HarvardFirst-YearExperiment, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 491 (1989).
13. I understand that there is difference as well as similarity to be found in a course called
"Contracts" taught at Harvard by the revolutionary pedagogue, Christopher Langdell, in 1870, and
post-Mentschikoff, post-Llewellyn courses of the same name taught at any law school in 1990. Nor
do I underestimate the activities of latter-day curriculum reformers, including those at my own
institution. See, eg., Neil P. Cohen, The Process of Curriculum Reform, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 535
(1989) (recommended curriculum changes while serving as chair of the University of Tennessee
College of Law's curriculum committee and currently arguing that the process used in curricular
reform may influence faculty approval of curricular reform programs). Nevertheless, in the context
of the issues involved in this paper, I believe my premise stands. See Strachan, supra note 9 (starting
from premise that legal education has remained unchanged for the last century).
14. See, eg., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539; Barnes, supra note 8;
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersectionof Race and Sex: A Black FeministCritique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 139;
Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original Understandings, 1991
DUKE L.J. 39 (1991); Delgado, supra note 8; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution:
Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 9 (1989).
15. The writings of Mari Matsuda provide one analysis of the voices that are excluded and can
serve as practice aids for teachers who want to counteract patterns of exclusion in their own work.
See, eg., Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies andReparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Ray. 323 (1987) [hereinafter Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom] (urging critical legal
scholars to study actual experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition of people of color);
Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge PlantingSeeds in Plowed-Up Ground, 11
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988) (arguing that legal education should encompass outside
perspectives--especially from those "on the bottom"-to stimulate scholarly imagination).
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the materials presented ethnocentric?16 Male centered? 17 Race bound?"
To ask many of these questions is, of course, to answer them.
However, many will wonder, what else should be the focus of legal

education if not the tools, elements, and creations of "our" legal culture?
And though our materials may appear to be dominated by the concerns

and problems of white western males of comfortable means, some will
say that these concerns and problems are, in the main, universal concerns
and problems, resolvable by resort to universal principles.
In this Essay, however, I do not intend to launch a full-scale consideration of these fascinating issues nor try to envision what an entire alter-

nate curriculum (or a significantly altered approach to the present
curriculum) might be. Instead, I will claim that legal educators should
be able to reach relatively broad and rapid agreement on one theme of
the canon debate: the centrality of racial discourse to our field of intellectual endeavor.
16. Robert Williams, a Native American law teacher, believes they are. He has begun to
recount Native American stories, funny and otherwise, interjecting them into legal discourse to see
what light they bring to bear. See, eg., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The
Perilsand Promise of CriticalLegal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQUALITY 103 (1987).
17. A number of commentators have attempted to analyze closely the messages about gender
contained in particular casebooks and courses. See, eg., Mary E. Becker, Commentary: Obscuring
the Struggl" Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's
Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989) (casebook's presentation of law of sex
discrimination obscures inequality between the two sexes by not questioning structural inequalities
present in social security system); Mary I. Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A
FeministResponse to a CriminalLaw Textbook 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988) (feminist critique of
textbook uncovering ways text presents women and addressing doctrinal issues that involve
questions about gender); Nancy S. Erickson, Final Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal
Law, " 42 RUTGERs L. REv. 309 (1990) (comprehensively analyzing treatment of gender in criminal
law as presented in criminal law casebooks); Nancy S. Erickson & Mary A. Lamanna, Sex-Bias
Topics in the CriminalLaw Course:A Survey ofCriminalLaw Professors, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
189 (1990); Mary J. Frug, Re-Reading Contracts:A FeministAnalysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34
AM. U.L. REv. 1065 (1985) (examining treatment of women in contracts casebook and noting
"maleness" of casebook); Carl Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade and Schwartz Torts
Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 495 (1988) (analyzing gender bias in casebook and
examining subtle ways casebook editors treat women). Others have suggested ways of integrating
gender issues into tort law, a paradigmatically core-curriculum course. See, eg., Leslie Bender, A
Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Lucinda M. Finley, A
Break in the Silence" Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE LL. & FEMINISM 41
(1989).
18. Numerous authors have considered race as a feature of contemporary legal education and
legal pedagogy. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 80-97
(1991) (chapter entitled "Crimes Without Passion"); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a
Race-ConsciousPedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (1989) (discussing difficulties
minority students face in the classroom and suggesting ways to overcome them); Jerome M. Culp,
Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77
VA. L. REv. 539 (1991) (black law professor begins law courses with personal narrative); Gerald P.
L6pez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989) (using narrative to give
another perspective); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
JurisprudentialMethod, 11 WOMEN's Ras. L. REP. 7 (1989) (urging lawyers to see the world from
the viewpoint of the oppressed).
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2. Its Advantages
A central feature of the debate in the larger academy over the canon
has been the insistence by one side that matters of race deserve greater
attention than they have traditionally received.19 These advocates urge
exploration of the lives, concerns, and experiences of people of color, celebration and criticism of their creations, and analysis of the dominant
attitudes, ideas, and institutions that have contributed to the subordinate
status these people have experienced.
It goes without saying that there is scarcely a scholar today who
would object to the study of the work, life, or concerns of a black person
simply because her skin was black. Nevertheless, calls for the inclusion
of race-focused study have met with strong resistance, including the
assertion that texts of appropriate quality are lacking (the "qualified-pool
problem") and the observation that there are inadequate resources to
implement such expansion. 20
Members of law school communities are certainly in no better posi19. Houston Baker, an English professor at the University of Pennsylvania, has charged, for
example, that in many cases a continued emphasis on western civilization in core curricula
constitutes "'a willful ignorance and aggression toward Blacks.'" O'Brien, supra note 3, at 26.
Jonathan Culler, director of the Society for Humanities at Cornell University, similarly observed:
"I'm not saying that Black students[ ] cannot respond to or benefit from great works from
dead white men. They can and they do. But when you tell students that the books you are
assigning them are the great works of the universe that address our common humanity,
and all the books that do this happen to be written by dead white men... the effect is to
deny to some groups their own humanity ....
Id.
20. These particular recurring objections merit some comment here. First is the implied or
explicit assertion of a qualified-pool problem, the argument that worthy texts by authors of color and
female authors are simply too scarce to support the project. According to this view, those texts we
currently honor and celebrate have achieved their status through the meritocratic application of
standards of "quality" over the centuries. See Irving Howe, The Value of the Canon, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 40, 44 (arguing that we must recognize that on the whole the "great
works" of literature and thought through the centuries were the achievements of men, even though
the circumstances under which men have so dominated the field may be excoriated). The test-oftime assumption has been contested by authors who have pointed out that neither the birth nor the
endurance of a work is the result of neutral processes. See LAURENCE SCHWARTZ, CREATING
FAULKNER'S REPUTATION: THE POLITICS OF MODERN LITERARY CRITICISM

(1988) (describing

how a "confluence of literary, cultural, and commercial forces created and shaped Faulkner's
literary reputation" in the post-war climate); Earl Shorris, In Search of the Latino Writer (Book
Review), N.Y. Times, July 15, 1990, § 7, at 1, col. 1 (discussing the exclusion of Latino writers from
the canon of American literature). Other writers have attempted the difficult job of critically
analyzing the silences and absences in the received canon. See generally TILLIE OLSEN, SILENCES
(1965) (discussing the influence of sex, class, and color on the creation of literature and stating that
"[l]iterary history and the present are dark with silences: ... some silences hidden; some the ceasing
to publish after one work appears; some the never coming to book form at all"); VIRGINIA WOOLF,
A RooM OF ONE'S OWN (1929) (arguing that women's writing has been "impoverished by the
limited access women have had to life," id at x); Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The
Afro-American Presencein American Literature, 28 MICH. Q. REv. 1 (1989) ("certain absences [in
American literature] are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call attention to themselves," id. at
11). A recent anthology purports to demonstrate a much larger qualified pool than had previously
been supposed. See THE HEATH ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (Paul Lauter ed. 1990)
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tion than anyone else in this racially divided country to achieve a general
consensus on matters of color. Nevertheless, our particular heritage as
American lawyers, as observers and interpreters of American law, puts
us in a position to enter this discourse about the place of race in the
curriculum at a more advanced stage than our academic counterparts
elsewhere. Arguments about a qualified pool of race-related texts of genuine significance, for example, or about the problem of priorities given

limited resources, may plague and vex our colleagues in other parts of
the university but they appear simply beside the point in a discipline
whose canon by anyone's reckoning must include, for example, the founders' Constitution, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments,
and Brown v. Board of Education.2 1
At present, legal education's advantage in this regard exists more as
an opportunity than as a fully realized achievement. It is an opportunity
we should enthusiastically grasp. Our canon is already an integrated one
and should be consciously taught as such. American law students should

not leave the law schools of the late twentieth century until they have
received a thorough and explicit grounding in the role that race has
played in the creation and transformation of central legal institutions.
The power and burden of race, both past and present, should be seen as

indispensable parts of minimal cultural and constitutional literacy for the
legal practitioners and theoreticians we send forth into the bar and the
world.
(providing a selection of authors of diverse identities and backgrounds in terms of race, class, and
gender).
A second common objection to a race-conscious curriculum is that there are inadequate
resources for its implementation. The argument is that, given the limited time and money devoted to
education, attention needs to be focused on the "fundamentals," not on peripheral "extras." See E.
HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 144-45 ("If the contents of our existing extensive curriculum were listed
openly . . . we would see that much of the information now being conveyed to our children is
wasteful of precious opportunities." (emphasis added)). Some commentators have articulated the
unconsciously privileged assumptions that may underlie this assessment of the fundamental and the
peripheral. See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies 14 (1988) (Working Paper No.
189, Wellesley College Center for Research on Women) (listing in a consciousness-expanding way
the conditions most white women can assume will hold true for them in daily life). Others have
directly urged decentering. See, ag., Atlas, supra note 3, at 75 (During Stanford's reform of its
western civilization requirement, the leader of a black student organization stated: " 'If you think we
are talking about a handful of good books you are mistaken .... We are discussing the foundations
of education in America and the acceptance of Euro-America's place in the world as contributor,not
creator.'" Id. (emphasis added)).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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II
RACE IN A LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM: CASE STUDY

I want now to put more flesh on the bones of my argument by
exploring in greater depth the reasons and ways that race is so central to
the American legal story. Rather than argument, I choose narrative.
Rather than sketch a general race-conscious description or history of
American legal institutions,2 2 I will tell some stories from my own
classes, which I hope will provide a sense of why I say race is such a key
lens for the viewing and understanding of American law and why teaching from this perspective can make for exciting and useful times in class.
The main stories I want to tell involve my teaching of a seminar on
"Race and Gender in American Law" and a large class on "Discrimination and the Law." However, I also teach first-year Property and an
upper-division course called "Gratuitous Transfers" (covering wills,
trusts, and future interests), and both these courses deserve some mention in regard to race.
A.

Property Class and Gratuitous Transfers Class

Roots of Title in the New World
A number of basic property casebooks now include early attention
to Native American land claims.23 The case of Johnson and Graham's
Lessee v. M'Intosh,24 for example, is a fascinating vehicle for the introduction of notions of occupancy, possession, chains of title, the stark juxtaposition of positivist and natural law ideas of authority, and the
relationship between property and sovereignty. It also, however,
L

22. For those interested in such a description, the mosaic of resources is vast. I offer the
following without the least claim of comprehensive coverage. See, eg., DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980); VINCENT HARDING, THERE Is A RIVER: THE
BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978);
MAXINE H. KINGSTON, CHINA MEN 152-59 (1980) (chapter entitled "The Laws"); Anthony E.

Cook, Beyond CriticalLegal Studies" The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment

Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988);
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, CapitalPunishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and

Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as RacialHistory, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 425 (1990);
Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law:An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American
Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 713 (1986).
23. See, eg., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 94160 (1988) (section entitled "Native American Land Claims: Sovereignty, Cherokee Removal, and
CHARLES DONAHUE, JR., THOMAS E. KAUPER &

Modern Non-Intercourse Act Litigation");
PETER V. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS

ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT
AND THE INSTITUTION 30-42 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)); CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 3-32

(2d ed. 1985) (section entitled "Chain of Title: European Versus Native American").
24. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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reminds and informs us of the racial displacement and usurpation that
attended the arrival of European settlers and the birth of the nation. It is
for this latter lesson that I believe the case is most valuable and
irreplaceable.
In Johnson and Graham's Lessee the Court was asked to choose
between two groups of opposing white litigants. One side traced title
back to original grants from the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations; 25 the
other side claimed title to the same land through grants from the United
States. The latter claimants relied on a chain of title that started with
English "discoverers" and descended through an English crown grant to
colonists, the armed conquest of territory in the name of England by the
Virginia colony, the ceding of the Virginia territory "covered by Indians"
to the newly created United States, and ended with a grant from the
United States to the litigants' immediate predecessors in title.2 6
Justice Marshall decided that the titles received from the federal
government were superior to those received from the tribes. His Genesislike explanations of this result are riveting:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as they
could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample field to the
ambition and enterprise of all .... [I]t was necessary [for the European
powers] ... to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the

law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be
regulated as between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave
title .... 27

Marshall went on to explain:
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may
be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been successfully
asserted. The British government, which was then our government, and
whose rights have passed to the United States, asserted a title to all the
lands occupied by Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies.... These claims have been maintained and established as far west
as the river Mississippi, by the sword. The title to a vast portion of the
lands we now hold, originates in them. It is not for the Courts of this
country to question the validity of this title .... 8
25. Id. at 548-49.
26. Id. at 572-73.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 588-89. Justice Marshall's attitudes toward the history he recounts and interprets
are surely complex, though the impact of his judgment may have been brutally simple. In another
case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Cherokee Nation petitioned the
Court for an injunction restraining the State of Georgia from exercising authority over territory
secured to the Cherokee by treaties with the United States. Marshall reflected:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite
them can scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent,
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The centrality of racial issues to the resolution of this property issue was
recognized by the Chief Justice, who also remarked that the "character
and religion" of the Native Americans who lost their land "afforded an
apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius
of Europe might claim an ascendancy."2 9
2. Slavery
If the racially charged "discovery" and conquest from which so
many American land titles spring is one demonstration of the fact that
race is at the heart of American property law, then surely the institution
of slavery is another. Its legacy was visible in my Gratuitous Transfers
course in cases involving race discrimination in devises, bequests, and
inter vivos trusts. These examples illustrate the way that publicly sanc-

tioned private acts by decisionmakers who own and control wealth have
historically constructed and reinforced racial exclusions and inequali-

ties. 30 But slavery itself, not simply its legacy, should be part of the firstfound by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain,
gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their
lands by successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until
they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their
comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the present application is made.
Id. at 14. He denied the injunction. Id. at 20.
For further discussions on the law and its relationship to Native Americans, see generally
Milner S.Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, I AM. B. FOUND. REs. J.3 (1987) (exploring the
impact of constitutional law upon Native American tribes); Strickland, supra note 22 (arguing that
law has played a key role in the genocidal extermination of Native Americans as well as an
important role in Native Americans' struggle for survival); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative
Traditionsof FederalIndian Law, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 237 (1989) (discussing early nineteenth-century
Cherokee Nation's views of tribal sovereignty and arguing that modern public discourses seek to
confine tribalism).
29. Johnson and Graham'sLessee 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) at 573. The significance of the conquest
theory of title has not gone unremarked by law students. The Law Student Division of the American
Bar Association passed a "canon expanding" resolution in 1989 urging the Section on Legal
Education and Admissions to include as an interpretation to ABA accreditation standard 302(a)(1)
the following:
In keeping with the commitment of Standard 212 to providing full opportunities for
the study of law and entry into the profession by qualified members of groups that have
been victims of discrimination in various forms, each law school is encouraged in such
instruction to cover alternative perspectives on the history and development of the law that
may educate students about the doctrines by which European settlers acquired and
retained sovereignty over land in the New World.
Law Student Division, Report to the House of Delegates Law Student Division 105 (1989)
(American Bar Association No. 89-17). The report accompanying the resolution made clear that the
conquest theory of property acquisition is the primary legal doctrine contemplated by the law
students who drafted this measure. See id. at 106. The report pointed out that the conquest theory
had continuing vitality well into the nineteenth century and that it is relevant to an understanding of
international law today. Id. at 112. Whatever the obvious difficulties with having the ABA impose a
detailed list of theories to be covered by teachers in American law schools, the points raised by this
resolution are important ones.
30. See, eg., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (involving land conveyed in trust to city for
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year property course. A number of property teachers, both on their own
initiative and in response to student urging, have in fact begun to address
31
the question of slavery.
Following their lead, I have tried various ways of integrating the
subject into my property class. In my first attempt the topic functioned
more as a disconnected sermon than as an organic part of the whole.3z
use as a whites-only park); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (regarding restrictive covenant to
exclude blacks from owning or occupying property); Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v.
Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) (concerning clause
that provided land would automatically revert to grantor if nonwhites used land granted for park
purposes). There is another strange race theme in gratuitous transfers, at least for those teaching
and practicing in the South. It turns out that if you are researching property questions and
decedents' estates questions in Tennessee, for example, it is not at all uncommon to find yourself
smack in the middle of slavery cases. These precedents are currently cited on propositions involving,
say, treatment of realty versus personalty for purposes of descent and distribution or fraud on the
marital share.
31. Personal conversations with Professors Mary Ann Glendon, Duncan Kennedy, Lance
Leibman, and Frank Michelman of Harvard Law School (Spring 1988). Slavery-related readings
used or suggested to me by these property teachers included the following: Gorman v. Campbell, 14
Ga. 137 (1853) (hiring slave is contract of bailment and as a result hirer of slave liable to owner for
slave's death); Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) (narrow construction of the
fugitive slave law by Justice Shaw); State v. Jim, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 348 (1856) (owner of slave who
was on trial for capital felony was competent witness for slave despite owner's pecuniary interest in
slave's survival); State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 167 (1829) (person who has hired slave cannot be
liable to an indictment of battery on slave because right to inflict physical discipline is necessary
corollary of chattel slavery); Snee v. Trice, 1 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 345 (1802) (English law of master's
vicarious liability for acts of servants must be adapted when applied to master's liability for
misconduct of slaves); D. BELL, supra note 22, at 3-5 (section entitled "The Emancipation
Proclamation"), 8-9 (section entitled "Abolition of Slavery in Northern States"); ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1-6, 119-23, 131-32, 147-54
(1975); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 25-28, 3536, 45-49 (1974); HAROLD W. HORowrrz & KENNETH L. KARST, LAW, LAWYERS & SOCIAL
CHANGE 103-109 (sections entitled "The Emancipation Proclamation: Lawmaking by the
Executive" and "The Emancipation Proclamation") (1969); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 253-60 (1979); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE
PECULIAR INsTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 206-216 (1956) (general
description of slave codes); Robert J. Cottrol, Liberalism and Paternalism: Ideology, Economic
Interest andthe Business Law ofSlavery, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 359, 359-68 (1987); Andrew Fede,
Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619-1865: A Case Study of Law and Social
Change in Six Southern States, 29 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 93 (1985); Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow
Servants: Ideology, Law, and Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269 (1987); see also R.
CHUSED, supra note 23, at 161-251 (section entitled "Black Persons and Property Ownership"
covering slavery and the transition to freedom as well as housing segregation and racial property
restrictions); Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage:Slave Law andFamily Law, 5 LAW &
INEQUALITY 187 (1987) (discussing slave family life, laws denying slave marital rights, and the
current effects of those laws).
In addition, Donald Weidner of Florida State University has described an extensive segment on
slavery and its aftermath that he regularly incorporates into his first-year property class.
His
description was part of a workshop conducted on October 31, 1991, at a conference at ClevelandMarshall College of Law on "The Justice Mission of American Law Schools."
32. In that attempt I assigned the following: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539
(1842) (announcing the view that slavery enjoyed special constitutional status); DERRICK BELL,
AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 26-50 (1987) (relating "The
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In my second attempt I saved slavery as a culminating topic for the end
of the course. We had begun by examining "Property as a Cultural Institution," and the final class was entitled "Property as a Cultural Institution Revisited." In examining slavery and our society's tolerance of the
treatment of human beings as property, we reflected back on themes
encountered earlier in the course.33 Our discussion explored the values
and dangers of property regimes and whether our nation's past experiences with slavery and its abolition might guide us in making judgments
about the future of our present system of property. This approach
worked much better than the approach of the previous year but still left
much to be desired in the level of discussion we were able to reach. In
any case, I believe the first-year property course requires some encounter
with the institution of chattel slavery. 4 So I will keep trying.
The instances where race intersects the property syllabus are imporChronicle of the Constitutional Contradiction"); K. STAMPP, supra note 31 (selected excerpts); R.
CHUSED, supra note 23, at 185 (two cases from the slavery section). No small part of the sermonlike
quality of the lesson sprang from my worries about the psycho-racial dynamics of the classroom. See
infra text accompanying notes 125-40 (discussing the "underground classroom").
33. Slavery-related readings included excerpts from Abraham Lincoln, Preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862) (promising to recommend that loyal citizens be
compensated for the loss of slaves), reprintedin 5 THE COLLECTED WVoRKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN
433-36 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953); Abraham Lincoln, The Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863)
(omitting any mention of compensation), reprinted in 6 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 28-30 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953); U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (declaring in the often-omitted § 4 that "neither the United States nor any
State shall ... pay ... any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slaves"); D. BELL, supra note
32, at 26-50 (imagining a time traveler pleading with the framers to reject slavery); Eric Foner,
Rights and the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War andReconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIsT.
863, 871-72, 877-79 (1987) (discussing the claim by freedmen that they had a right to a share in the
land of their former masters); Juliet E.K. Walker, Whither Liberty, Equality or Legality? Slavery,
Race, Property and the 1787 American Constitution, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUm. RTs. 299 (1989)
(reconciling slavery with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution based on the
founders' vision that property preserves liberty); Comment, Another Look at Our FoundingFathers
and Their Product A Response to Justice ThurgoodMarshall,4 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB.
PoL'Y 73 (1989) (authored by Edward L. White III) (summarizing the slavery provisions of the
Constitution of 1787).
I added excerpts from the thought-provoking introduction and afterword of an anthology by
C.B. MacPherson. See PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1-13 (entitled "The
Meaning of Property"), 199-207 (entitled "Liberal-Democracy and Property") (C.B. MacPherson
ed. 1978). MacPherson suggested that a "good society" would be founded in important part upon
property rights but those rights would be recast not simply in terms of an "individual right to
exclude others from the use or benefit of something," id. at 205, but also "the right not to be
excluded from the use of those things (including society's productive powers) which are the
achievements of the whole society," id. at 206.
34. Race, of course, occurs in plenty of other property contexts besides those of Native
American land claims and slavery. Zoning and land-use planning are both racially charged areas.
Landlord-tenant law can be taught so that students learn about the ways race and movements for
racial justice have affected the development of modem property law. For a discussion of a particular
instance of these effects, see Edward H. Rabin, Symposium: The Revolution in ResidentialLandlordTenant Law: Causesand Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517 (1984), excerpted in R. CHUSED,
supra note 23, at 724-27; see also Muhammad I. Kenyatta, Critical Footnotes to Parker's
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tant but they are not the heart of my argument. 35 The reason I believe
law teachers might be able to reach consensus about the centrality of race
in American law has less to do with these instances than with the Constitution. Race is and should be recognized as central to the Constitution,
which is, of course, central to the law school curriculum. The remainder
of this Essay will therefore focus on my experiences teaching aspects of
constitutional law in a large-class course on discrimination law. 36
B. Discrimination Class
1. Background
My second fall in law teaching I agreed to teach a course called
"Discrimination and the Law." 37 When the first day of class arrived and
"ConstitutionalTheory," HARV. BLACKLETTER J., Spring 1985, at 49 (reminding scholars to accord
due credit to the impact of popular movements of people of color on constitutional law as well).
35. However, in my view race is a relevant topic for every law school course and eventually
should be thoroughly integrated into the "core" and "peripheral" parts of the curriculum. I leave
exploration of these matters for another day.
36. I will occasionally indulge in minor fictions when necessary to protect the identity of
individuals and will sometimes include (without special designation) relevant experiences from a
seminar on "Race and Gender in American Law" that I taught in the spring of 1989 and again in
1990.
37. As a new teacher still getting to know the student body, just beginning to glimpse the depth
of commitment required for adequate class preparation, and only starting to realize how potentially
debilitating the pressures of the tenure process can be, I was hesitant to do so. I questioned the
wisdom of jumping into a subject area that might put me at odds with many of my students and be
viewed as peripheral by my colleagues.
People of color and white women in legal scholarship have frequently voiced the concern that
their work will be taken less seriously, viewed as excessively narrow, or even received with hostility if
it focuses primarily on matters of race or gender. Sometimes this concern is self-imposed, sometimes
urged by well-intentioned, and perhaps well-informed, others. See, e.g., Richard Delgado,
Commentary: The ImperialScholar:Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 561, 561 (1984) (commenting that when he first began teaching law he was told "to 'play
things straight'.. . to establish a reputation as a scholar in some mainstream legal area and not get
too caught up in civil rights or other 'ethnic' subjects."); Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem"
Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991) (recounting that
when she first expressed interest in teaching a course on sex discrimination at Stanford her dean was
negative: "Not only was it a field he diplomatically described as 'mush,' but it would 'brand me as a
woman.'" Id. at 1733); Ensuring a Rainbow After the Storm: Recent Initiatives to Institutionalize
Pluralism on Predominantly White Campuses, HIGHER EDuc. EXTENSION SERVICE REV., Spring
1990, at 1, 5 [hereinafter Ensuring a Rainbow] (citing reports that the research of black faculty
members "often remained unaccepted and marginalized, in part because of the ethnic focus");
Gerald P. L6pez, Remarks at the Meeting of the Law & Humanities Section of Association of
American Law Schools (Jan. 1990) (tape on file with author) (criticizing and exploring the roots of
the common advice given to people of color not to "ghettoize" themselves by writing about race);
Testimony of Emma Coleman Jordan, AM. A. L. ScHooLs NEWSLETrER, Summer 1988, at 3J (on
file with author) (speech on behalf of the Society of American Law Teachers) ("[flor many women
and minority scholars, the standard advice of tenure committees is to avoid race- or genderdiscrimination law"). But see Stephen R. Barnett, Get Back, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 24
(reporting that academics of color are being typecast by their ethnic backgrounds and are
experiencing pressure to do color-conscious scholarship).
On the other hand, given my own values and commitments, I was no less disturbed at the
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I looked at the sixty-plus students arrayed in their rising ranks before me,
I was apprehensive. I knew I did not want to teach this class as a
straight doctrinal course. The subject matter and the times seemed to
call for another approach.
If the course would be different from my other large classes, it
would also be different from the seminar on Race and Gender I had
taught the semester before. The level of trust, resulting candor, and subtlety that a group of twelve can establish is radically different from that
achievable by a group of sixty-five. And the ratio of African-American
to white students in a large class, unlike in a seminar, had no chance of
reaching a level different than the overwhelmingly white character of
most classrooms at our institution given the racial composition of our
student body as a whole.3"
prospect of conscious avoidance. To the credit of my school's administrators, they insisted that my
fears that this choice of subject matter might result in a devaluation of my work were unworthy both
of me and of the institution.
38. The only substantial group of students of color at my law school, as at many law schools in
the Southeast, is black. Over the years, the number of Latino, Asian-American, and Native
American students we have enrolled is small to nonexistent. Approximately 8% of our student body
is African-American; approximately 17% percent of Tennesseeans are African-American. One
semester when I was teaching my "Race and Gender" seminar with a group of students that
paralleled the school's racial composition, I asked students to recall a time or event or setting in their
lives when they had felt themselves to be in a racial minority. Several white students literally had no
such minority experience and none reported such an experience in an educational institution.
By happenstance, the first time I taught this seminar, however, the group contained a bare
majority of whites. Interestingly, this demographic fact led most of the white participants to feel as
if they were outnumbered. Many reported their impression that the class was in some significant
way a black environment, despite all the obvious ways in which that was clearly not the case. (We
were, after all, a small class situated in a predominantly white institution, conceived, taught and
graded by a white professor, in which the majority of participants were white.) I believe that this
racial context made for a significant learning experience for white students and dramatically altered
both the tone of discussions and the level of sophistication with which we approached certain
racially charged topics.
Obviously there is more to this dynamic than a mere head count. The teacher, the subject, the
readings, the entire context, play a role. Nevertheless, the observation that a black-dominated
learning environment (or a less overwhelmingly white-dominated one) can be good for students of
both races strikes me as important and worth the attention of teachers interested in truly pluralistic
educational experiences for students who will be functioning in an increasingly multicultural and
multiracial environment.
Inconclusive but provocative evidence about the advantages for black students of a blackdominated learning environment further underscores these points and suggests further action. See,
eg., JACQUELINE FLEMING, BLACKS IN COLLEGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STUDENTS'

SUCCESS IN BLACK AND IN WHITE INSTITUTIONS (1984) (empirical evidence suggests that black
students at black-dominated colleges show more progress than their counterparts at white colleges);
cf. Joan Morgan, Retention at Black Colleges Notable-According to the Figures, BLACK ISSUES
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 1, 1990, at 22 (evidence suggests that black colleges are more successful than
white colleges in retaining black students until they graduate). An African-American colleague of
mine in the English Department at my university once remarked, "You know, whenever black
enrollment in my courses reaches the 50% mark, my black students 'suddenly become' brilliant.
They become brilliant." On the importance of providing students of color in predominantly white
institutions with safe spaces and a process for mutual analysis, debriefing, and support, see Charles
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The First Class

So it was with both excitement and apprehension that I stepped to
the front of the room, picked up a piece of chalk, and drew a large circle
on the blackboard. "This is all the people in the world," I said.39 I then
drew a line down the middle of the circle. "This," I said, pointing to one
of the halves, "is all the men in the world."
And so I continued, demarcating narrower and narrower wedges in
the circle, explaining that one was all the white men in the world, the
next was all the white men in the industrialized world, the next and last
(by now tiny) wedge was all the white, affluent, well-educated men in the
industrialized world.' I remarked that for most of us, the world of that
narrow sliver dominated much or most of our experience and our intellectual attention. Even those of us in the room who were not white, and/
or male, and/or from affluent, well-educated backgrounds had certainly
been devoting much of ourselves to studying a world of concepts and
discourse developed almost exclusively by white, western, affluent, educated men.
My comments continued in the following vein: "Obviously, when
we look at things this way, we can see that much of our ordinary focus is
terribly narrow. But that's not the worst of it. You see, this little wedge
somehow gets itself up not just as one more wedge in a circle of varying
wedges but as the center." I erased the wedges and redrew our diagram
as a small central circle at the middle of the larger one.
After a few words about the center and the margin, about the inesLawrence, Reclaiming the Slave Scrolls: The Liberationist Teacher as Healer (Nov. 1990)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
For an argument that white students may be liberated from a sense of racial superiority by
attending a predominantly black college or university, see Charles V. Willie, Black Colleges Should
Recruitand Admit More White Students, Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 13, 1991, at A48, col. I. For a
response to this argument, see Letter to the Editor from William A.T. Byrd, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Apr. 10, 1991, at B4, col. 1 (arguing that it is the responsibility of predominantly white colleges to
develop their own programs to change the mind-set of their students).
39. The idea for this beginning came straight from Patricia A. Cain's article, Teaching
Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 165, 168 (1988). The article gave me the courage to try a number of things I would never
otherwise have dreamed of. Further, it convinced me of the importance of teachers modeling for
each other and communicating with each other in concrete detail about pedagogy and was one of the
inspirations for this Essay.
40. There was obviously a politics to this circle. By choosing categories of gender, race, and
class, I suppressed others, creating tacit alliances and divisions. This system allowed me to move
sequentially from larger to smaller slices, which has a certain logic and appeal. Afterward I noticed,
however, that by beginning with gender, I placed myself (an educated, white, Christian, thin,
heterosexual, presently abled U.S. citizen with a comfortable income) in the category of tacitly
oppressed or subordinated at thefirst cut, and therefore from then on. How convenient.
The categories are provisional, not essential, as I tried to make clear in the course and as I want
to make clear here. Other categories of difference (such as nationality, religion, sexual orientation,
geographic region, ethnicity, physical or mental disability, language, accent), as well as other
orderings of categories, might well be salient and could be pedagogically invaluable.
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capable fact that one's position in this circle conditions one's view of the
world,4 1 about the false sense of universality that can so easily come to
those in the center, I read aloud from a book by Bell Hooks, a black
feminist theorist:
To be in the margin is to be part of the whole but outside the main
body. As black Americans living in a small Kentucky town, the railroad
tracks were a daily reminder of our marginality. Across those tracks
were paved streets, stores we could not enter, restaurants we could not
eat in, and people we could not look directly in the face. Across those
tracks was a world we could work in as maids, as janitors, as prostitutes,
as long as it was in a service capacity. We could enter that world but we
could not live there. We had always to return to the margin, to cross the
tracks, to shacks and abandoned houses on the edge of town.
There were laws to ensure our return. To not return was to risk
being punished. Living as we did-on the edge-we developed a particular way of seeing reality. We looked both from the outside in and...
from the inside out. We focused our attention on the center as well as on
the margin. We understood both. This mode of seeing reminded us of
the existence of a whole universe, a main body made up of both margin
and center. Our survival depended on an ongoing public awareness of
the separation between margin and center and an ongoing private
acknowledgment that we were a necessary, vital part of that whole.
This sense of wholeness, impressed upon our consciousness by the
structure of our daily lives, provided us an oppositional world view-a
mode of seeing unknown to most of our oppressors, that sustained us,
aided us in our struggle to transcend42 poverty and despair, strengthened
our sense of self and our solidarity.

I explained that one of the goals of our course would be for us to
think about, listen for, and pay attention to the margin. We would strain
to hear voices (including at times our own voices) from the edge. We, I
said, would try to recognize and act upon the paradox that those in the
center are in some important ways the most ignorant and parochial.
Those at the center typically lack the knowledge, the experience, and the
41. See ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 353, 385-89 (1983)
(chapter entitled "Feminist Politics and Epistemology: Justifying Feminist Theory"); Kimberl6
Crenshaw, supra note 18; Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 15; Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987).
42. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER ix (1984) (suggesting that
feminists must look to the experiences of women at the margin). For more views from the margin,
see ROBERT M. BROWN, UNEXPECTED NEWS: READING THE BIBLE WITH THIRD WORLD EYES
(1984) (suggesting that through rereadings of the Bible from the perspective of Christians in the
Third World, Christians from the developed world "may get a new understanding of what the
biblical message says to us," id. at 14); Jamaica Kincaid, On Seeing Englandfor the First Time,
HARPER'S, Aug. 1991, at 13 (describing England from the point of view of a child growing up in
Antigua).
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dual consciousness Bell Hooks had described.4 3 They, and we, and the
law, I said, were in need of insights from the margin. Those of us in the
class would be in differing positions with regard to our ability to gain or
share those insights, but all of us could learn, and all of us could learn
from each other.
I invited class members to think about the ways they themselves
might be positioned in the circle, whether the circle represented their
hometown, legal education, the courtroom, or western civilization. I
asked them to consider the ways their position(s) might advantage or
disadvantage them in their perception of reality and in their ability to
communicate to different audiences.' As an illustration of differences in
43. The concept of dual consciousness was explored early from a black male perspective by
W.E.B. Du Bois in The Souls ofBlack Folk first published in 1903:
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some
through feelings of delicacy; by others through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All,
nevertheless, flutter round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me
curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly, How does it feel to be a
problem? they say, I know an excellent colored man in my town; or, I fought at
Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I
smile, or am interested, or reduce the boiling to a simmer, as the occasion may require. To
the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word.
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience,--peculiar even for one who has
never been anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe....
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this
American world,-a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him
see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others,
of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.
One ever feels his two-ness,-an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone
keeps it from being torn asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife,--this longing to attain
self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this
merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America,
for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro
soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the
world.
W.E.B. Du Bois, Of Our Spiritual Strivings, in THE SouLs oF BLACK FOLK 1-4 (1953).
Scholars of color continue to explore the pain and strength that accompany this dual
consciousness. Charles Lawrence, in listing and describing the special gifts he believes to be part of
the African-American heritage, included "the gift of second sight, embracing duality." Charles
Lawrence, Remarks at the Meeting of the Law & Humanities Section of Association of American
Law Schools (Jan. 1990) (tape on file with author.) Professor Mari Matsuda recently observed,
The multiple consciousness I urge lawyers to attain is not a random ability to see all points
of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed. That
world is accessible to all of us.... We can choose to know the lives of others by reading,
studying, listening, and venturing into different places. For lawyers, our pro bono work
may be the most effective means of acquiring a broader consciousness of oppression.
...Holding on to a multiple consciousness will allow us to operate both within the
abstractions of standard jurisprudential discourse, and within the details of our own special
knowledge.
Matsuda, supra note 18, at 9 (emphasis in original).
44. None of my talk about privileging the margin should be read as ignoring the importance of

1991]

RACE IN LEGAL EDUCATION

1531

perspective from different points of the circle, I shared a story from my
years in law practice.
My colleagues and I were representing the surviving husband and
children of a black woman who had died at home of a heart attack
shortly after being sent away from the local emergency room with the
word that she was merely suffering indigestion. As we prepared for trial,
it became my task to work on the issue of damages, a task that can be
strangely moving in a wrongful death suit.
The job in such a case is to prepare to show the jury the deceased
person as a whole, vivid, and sorely missed personality, to find people
who loved, respected, or admired her, and get them to help tell her story.
Prospective witnesses in such cases often have been needing an opportunity to speak, to reflect, to weave a memorial, to find meaning, to mourn,
and to rage.
The decedent in this case-I will call her Lucille-had been, from
what I could tell, a tough, warm, funny woman. She worked one job at a
nearby factory as an assembler of machine parts and for most of her
adult life had also worked second, third, and fourth jobs as a domestic in
various people's homes.
My colleagues and I spoke at length with her husband-I will call
him Sam-to identify her domestic employers, searching for the one that
could give us the strongest testimony about Lucille. We needed to show
her wage-earning capacity, of course, and we also wanted to provide a
glimpse of Lucille's personality: her strength, dependability, and sense of
humor. In addition we thought a regular employer would be an effective
and credible person to corroborate a few questions about Lucille's health
because her serious diabetes was a risk factor that was an issue in the
liability phase of the lawsuit.
We settled on the woman who had employed Lucille the longesttwenty-two years. This woman-Evelyn, I will call her, although she
was, of course, "Mrs." to Lucille and Sam and to our law firm as wellhad always given Lucille glowing recommendations. She was the wife of
a prominent local businessman, which might well be a plus for us with a
small-town jury. Lucille had helped Evelyn raise her children. Sam
plied us with details about this family, its circumstances, its usual weekly
schedule, the present whereabouts of the children, the fortunes of the
husband.
I reached Evelyn by telephone, explained my errand, and arranged a
visit. Later that week I drove up a long white drive to a serene dove-grey
home with a screened back porch profuse with ferns and flowering
plants. Our conversation began warmly enough. Evelyn did think very
helping all students to become adept at wielding the "tools of the center." Those skills can be
empowering and should be shared.
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highly of Lucille. Yes, she was a hard worker, exceptionally dependable
and mature in her judgment, and besides that, really like a good friend.
Evelyn would leave her children with Lucille, even overnight or longer,
without the slightest hesitation. In fact she had often remarked to her
husband that Lucille might as well be a white person.
I did not flinch, but continued with my questions.4 5 In a minute,
however, we hit a snag. No, Evelyn would not be able to testify about
Lucille's multiple jobs. She was unaware that Lucille had other regular
jobs, though she knew Lucille occasionally worked for other ladies in
town. And no, she could not tell me anything significant about Lucille's
health, really, she had always seemed just fine. Evelyn was surprised to
learn of the diabetes. No, she was unaware that Lucille had carried insulin with her for the past eight years and had given herself daily injections.
Lucille had come into this woman's home several times a week, had
performed for her the most intimate tasks imaginable, and yet many of
Lucille's most basic life circumstances were as though they were nonexistent for her.4 6 As it turned out, these blank spots in Evelyn's knowledge
of Lucille made no difference anyway because Evelyn had to tell me she
would be unable to testify. She was not used to speaking in public and
her health was poor, she said. She did not know if her husband would
allow her to testify in any event because of the emotional strain of
appearing in court.
Evelyn had stuck with me, I told the class, as a reminder of the
difference in what the powerful and the powerless know of and about
each other. Sometimes the knowledge differential is a matter of psychology, sociology, or economics as in the case of Lucille and Evelyn. But
sometimes it is actually a matter of law.
To talk about ways that law in particular can work to shape our
knowledge and ignorance of each other and of important events, we
looked at one final illustration, the case of Blyew v. United States.47 I
began by explaining that the Blyew case arose in Kentucky soon after the
end of the Civil War. I noted that we would be examining the Civil War
and its aftermath in much greater detail as we proceeded through the
course but that for now the students should be aware of a few simple
45. Although I am not going to address the subject of silence in the face of racist statements, it
is a topic worth serious examination. See Patricia Williams, The ObligingShell: An Informal Essay
on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2148-51 (1989) (black female author's
pondering of her own silence when she overheard anti-Semitic remarks in conversation of store
clerks).
46. Please understand I am certain Lucille valued her privacy, and I am not suggesting here
that the main problem involved in racial subordination (or in domestic service) is a lack of fully
reciprocal intimacy. On the relationship between white female employers and black female domestic
servants, see generally JUDITH ROLLINs, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AND THEIR EMPLOYERS

(1985).
47.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
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facts. They needed to know that shortly after the end of the war, Congress passed, and the states ratified, the thirteenth amendment, which
abolished slavery, and that Congress had gone on to enact the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,48 which had as its primary purpose the protection of
certain rights of citizenship for the recently freed slaves in the former
slaveholding states. I explained that a central feature of the statute was
its grant of federal court jurisdiction over "all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights
secured to them [earlier in the act]."'49 Those "rights secured" included
rights traditionally protected by the common law such as the right "to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to...
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." 5
I went on to explain to the students that Blyew was a criminal prosecution brought in a federal court in Kentucky pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Then I let the justices of the Supreme Court give
them the facts of the case. First, from Justice Strong for the majority,
the class heard:
[The defendants] were indicted ... for the murder ... of a colored
woman named Lucy Armstrong .... [Ain averment was made in the first
count that the said Lucy Armstrong was a citizen of the United States,
having been born therein, and not subject to any foreign power; that
Blyew and Kennard (the persons indicted) were white persons, each of
them at the time of the alleged killing and murder above the age of eighteen years; that the said killing and murder, done and committed, as
averred, were seen and witnessed by one Richard Foster, and one Laura
Foster, citizens of the United States, having been born therein and not
subject to any foreign power,... both of the African race; and that the
said Lucy Armstrong, Richard Foster, and Laura Foster were then and
there denied the right to testify against the said Blyew and Kennard, or
either of them, concerning the said killing and murder, in the courts and
judicial tribunals of the State of Kentucky, solely on account of their race
and color.51
The facts related by the majority are a little tantalizing and mysterious. So we went on to Justice Bradley's dissent, our view opening to
include more pieces of information:
The evidence in the case demonstrated the fact that the defendants went
to the cabin of Jack Foster, a colored man, in the evening, and, after
sitting a while, coolly proceeded to kill the family, and succeeded in kill48.
49.
50.
51.

The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
Id. ch. 31, § 3 (emphasis added).
Id. ch. 31, § 1 (emphasis added).
Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 583.
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ing Lucy Armstrong, a blind woman over ninety years old, Foster's
mother-in-law; also Jack Foster and his wife and their son Richard; two
of the children escaped and were witnesses in the cause. One of the
defendants was heard to say to the other, a short time previous to the

occurrence, that he thought there would soon be another war about the
niggers; that when it did come he intended to go to killing niggers; and he

was not sure that he would not begin
his work of killing them before the
52
war should actually commence.

There was uneasy silence in the room. I have read these particular
passages aloud now to several different groups. Each time I find myself
seized by a combination of elation and terror. This is powerful material,
such harsh truth about racism here on the page, intruding itself where we
do not expect it. It may even be dangerous.5 3 Nevertheless, as I had
done before, I kept on, daring to hope that something worthwhile would
result. At this point in the dialogue my listeners still did not know the
holding of the case, and it is the holding that has so much to teach us
about racism and the law.
Before discussing the Court's holding and examining what it had
decided to do about this searing and partial news from the margin, however, I first had to explain the mystery of why two eyewitnesses could not
testify to a murder. So I described the pervasive antebellum rule in slaveholding states that a black person could not offer testimony in a legal
proceeding against a white person, a rule evidently still alive in postwar
54
Kentucky.
52. Blyew v. United States, 20 L. Ed. 638, 642 (1872). In the official reporter this information
is reworded and presented as part of the statement of facts. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 581, 584-85 (1872).
53. Each time I, a well-paid white women, get up and flaunt this hurtful language I wonder
what kinds of wounds are reopened or inflicted by this talk of killing niggers. See, e.g., Mar J.
Matsuda, PublicResponse to Racist Speeck Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2320,
2327 n.41, 2329 & n.49 (1989) (when discussing hate speech, author refrains from even spelling
racial slurs, using instead "n-r"
and "J-p" to avoid harm to others and to "prevent
desensitization to harmful words"). Are these passages vulnerable to sensationalism? In reading
them, what kinds of messages do I send about what racism really is?
54. See Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variationson a JurisdictionalTheme, 41 STAN. L. REV.
469, 483-84 (1989). Apparently the particular evidentiary statute in effect in Kentucky at the time of
Blyew was actually passed by the Kentucky legislature after the war, in 1865. See id. at 483. A
federal district court in Kentucky had ruled that the state statute was overridden by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 but the Kentucky Supreme Court had ruled the opposite and declared the federal statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 484. Thus at the time of the Blyew prosecution, the issue stood contested,
and the U.S. Attorney would have known that the testimony of Richard and Laura would be
excluded in Kentucky state court by virtue of a relatively recent statute and despite passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id.
The effect of this postwar Kentucky law was much like that of the Black Codes of several states,
which had provisions so oppressive to black people, so grudging in their definition of freedom, that
they are widely credited with creating the impetus for the fourteenth amendment and the end of
Andrew Johnson's deferential "Presidential Reconstruction." See RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877, at
41-42 (Robert W. Johannsen ed. 1970) (quoting the amazing remarks of Benjamin Humphreys, then
Governor of Mississippi, suggesting the legal strategy the southern states should devise for handling
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I then asked the class what they would have done had they been
federal prosecutors wishing to bring these murderers to justice, faced
with a Kentucky statute that would exclude Richard's dying declaration
and Laura's eyewitness testimony from a state court trial. All were
agreed that they would use the 1866 statute to bring the case in federal
court. It looked like a perfect fit. And that is, of course, exactly what the
prosecutor did in Blyew.
Then I informed them of the holding. The Supreme Court of the
United States held in Blyew that the indictment against the accused murderers should be dismissed because the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not
grant jurisdiction to the federal courts in such a case. 5 I asked them to
imagine, based on what I had already told them, what explanation the
Court could possibly have offered for its denial of jurisdiction under circumstances such as those before it.
After some discussion, the class teased out the Court's rationale:
the federal court lacked jurisdiction because this case was not one
"affecting persons who are.., denied.., in the courts.., of the State
'56 Certainly "the
... any of the rights secured to them by [this act]."
rights secured" explicitly included the right to give evidence and the
right to equal benefit of laws protecting personal security. 7 The problem
was rather that there were no persons affected within the meaning of the
statute.5" The "parties" to the case were, after all, only the government
and the alleged murderers! None of those parties claimed to have been
denied any rights. Perhaps Lucy and her grandchildren had rights at
stake in some sense, but this case, this prosecution, could not be one
"affecting" Lucy Armstrong because she was dead. And Laura and
Richard Foster were similarly unaffected in the eyes of the Court because
they were merely witnesses.5 9
the newly freed blacks). For a recent resource on these and other features of the Reconstruction era,
see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988).

For insight into the intense, often shameful politics of Reconstruction historiography, see Randall
Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521 (1989).
55. Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 591-93.
56. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
57. See supra text accompanying note 50.
58. Blyew, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 591-93.
59. "Those who may possibly be witnesses, either for the prosecution or for the defence, are no
more affected by it than is every other person, for any one may be called as a witness." Id. at 591-92.
A federal district court in Kentucky had already considered this argument and rejected it in United
States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151). The court remarked that "it is by
no means true, as a universal proposition, that none are affected in the legal sense of the term, by a
case, but those who are parties to the record. The solution of the question must always depend upon
the circumstances." Id. at 787.
Goldstein, in his article on Blyew, decried the fact that it "has never been part of the established
canon of civil rights texts" and traced its historical treatment by legal scholars. Goldstein, supra
note 54, at 475 & n.25. (This talk of a canon is, of course, gratifyingly germane in the present
context.) He deplored Blyew's relative obscurity and argued that the case represented an important
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The enormity and elegance of this logic seemed to take a while to
sink in. The Supreme Court was declaring itself powerless, despite the
existence of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, to require that Laura and
Richard Foster's voices be heard against the men who murdered their
parents and grandmother before their very eyes, powerless to order that
they were entitled to tell their story before the seats of justice. We spoke

again of the metaphor of margin and center. We spoke once more about
silencing and exclusion. The resonance of the metaphor with the experiences of Laura and Richard Foster was unmistakable.
After we paused a moment, I announced that part of what we would
be about in the course was working together on the Lucy Armstrong
Memorial Project. The aim of this project would be the telling of Lucy
Armstrong's story, the opening up of the arena of American legal discourse to the witness of Laura and Richard and others like them, and a
conscious effort to locate and listen to the narratives of those who, like
Lucy's grandchildren, like Lucy herself, have too often been silenced and
excluded by the rules, procedures, and assumptions under which the

nation has attempted to do justice. 6°
milestone in post-Civil War jurisprudence. Id. at 475. Though it was decided a year earlier, he
believes it should be viewed as a companion case to the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873). Goldstein, supra note 54, at 475 n.25. I found Blyew myself in the brief historical section
introducing Theodore Eisenberg's casebook, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
12-18 (3d ed. 1991), only discovering Goldstein's well-researched and provocative article after I had
taught the class. I agree with that author's estimation of the importance of the case.
60. This conception of the Lucy Armstrong project was greatly influenced by others exploring
the narrative mode. See, eg., Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
Robin West has cast the feminist project as a call to "tell true stories of women's lives." Robin
West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 64 (1988). She urged women to "flood the
market with our own stories until we get one simple point across: men's narrative story and
phenomenological description of law is not women's story and phenomenology of law." Id. at 65;
see also Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League at 5-11, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-495, -1379) (quoting
letters from women about their own and others' decisions to have abortions); cf DAVID C.
REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE (1987) (containing narratives from women who
oppose abortion).
In addition to, and overlapping with, the feminist call for stories, several scholars of color have
both advocated and used narrative in various contexts. See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others"A Pleafor Narrative 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). Arguing that legal
scholars should listen to voices "from the bottom," Mari Matsuda featured personal remembrances
of Japanese-American internment victims in an article theorizing about reparations. See Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom, supra note 15.
Charles Lawrence and Patricia Williams have been telling their own stories in different ways
and with great power. See, e-g., Lawrence, supra note 7 (beginning analysis of doctrine of
discriminatory intent with a story); Pat Williams, On Being Invisible, 4 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 16
(1987); Williams, supra note 45; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murderingthe Messenger The Discourseof
Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987); Patricia J.
Williams, On Being the Object ofProperty, 14 SIGNS 5 (1988). Michael Olivas used his grandfather's
stories to reflect on a chronicle by Derrick Bell and to frame his own thoughts on race and law in
United States history. See Olivas, supra note 22.
Derrick Bell has turned to fable and allegory as tools of persuasion. Further, he has opened up
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Many things happened after that first class: ruptures and connections, highs and lows, clarities and confusions, instances of bravery and
instances of cowardice from the instructor and from others in the class.
But the metaphor of margin and center, the image of the chalk circle (a
drawing I had thought about but had not decided for certain I would

even execute until I found myself at the board that morning), stayed with
us throughout the course. It cropped up repeatedly in student papers, in
class discussions, and on the final examination. I think the metaphor,
though filled with ambiguity like most good metaphors, is a powerful

one.
3.

Course Structure

That first class was designed to begin a course on race and gender
"discrimination," 6 1 hardly a part of the law school core curriculum.
What it ushered in, however, was a series of texts and questions that I
will argue are clearly relevant, often central, to the overall teaching effort
in American law schools.
The course was organized into two broad sections. First, we took an
extended look at the legal history of race and then of gender in America.
tales of his own professional life in a continuing effort to persuade fellow academics of the reality and
urgency of racial problems in the academy and in society. See, eg., Derrick Bell, Xerces and the
Affirmative Action Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH.L. REv. 1595 (1989); Derrick Bell, Racism: A Prophecy
for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93 (1989). For examples of Bell's willingness to offer up his
own vocational struggles as fables of a different sort, see Derrick Bell, The Final Report: Harvard's
Affirmative Action Allegory, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2382 (1989); Derrick Bell, The Price and Pain of
Racial Perspective, STAN. L. ScH. J., May 9, 1986, at 5 (describing an incident at Stanford also
discussed at length in Roy L. Brooks, Anti-Minority Mindset in the Law School PersonnelProcess:
Toward an UnderstandingofRacialMindsets, 5 LAW & INEQUALITY 1 (1987)). Bell's storytelling
has prompted both criticism (see, eg., Lino A. Graglia, Book Review, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 436,
437 (1988) ("Bell's book, [And We Are Not Saved,] is a whining litany of arrant and pernicious
nonsense written in childish prose")) and emulation (see Robin D. Barnes, An Extra-Terrestrial
Trade Proposition Brings an End to the World As We Know It, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 413 (1990);
Michael A. Middleton, After we're Gone?: A Commentary, 34 ST. Louis U.L.J. 443 (1990)).
61. I place this word in quotation marks because its meaning is so profoundly contested at this
point that I would probably not have chosen it as the name of the course had it not already been
chosen for me. Some authors have identified antidiscrimination with a color-blind, individualistic,
opportunity-focused value; they contrast it with a color-conscious, group-oriented, results-oriented
value. Thus, Randall Kennedy counterposed antidiscrimination with antisubjugation. Randall
Kennedy, Persuasionand Distrust:A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1327, 1336 (1986).
Ruth Colker, on the other hand, described a similar polarity but abstained from using the word
"discrimination" at all. Instead, she dubbed the two poles as "anti-differentiation" and "antisubordination." Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv.1003, 1006-07 (1986).
Two writers have recently insisted that the word (like the whole of "antidiscrimination" law)
contains and should continue to contain both meanings: discrimination as differentiation and
discrimination as subordination. See Crenshaw, supra note 22, at 1341-46; D. Marvin Jones,
UnrightableWrongs: The Rehnquist Court,Civil Rights, andan Elegy for Dreams, 25 U.S.F. L. REv.
1, 2-3 (1990).
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Next, we examined employment discrimination law (a particular area of
contemporary legal doctrine that concerns both race and gender) as a
kind of doctrinal case study. We concluded with a look at the present
and some speculations about the future.
The fact that I was teaching this course in the fall of 1989 made the
subjects of "race and gender in the present" especially loaded ones. That
year the Supreme Court had released a volley of cases that shook the
then-existing structure of employment discrimination law to its foundations6 2 and had hinted that Roe v. Wade might be overruled or seriously
weakened within the next few terms.63
I will not argue that extended treatment of employment discrimination is at some easily agreed-upon core of a broad legal liberal arts education. It is in the area of history, and especially constitutional history, 64
that I believe legal educators should be able to reach consensus about the
centrality of race to our discipline. The remainder of my reflections on
62. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (interpreting the statute of
limitations to make it more difficult for women to challenge even an intentionally discriminatory
seniority scheme); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing white fire fighters to challenge a
consent decree imposing an affirmative action plan long after it was originally entered); Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (excluding posthiring racial harassment from harms
remediable under § 1981 and treating as highly contestable the statute's ability to reach private
discrimination); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (redefining the nature of a
disparate-impact case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it much more difficult
for plaintiffs to prove sex or race discrimination in the absence of evidence of discriminatory intent).
All of these employment cases were decided in the shadow of the earlier City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action and striking
down a municipal minority set-aside program). The implications of Croson for employment law, like
the larger implications of many of the above cases, are still unclear. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding a minority preference in federal broadcast licenses). The
literature on the 1989 spate of cases is voluminous, deeply divided, and still emerging. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Cooper, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio: A Step Toward Eliminating Quotas In the
American Workplace, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 84 (1991) (arguing that the plaintiff's higher
burden of proof established in Wards Cove relieves in salutary fashion the pressures on employers to
use racial quotas); Alan Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. Rav.
1407 (1990) (examining evolution of antidiscrimination law since 1954 and exploring its
contradictory character); Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64
TUL. L. REv. 1515 (1990) (arguing that the 1989 Supreme Court decisions help effectively disallow
legal redress of inequalities); Randall L. Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Racial
Discrimination" A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93 (1991)
(examining Patterson in light of Cooper's article, supra, and arguing that the disparate-impact
approach is better because it reaches other forms of conduct affecting race relations besides
intentional discrimination).
63. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding statutory ban
on public assistance of nontherapeutic abortions).
64. For a literary look at ways in which the Constitution is to American law what the canon is
to the literary tradition, see Michael T. Gilmore, The Constitution and the Canon, 29 Wm.& MARY
L. REV.35 (1987). If you accept that analogy and will grant the Constitution canonical primacy in
the American legal world, then you might say that this Essay is designed to convince you of the
paradoxical point that the marginalized are already at the core of our law, awaiting our recognition.
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the discrimination course will therefore focus on race and the Constitu-

tion, broadly considered.
4. Race and the Constitution

It hardly needs saying that the Constitution represents contested
and bloody ground. There are sharply conflicting narratives about many
facets of this document and specifically about its relationship to race.
Law students ought to be familiar with these competing narratives. The
celebration of the Constitution's bicentennial brought on a great flowering of scholarship and commentary about race and the Constitution and
sharply focused some of the competing narratives.6 5 No doubt scholars
of differing persuasions would have raised the race question during the
bicentennial in any event,66 but a highly publicized speech by Justice
Thurgood Marshall6 7 underscored the question in such a dramatic fashion that it provoked additional contributions and responses. Justice
Marshall's primary point was that he could not join unreservedly in the
celebratory mood of the bicentennial:
The focus of this celebration invites a complacent belief that the vision of
those who debated and compromised in Philadelphia yielded the "more
perfect Union" it is said we now enjoy.
I cannot accept this invitation, for I do not believe that the meaning
65. See, e.g., SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE CONSTITUTION, EQUALITY, AND RACE
(Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds. 1988) [hereinafter SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES]
(part of series entitled "A Decade of the Study of the Constitution"); Ellen C. DuBois, Outgrowing
the Compact of the Fathers Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution,
1820-1878, 74 J. Am. HIST. 836 (1987); Foner, supra note 33; Vincent G. Harding, Wrestling
Toward the Dawn: The Afro-American Freedom Movement and the ChangingConstitution, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 718 (1987) (symposium entitled "The Constitution and American Life"); We the People: A
Celebration of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 30 How. L.J. 915 (1987)
(symposium issue); Nathaniel R. Jones, Remarks on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, 5
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 12 (1988) (symposium issue); Symposium: The Constitution and Race A
CriticalPerspective, 5 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. Rrs. 229 (1988) (reprinting papers from conference on
Race and the Constitution held by National Conference of Black Lawyers); Mark Tushnet, The
Politicsof Equality in ConstitutionalLaw: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois; and Charles
Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 884 (1987); Walker, supra note 33.
66. See Harry N. Scheiber, Introduction: The Bicentennial and the Rediscovery of
ConstitutionalHistory, 74 J. Am. HisT. 667, 673 (1987) (introduction of symposium issue devoted to
the Constitution); see also Steve Chapman, A View of the United States Constitution from Urban
American Indians, 10 HAMLiNE L. REV. 87 (1987) (bicentennial is not a cause for celebration for
most Native Americans because most did not receive citizenship rights until 137 years after signing
of the Constitution); Gerald P. L6pez, The Idea of a Constitution in the Chicano Tradition, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1987) (from the perspective of Chicanos, "the Constitution... heralded the
tradition of those with whom [Chicanos] regularly fought," id. at 163).
67. The precise event was the Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and Trademark
Law Association in Maui, Hawaii, on May 6, 1987. For two among many reprints of Marshall's
speech, see Thurgood Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennialof the United States
Constitution, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial];
Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution:A Living Document, 30 How. L.J. 915 (1987) (symposium
issue celebrating bicentennial).
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of the Constitution was forever "fixed" at the Philadelphia Convention.
Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense ofjustice exhibited by the
framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they
devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a

civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual
freedoms
68
and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.

Those in sympathy with Justice Marshall's sentiments rejoiced at his
ringing words.69 Critics, on the other hand, accused Marshall of "blam-

ing" the founders for "act[ing] immorally," 70 of having made a "virulent" attack on the framers.7 1 One author argued that Marshall had
"bewilderingly given Dred Scott new life" by accepting the Court's representation of the framers' beliefs and instructed the justice to "give up the
effort to revive this foul-smelling corpse."72 The Washington Legal
Foundation called for Marshall's resignation because his remarks dis68. Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial, supra note 67, at 1-2. Marshall's speech called
forth echoes of a similar occasion. In his famous 1852 Independence Day speech, Frederick
Douglass proclaimed, "This Fourth of July is yours, not mine You may rejoice, I must mourn."
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Meaning of July Fourthfor the Negro, in 2 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE 1850-1860, at 181, 189 (Philip S. Foner ed.
1950) [hereinafter 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS] (speech at Rochester, New
York, July 5, 1852) (emphasis in original).
69. Charles Lawrence recalled, "My mother called that same day and said, 'Did you read what
Thurgood said about the constitutional bicentennial? Wasn't it wonderful? That man made my
week."' Charles R. Lawrence III Promises to Keep: We Are the Constitution'sFramers,30 How.
L.J. 937, 939 (1987). Regina Austin wrote, "It warmed my heart to read an account of Justice
Marshall's attack on the offensive narrowness of the celebration of the bicentennial of the
Constitution," and observed that as a result of his remarks, "[tihe jubilee proceeded, but with less of
the assured self-satisfaction that had characterized it before Justice Marshall spoke out." Regina
Austin, "Write On, Brother" and the Revolution Next Time: Justice Marshall's Challenge to Black
Scholars, 6 HARv. BLACKLETrER J. 79, 79 (1989); see also Carl T. Rowan, Equality as a
ConstitutionalConcept, 47 MD. L. REv. 10 (1987) (examining controversy surrounding Constitution
and discussing Marshall's speech).
70. See Comment, supra note 33, at 123.
71. Don Fehrenbacher, author of the 1978 book The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in
American Law and Politics, chose thus to characterize Justice Marshall's thesis in a bicentennial
speech at the University of Tennessee. Address by Don Fehrenbacher, University of Tennessee
(Sept. 19, 1988).
72. Erik M. Jensen, Commentary: The ExtraordinaryRevival of Dred Scott, 66 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 2, 10 (1988). Jensen also observed that "[u]ntil recently, we thought [Chief Justice] Taney was
dead wrong---certainly wrong morally, but wrong also as a matter of history and of constitutional
law." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). The presumptions behind the "we" might be interesting to
explore. Perhaps something about those people he means to include is suggested in his subsequent
reflection that "some of [the framers'] racial beliefs cause us a great deal of embarrassment." Id. at 2
(emphasis added).
Jensen's primary argument is that Taney's reading of the intent of the drafters as clearly and
thoroughly white supremacist was ill-founded because there is strong evidence that the framers were
opposed to slavery and thought it was morally wrong but were unwilling to abolish slavery because
of "real needs and real fears." Id. at 4-7. To the extent that he is urging us to reject Taney's flat
historiography in Dred Scott, Jensen's point is certainly well taken. Id. at 2.
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played a" 'deepseated bitterness and dislike that impair his capacity.'
William Bradford Reynolds, then Assistant Attorney General of the
United States, stated that Marshall was "absolutely right to remind us"
of "the most tragic aspects of the American experience" but expressed
grave concern that the substance of Marshall's analysis was to consign
the original unreconstructed Constitution "to the dustbin of history."'74
In Reynolds' view such a move would itself be tragic because
"[n]otwithstanding its very serious flaws, the Constitution in its original
",v3

for human liberty in the entire hisform constituted the greatest advance
' 75

tory of mankind, then or since.
In retrospect, I think Justice Marshall's speech might have been the
best place for me to open this topic with the class. The controversy over
his statement certainly conveys a sense of the heat and immediacy of the
historical questions at issue, a heat and immediacy that some law students doubt intensely. 76 But as it happened, and given that the first por-

tion of the course was organized chronologically, I started the students
off on readings about the institution of slavery itself and the laws related
to it. In keeping with the Lucy Armstrong Memorial project, I assigned
a number of texts produced by slaves themselves.7 7 In addition the class
read an assortment of legal and nonlegal materials on slavery.7 8
73. Ted Gest, Justice Marshall'sMinority Report, 102 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 18,
1987, at 12.
74. William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 1343, 1345 (1987).
75. Id. at 1346. Randall Kennedy raised an interesting counterpoint to both Marshall's
supporters and detractors. He observed that Marshall's speech "provided a necessary critique of the
uncritical [bicentennial] celebration." Randall Kennedy, Comment, 47 MD. L. REv. 46, 46 (1987)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Comment]. He went on, however, to argue against unambiguous rejection of
the founders' Constitution, pointing out that before emancipation and the postwar amendments,
some black abolitionists embraced that very instrument. They became "heroic readers who
transformed the Constitution into a platform more hospitable to their needs, a platform far more
decent than that created by the antebellum Supreme Court." Id. at 48; see also infra text
accompanying notes 110-12 (discussing debate among abolitionists as to whether 1787 Constitution
was proslavery or antislavery). In both this comment and another similar piece Kennedy placed his
remarks in the context of allegiance, loyalty, and a decision to seek insider over outsider status. See
Kennedy, Comment, supra; Randall Kennedy, Afro-American Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Yes, I
Would Sign the Constitution, 29 WM.& MARY L. REv. 163 (1987).
76. One vivid, though happily unrepresentative, student comment on the end-of-semester
evaluation form: "[W]e spent so much time on the history of slavery-who cares, not relevant."
77. See, eg., MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN WOMEN'S HISTORY (Mary B. Norton ed.

1989) [hereinafter PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN WOMEN'S HISTORY]; SLAVE TESTIMONY: Two
CENTURIES OF LETTERS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (John W. Blassingame
ed. 1977). Though it has not always been so, many other sources are now available. Eg., THE
CLASSIC SLAVE NARRATIVES (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed. 1987).
78. Readings included excerpts from State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829) (holding that
a slave owner was not liable for shooting a slave); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY,
AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA

(1975);

SLAVERY DEFENDED: THE

VIEWS OF THE OLD SOUTH (Eric L. McKitrick ed. 1963); K. STAMPP, supra note 31; ROBERT S.
STAROBIN, INDUSTRIAL SLAVERY IN THE OLD SOUTH

(1970).
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After this brief sociolegal introduction to the institution of slavery,
we began to explore the drafting of the Constitution with respect to slavery, what one author has called "the witch at the christening. '79 We

looked first at the Declaration of Independence, a comfortably familiar
document, but went on to read about a less well-known episode in the

Declaration's history. When Thomas Jefferson first drafted the Declaration of Independence, he included a passage that was highly critical of
George III for sanctioning the slave trade.8" However, the passage was
eventually purged from the document.8" I viewed this as a first exercise
in learning to think about what is missing from the face of legal doctrines

and texts, an exercise in learning to listen for silences, to look for negative spaces, and to dream what might be shaping them.8 2
The Constitution of 178783 is a monument to silence on the slavery
question. Although the reality of eighteenth-century chattel slavery is
79. See William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's
Origins, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONTrTUTION 167 (Leonard W. Levy &
Dennis J. Mahoney eds. 1987).
80. Jefferson originally proposed to include King George's support of the international slave
trade as one more example of the despotic tendencies and unacceptable practices that justified
American rebellion. His draft read:
"He [George III] has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating it's most
sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him,
captivating and carry[ing] them into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur miserable
death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel
powers, is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain."
A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 22, at 381 (emphasis in original); see also JAMES MUNvEs, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

99 (1978) (reprinting proposal included in

reconstruction of Declaration of Independence).
81. The passage was deleted after congressional debate, Jefferson's July 2 notes recording:
"The clause ...reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, was struck out in complaisance
to South Carolina and Georgia .... Our Northern brethren felt a little tender for they had been
pretty considerable carriers of [slaves]." See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 22, at 382; see also Paul
Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentionsof the Framers:The Limits of HistoricalAnalysis,50
U. Prrr. L. REV. 349, 375-76 (1989) (discussing Jefferson's condemnation of King George III).
82. See supra note 20 (discussing "silences" in literature). Toni Morrison has urged those
working in a literary context to take up the task of
the examination and re-interpretation of the American canon, the founding nineteenthcentury works, for the "unspeakable things unspoken"; for the ways in which the presence
of Afro-Americans has shaped the choices, the language, the structure-the meaning of so
much American literature. A search, in other words, for the ghost in the machine.

we can agree, I think, that invisible things are not necessarily "not-there"; that a void
may be empty, but is not a vacuum. In addition, certain absences are so stressed, so ornate,
so planned, they call attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and purpose, like
neighborhoods that are defined by the population held away from them. Looking at the
scope of American literature, I can't help thinking that the question should never have
been "Why am I, an Afro-American, absent from it?" It is not a particularly interesting
query anyway. The spectacularly interesting question is "What intellectual feats had to be
performed by the author or his critic to erase me from a society seething with my presence,
and what effect has that performance had on the work?"
Morrison, supra note 20, at 11-12. The applicability of this observation to the Constitution of 1787
will, I hope, become obvious in just a moment.
83. U.S. CONST. arts. I-VIII.
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built into the structure of the Constitution of 1787, the word "slavery"
never appears in the document.8 4 It is quite possible for an uninformed
twentieth-century reader to scan the entire 1787 Constitution with at
least moderate care and never realize that slavery was an issue for the
framers, let alone that the Constitution embodied a series of conscious
and momentous decisions on the slavery question for the nascent republic. 5 So our first task was to uncover and decode the slavery provisions
of the document.8 6
First, we discussed the three-fifths clause, under which "free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excludirig Indians not taxed" were counted for purposes of determining a state's
representation in the House of Representatives (and for purposes of
apportionment of direct taxes), while only three-fifths of "all other persons" were to be counted.8 7 The other persons were, in that context,
84. Some scholars might take exception to my characterization that slavery was "built into"
the Constitution. In fact some would argue forcefully that slavery was taken out of it to the
maximum extent possible. Goldman and Kaufman, for example, state that "[t]he great American
paradox is that while slavery and the race problems that followed from it are an integral part of our
history, slavery and race discrimination are not part of the fundamental principles of the nationand never have been." SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, supra note 65, at xiii (preface by
editors).
The U.S. Supreme Court once had this to say on the subject:
[T]he right to seize and retake fugitive slaves, and the duty to deliver them up, in Whatever
state of the Union they may be found . . . derive their whole validity and obligation
exclusively from the Constitution of the United States .... Under the Constitution [that
right] is recognized as an absolute, positive, right and duty, pervading the whole Union.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 916 (16 Pet.) 539, 622-23 (1842).
[A Pennsylvania act criminalizing the seizure of fugitive slaves] purports to punish as a
public offence against that state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave by his master,
which the Constitution of the United States was designed to justify and uphold.
Id. at 626. See generally Stanley N. Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional
Equality, 75 J. AM. HIsT. 747 (1988) (noting that the original Constitution failed to guarantee
protection of individual equality).
85. In support of this proposition I offer, with some chagrin, my law school self, a reasonably
conscientious student in the 1970s with probably a greater than average interest in racial matters. I
simply never saw a sign of slavery in all my readings of the Constitution. Frederick Douglass was,
perhaps, prescient in this as in some other matters, when he observed:
Had the Constitution dropped down from the blue overhanging sky, upon a land
uncursed by slavery, and without an interpreter, although some difficulty might have
occurred in applying its manifold provisions, yet so cunningly is it framed, that no one
would have imagined that it recognized or sanctioned slavery.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution and Slavery, in 1 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: EARLY YEARS, 1817-1849, at 363 (Philip S. Foner ed. 1950) [hereinafter I
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS].
86. Since teaching the class I have found another source of dissenting views on the
Constitution. It is THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: 200 YEARS OF ANTI-FEDERALIST,
ABOLITIONIST, FEMINIST, MUCKRACKING, PROGRESSIVE, AND ESPECIALLY SOCIALIST CRITICISM

(Bertell Olman & Jonathan Birnbaum eds. 1990) which includes, among other things, excerpts from
W.E.B. Du Bois' Harvard dissertation, Slavery and the Founding Fathers (originally published as
The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United States of Amnerica (1896)), which gives a
detailed and astute report of the relevant debates at the founding Convention.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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slaves.
This provision most often appears in contemporary popular rhetoric
as proof that slaves were devalued by the Constitution of 1787 because
each was counted as only three-fifths of a person-less than a full human
being. Though the substance of the rhetorical point is well taken, it is
nevertheless the case that the more each slave counted, the better for the
perpetuation of slavery. Antislavery forces wanted slaves to count for
nothing. Slaves, after all, would not vote or otherwise exercise political
power in any case. Therefore, each enslaved African-American who
"counted" for anything in this formula simply helped to increase the representation of slaveholding states, in effect increasing the political clout
of his or her master and tipping the balance of power in the Congress
more toward the proslavery forces.
Second, the slave trade clause forbade Congress to outlaw the slave
trade until 1808.88 Given the history of the issue, proponents of the trade
had reason to fear federal action.8 9 Abolitionist forces had attacked the

international slave trade early as one of the most vulnerable components
in the then-existing infrastructure of slavery, and this trade was subjected

to restrictive regulation in various states, both North and South, from
colonial times onward.9" Even some who supported slavery found it possible to condemn the international trade.9 The slave trade clause of the
Constitution of 1787 ensured the trade continued until 1808, and article
92
V put any shortening of that guaranteed time beyond all amendment.
Third, the fugitive slave clause required free states to recognize
escaped slaves as the legal property of their owners and to use their legal
88. Iad § 9, cl. 1. The clause reads: "The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight...." The language may be obscure to the modem
ear. In conversations with students I learned that I was not the only one who had believed this
clause had something to do with liberal immigration policies.
89. See W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638-1870, at 54-58 (1896) (report of debate on the issue at 1787
Constitutional Convention).
90. See generally id; DANIEL P. MANNIX, BLACK CARGOES: A HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC
SLAVE TRADE, 1518-1865, at 171-90 (1962).
91. In 1820 after a conversation with John C. Calhoun, John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary
that slavery "perverts human reason, and reduces men endowed with logical powers to maintain that
slavery is sanctioned by the Christian religion, that slaves are happy and contented in their condition
...
while at the same time they vent execrations upon the slave trade." Quoted in HERBERT
ATHEKER, ABOLITIONISM: A REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 10 (1989). See also DAVID B.
DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 213 (1975)
("American political history showed that opposition to the slave trade could be combined with a
defense of domestic slavery.").
92. U.S. CONST. art. V ("[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the
Ninth Section of the first Article ....
).
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apparatus to return such fugitives into bondage. 93 It was this clause that
was eventually to generate much of the abolitionist heat preceding the
Civil War. 94

Various other provisions of the 1787 Constitution related directly or
indirectly to slavery, 95 and constitutional scholars have proposed numerous ways to categorize and elucidate them. 96 Other clauses frequently
mentioned include those pertaining to the use of the militia to suppress
insurrections, 9 7 prohibition on export taxes, 98 and the requirement that
constitutional amendments could only be proposed by a two-thirds
supermajority of Congress or of petitioning states. 99

In the Discrimination class we looked at all these provisions. After
listing and decoding the provisions, however, we were faced with the
more difficult task of evaluating and interpreting. What do these provisions mean? Why should anyone care about these arcane and coded
messages now that the thirteenth amendment is the law of the land?
This was the point at which I introduced Thurgood Marshall's
bicentennial speech, his act of interpretation." ° As a counterpoint to
93. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl.2. The clause reads:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from
Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of
the Crime.
94. Possible reading assignments relating to the law of fugitive slavery as well as to the massive
social ferment that resulted when fugitive-slave catching brought slavery "home" to the Northmuch as the draft and nightly television brought Vietnam home to Americans in the 1960's and
failed to bring Baghdad home in 1991-include: Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842)
(excerpt supra note 84); R. COVER, supra note 31; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Is It Right and Wise to
Kill a Kidnapper?, in 2 LIFE AND WRrrINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 68, at 284-89;
PHILIP S.FONER, HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS: FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 To THE END

OF THE CIVIL WAR 87-108 (1983) (chapter entitled "Black Resistance to the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850: The Last Phase"); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
78-91 (1988); Larry Gara, The FugitiveSlave Law: A Double Paradox, in THE LAW OF AMERICAN
SLAVERY: MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 232 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1987).

95. For a summary of provisions, see Comment, supra note 33, at 79-81.
96. See id. at 79 n.37.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
98. Id. § 9, cl.
5 (federal); id. § 10, cl.
2 (state).
99. Id. art. V. The significance of this article is also contested. Several critics of Justice
Marshall thought his argument was fatally weakened by its failure to acknowledge this provision for
change. See, eg., Reynolds, supranote 74, at 1349 (amendment process as method of constitutional
evolution). But see Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the
Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93, 130 (1989) (arguing that original
Constitution precluded freeing the slaves precisely because the amendment process required a
supermajority and was therefore impossible without support by slave states).
100. I paired Marshall's remarks, supra text accompanying note 68, with the eloquent words of
Sojourner Truth when she spoke to an antislavery gathering just after touring an area of the Midwest
that had been devastated by an invasion of weevils that attacked and destroyed the wheat crop,
eating the heart of each kernel and leaving an empty husk behind. She is reported to have told the
crowd:
"Children," ..."I talk to God and God talks to me. I go out and talks to God in the fields
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Marshall's analysis I also introduced the observations of Don

Fehrenbacher. In Fehrenbacher's view the Constitution of 1787 was a
compromise that contained both proslavery and antislavery provisions

°1

but which at bottom "dealt only minimally and peripherally with slavery
and was essentially open-ended on the subject."10 2
We began grappling with our varying and sometimes diametrically
opposed reactions to the slavery compromise. In their "reflection
papers""1 3 students displayed a wide range of opinions and previous
and woods. This morning I was walking out, and I got over the fence. I saw the wheat aholding up its head, looking very big. I go up and take holt of it. You b'lieve it, there was
no wheat there. I say, 'God, what is the matter with this wheat?' And He says to me,
'Sojourner, there isalittle...
[weevil] in it' Now I hear talkin' about the Constitution and
the rights of man. I come up and take hold of this Constitution. It looks mighty big, and I
feels for my rights, but there ain't any there. Then I say, 'God, what ails this
Constitution?' He says to me, 'Sojourner, there is a little [weevil] in it.'"
LERONE BENNErr JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA 182 (6th ed.

1988).
101. Fehrenbacher identified the two major antislavery provisions as (1) the territory clause,
which he believes gave Congress the power to exclude slavery from the territories, and (2) the
commerce clause, under which he believes Congress could regulate or abolish the slave trade after
the slave trade clause expired in 1807. See Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, the Framers,and the
Living Constitution, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, supra note 65, at 1, 13; see also Walter
Berns, Comment, 47 MD. L. REv. 22 (1987) (arguing that "the Constitution was, to the greatest
extent possible, an anti-slavery document," id at 24).
Fehrenbacher admitted that both these categories "came to suffer from erosion" after the
framing. Fehrenbacher, supra, at 13. Though Congress did officially ban the importation of slaves
in 1808, enforcement was chronically lax. Id Congress failed at all attempts to ban slavery in
southern territories and was eventually blocked by the Dred Scott decision from doing so in any
territory. Id Nevertheless, Fehrenbacher believed it a mistake to impute the later "proslavcry
gloss" to the document of 1787. See id at 16-17. Fehrenbacher identified as elements of this
postframing, postslavery trend a number of developments: the federalizing of slavery in the nation's
capital, the active role played by the army and state department on behalf of slave owners, the
antiabolitionist policies of the U.S. Post Office, and the proslavery cast of many appointments to high
federal office, including, of course, the Supreme Court. Id at 15-16.
102. Fehrenbacher, supra note 101, at 13. Though chattel slavery was hardly peripheral to
those in bondage, Fehrenbacher, I presume, was referring to the framers, and he may be right that
the issue seemed relatively marginal to them. But see William M. Wiecek, "The Blessings of
Liberty" Slavery in the American Constitutional Order, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 65, at 23 (arguing that slavery was an essential element of America's constitutional order
in 1787). Some scholars, such as Edmund Morgan, supra note 78, would in any event dispute
whether slavery was a marginal issue in fact as well as attitude, maintaining that slavery was central
to the economy of the colonies and the new nation. For other sources that provide good fodder for a
discussion of Marshall's thesis, see sources cited supra notes 69-74.
103. The comments that follow, and most others quoted throughout the Essay, came to me
from "reflection papers" that I began assigning just after the initial readings on slavery. In
sequenced subgroups, class members were to reflect upon prior readings and class discussions,
drawing upon their legal knowledge where appropriate but also explicitly upon their personal
experience.
This idea came from Derrick Bell. See DERRICK BELL, MANUAL OF SUPPLEMENTS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1984) (1989-90). He
credited Professor Charles Lawrence with first developing this technique. Derrick Bell, Tracy
Higgins & Sung-Hee Suh, RacialReflections: Dialoguesin the Direction of Liberation, 37 UCLA L.
R V. 1037, 1041-42 (1990). Both of these professors assigned the papers prior to class, which has
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exposure:
Of the readings that we have done, the ones that have surprised me
the most are those that dealt with how the founding fathers dealt with
the issue of slavery. I had never thought about how the framers had
wrestled with this problem.
I just wanted to say that I have never had a Black professor in the seventeen years of my continuing education. It was not until this class that the
Constitution and its Framers had ever been presented to me as anything
but perfect, ingenious, and insightful. I am glad that I now know the
Constitution has its flaws ....
I'm shocked that this has never been
pointed out to me before. Growing up within the inner circle, and being
educated there-it's like a select existence which doesn't want to face the
realities of those on the fringe. I feel lucky to be moving, although
slowly, outward.
I am a thirty-five year old, white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant.... I was
born and raised ... in the Northeast. I attended high school with a black
population of some 80%. I was a minority. When racial violence struck
Detroit, Newark, and many other cities in the 1960's, it struck my town
as well. I have witnessed first-hand a black person get beaten up solely
because he was black, and I have seen white persons get beaten simply
because they were white. I know from experience that hatred exists in
both white and black men. I have heard words spoken to the effect that
the white man owes the black man something because of a thing called
slavery. In response to those words I have always felt that the point was
moot. I believed that what happened... should be forgotten, that it was
a dead issue and not relevant in twentieth century America. I think I
may have been mistaken.
Unqualified, obtuse praise of the Constitution's framers should cause
uneasiness. That seems reasonable. Thurgood Marshall's apparent outrage (especially if it reflects shock on his part at the framers' duality of
mindset and purpose) seems less so and is perhaps a bit disingenuous.
the obvious advantage of ensuring that the reading gets done and enriching the class discussion. On
the other hand, assigning the papers after the class discussion allowed students to talk about things
that happened in class as well. Professor Bell quoted Professor Lawrence about the use of reflection
papers:
The assignment privileges experience and the forceful articulation of that experience. Each
week I am newly impressed by the thoughtfulness of these pieces. I am struck by their
honesty, by the students' willingness to risk making themselves vulnerable, by their bravery
in their criticism of my manifested bias or myopia as well as that of the cases and the
authors assigned. The power of these pieces is not just in their usefulness as a method for
discovering new insights gained from a diversity of experience and perspective, but in the
authority they give to voices of those who [h]ave come to experience themselves as without
authority.
D. BELL, supra, at 4 (quoting Charles Lawrence, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship
as Struggle 18 (Mar. 13, 1989) (unpublished manuscript); see also Cain, supra note 39 (describing
use of journals in feminist theory class).
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The seeming (and at times, quite real) hypocrisy of politicians has long
been recognized ....
...The Constitution was an attempt to create a flexible framework
for rational government in the context of a world filled with regimes exercising arbitrary power.... It indeed represented the naked self-interest of
the white men who drafted and signed it. But it also represented an
enlightened self-interest. It allowed for change at a later date and therein
lies the "morality" of this or any such document.
In all truthfulness, Marshall's speech angered me as I read it. However, I tried to put myself in "his shoes," but it is a viewpoint I have
never had to experience. I never thought a July 4th celebration or a celebration for our Constitution would arouse such ill-feelings.
In looking at the issues from such a different perspective, I was able
to understand why Marshall and other blacks may have feelings of frustration and anger while the rest of the country celebrates a document
which maintained the oppression the blacks were suffering. However, I
felt Marshall was slightly harsh ....
I would be curious to know how many blacks feel the same as Justice Marshall seems to feel.
I know this probably sounds like "rose colored glasses" stuff, but I
truly believe all persons are created equal. And even if the Framers of
the Constitution were not sure who they meant when they used a similar
phrase, I am.
In class discussions some students viewed the problem as one of
inadequate information. The students thought that the framers simply
had no way of knowing the evils that would flow from slavery and had
not been exposed to our now widely shared modem sensibilities on the
subject of racial justice. Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the Constitutional
Contradiction104 posed a challenge to this view by fantasizing a timetraveling black civil rights advocate, transplanted into the Constitutional
Convention and armed with amazonian eloquence and grace (even protected by a bulletproof shield) but unable to alter the basic compromise,
despite her troubling news from the future. Some students were unsettled by the tone of this chronicle"0 5 but few disputed its concrete assess104. D. BELL, supra note 32, at 26-50.
105. One student described his reaction to the scene in this chronicle where one of the founders
fires a gun at Geneva Crenshaw, the heroine, after she announces herself and her mission:
This was an excellent choice for the first few weeks of class; as a white male it
certainly provided me with a "baptism of fire" concerning the real sense of betrayal by
America's founders many modern blacks feel. I am not accustomed to witnessing the
founders dealt with in so indelicate a manner. I was initially somewhat shocked by
"Geneva's" visceral contempt for the founders; I found the shooting incident, for instance,
to border on hysteria, a gratuitous "cheap shot" by a civil rights radical designed simply to
evoke high emotion. On reflection, however, I realized that my assessment of the ...
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ment of the probable outcome of such a mission.
Some students focused on economic realities 06 but drew radically
different conclusions. Some expressed the view that the accommodation
of slavery was "just economics," and therefore somehow had no real
racial or moral dimension, while others thought that the economic
motive made the moral dissonance all the more intense.
Some perceived the basic question to be whether the framers, and
the document they created, were "good" or "bad." Others were more
willing to entertain the idea of an openly ambivalent response.' 0 7 Questions about the existence, meaning, and discoverability of original intent
also became unavoidable as we explored the motives and statements of
various founders and studied their debates. 108 The question of intent and
dialogue simply revealed my own prejudices. My first reaction to the scene was "How dare
she treat the founders so" rather than "How dare they treat her so," in the sense that she
served to represent the people who the founders were in a deliberate, calculated fashion
choosing to leave in subjugation.
A black student reflecting on this same reading had a starkly different reaction:
The strength with which I was able to identify with Geneva Crenshaw's futile words
was tremendous. I felt almost as though it was I standing behind the-absolutely
necessary-protective shield speaking words of compassion and reason to the Framers and
being rebuked with words of cold and calculating self-interest....
To get a true taste of the flavor of racism, without actually being a victim, one need
look at it from the perspective of the damned. I suppose that Virgil could have told Dante
a story about the Inferno, but I'm sure the first hand look he got made a deeper impression.
Since we cannot all be the victims of racial discrimination, reading views from the margins
will help.
106. By "economic realities" here I include both the economic self-interest of many framers
who were themselves slaveholders, see Comment, supra note 33, at 91 n.102 (giving a head count of
slaveowning framers), and the powerful role played by slave labor and the products of slave labor in
the economies of northern and southern colonies alike, see, e.g., E. MORGAN, supra note 78, at 293387. Understanding the intersection between race and class is, in my view, one of the most crucial
tasks confronting those concerned about racial justice, as I have argued elsewhere. See Frances L.
Ansley, Stirringthe Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L.
REV. 993 (1989); see also Manning Marable, Toward a Black Politics" Beyond the Race-Class
Dilemma, NATION, Apr. 11, 1981, at 417 (discussing debate over whether race or class is at the
heart of the inferior status of blacks). Many members of the Discrimination class sensed the
importance of this connection also, although I fear the syllabus did not do enough to help them
grapple with it. One student observed:
The experiences of the 1960's and 1970's should teach us that the elimination of de jure
discrimination plays but a minute role in true equality....
Before discrimination can be effectively dealt with we must recognize the true cause.
The "haves" don't want the "have nots" to recognize what is truly going on because for
years they have effectively played various poor groups off against one another. Poor whites
vs. poor blacks; poor blacks vs. poor hispanics, etc.
107. On the notion that people (and legal theory) can tolerate, even thrive on, ambivalence, see
Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: ReconstructingIdeals from DeconstructedRights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401 (1987). In discussing the different ways that rights may appear to dominant
and subordinate groups, Williams noted: "[lit really is possible to see things-even the most
concrete things--simultaneously yet differently; and ...seeing simultaneously yet differently is more
easily done by two people than one; but... one person can get the hang of it with lots of time and
effort." Id. at 410-11.
108. The next time I teach this material I would consider including readings specifically
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its meaning led us to consider other possible values that might orient and
guide us in the process of constitutional interpretation.' 9
After we had immersed ourselves in the tug and pull of these differ-

ent constitutional visions, I told the class that we were not the first to
have disagreed about these matters. We then turned to the heated debate

that took place over a hundred years ago among abolitionists as to
whether the 1787 Constitution was proslavery or antislavery. The Gar-

risonian wing of the abolitionist movement concluded that the Constitution was irretrievably proslavery and should be repudiated, by means of

"disunion" if necessary.110 Another group preached that the Constitution permitted and even mandated immediate abolition of slavery."'
Others, including eventually Frederick Douglass, conceded that the Constitution did not mandate abolition but argued that there were antislavery features in the constitutional text itself that could provide a basis for
antislavery politics and eventual victory within the union.' 2 Then as
addressing the issue of original intent. For strong intentionalist perspectives, see Edwin Meese Il1,
The Moral Foundationsof Republican Government, in STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND?: ESSAYS ON
CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 63, 64 (Joseph S. McNamara & Lissa Roche
eds. 1987) ('[o]ur obligation is to understand the Founders as they understand themselves"); Bruce
E. Fein, Comment, 47 MD. L. REv. 196, 197 (1988) ("[c]lear and convincing evidence confirms that
the doctrine of original intent is the only legitimate judicial guide for constitutional jurisprudence").
For a recent article deftly attacking the conclusions of one intentionalist on his own terms, see Glenn
H. Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence" Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original
Understanding,24 GA. L. REV. 1045 (1990) (showing that Bork's interpretation of the Constitution
does not comport with that of the framers, as divined from founders' era sources Bork himself
endorsed). For a nonintentionalist view of race and the Constitution, see Finkelman, supra note 81
(arguing that an intent analysis is not useful in determining constitutionality because framers had
varying intents).
109. My readings were slim, and I believe students could have benefited from an introduction to
distinguishable interpretive theories. For a recent thoughtful article, see Robin West, Relativism,
Objectivity, and Law (Book Review), 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1481, 1490 (1990) (specifically addressing
slavery and the Constitution).
110.

AILEEN S. KRADITOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND

His CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 1834-1850, at 196-97 (1969) (quoting resolution
introduced by Garrison to dissolve the union).
Ill. See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 252-53 (1977) (speech before the American Anti-Slavery Society, May 11,
1847).
112. For a look at Douglass' fascinating transition, see FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Right to
CriticizeAmerican Institutions (May 1847), in 1 LIFE AND WRITINGS FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra
note 85, at 234; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution and Slavery (Feb. 1849), in 1 LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 85, at 352 (correspondence with C.H. Chase);
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Constitution and Slavery (Mar. 1849), in 1 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF
FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 85, at 361; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Oath to Support the
Constitution (Apr. 1850), in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 68, at
115; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Changeof OpinionAnnounced (May 1851), in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 68, at 155-56; FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Dred Scott
Decision (1857), in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 68, at 407-24
(speech before American Anti-Slavery Society, May 11, 1857); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The
Constitution of the UnitedStates: Is It Pro-Slavery orAnti-Slavery? (1860), in 2 LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, supra note 68, at 467-80.
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now, these disagreements about the framers generated much heat
because they were seen as relevant to contemporaneous controversies
that bitterly divided the public.1 13
As a culmination of our study of race and the 1787 Constitution we
read the Dred Scott opinion, and four students simulated a debate before
the U.S. Congress of 1858114 on the proposition that "[t]his body
should[,] and has the legal power to[,] abolish slavery throughout the
territory of these United States of America."' 1 5 The exercise had two
helpful features. First, it showed students how questions of constitutional interpretation are often cast by those immediately concerned as

issues of decisional freedom and constraint wholly separate from morality or politics, though hindsight may cast much doubt on such a characterization. Second, it positioned us to appreciate more fully the events
surrounding emancipation and the postwar amendments, which were to
be the next major subject on our agenda. Most of the class agreed that at

least the appearance of severe constitutional constraint facing the Congress in 1858 must have been formidable indeed. 1 6
At this juncture we found ourselves poised at emancipation, the
Civil War, and the great postwar changes in the Constitution. We
looked at the birth of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments117 and the civil rights legislation enacted by Reconstruction congresses (encountering the Blyew case now in a richer context 1 18). We saw
the end of Reconstruction with the Compromise of 1877 and watched the
113. An example of such heat in our own day is the fierce historical debate about the original
intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment and different versions of the postwar civil rights
statutes that accompanied the Court's deliberations in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989). In Patterson issues of great contemporary moment were cast as turning decisively on the
beliefs, goals, and attitudes of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. In a similar
acknowledgement of the significance of history, the American Enterprise Institute chose to
investigate the 1787 slavery compromise in part as a contribution to the debate on affirmative action.
SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, supra note 65, at xv.
114. A moment chosen because it was post-Dred Scott and presecession.
115. Derrick Bell suggested this exercise. See D. BELL, supra note 103. Varying the class
format with exercises of this kind in my view has a salutary effect on the tone of the class and on
student engagement.
116. Cf. Anthony J. Sebok, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835 (1991) (arguing
that pre-Civil War judges were not as constrained as they and later commentators have supposed).
117. Our examination included a look at failed attempts by feminists to have the guarantees of
the fifteenth amendment extended to women. Resources concerning this early chapter in the
troubled relations between American feminist movements and American antiracist movements
include Dubois, supra note 65. For a discussion of racism among white women suffragists, see
Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, Discontented Black Feminists, in PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN WOMEN'S
HISTORY, supra note 77, at 341; Barbara A. Babcock, ClaraShortridgeFoltz Constitution-Maker,66
IND. L.J. 849 (1991) (recounting alliance of early California feminists with Workingmen's Party of
California, which meant "complicity for [women] in a peculiarly extreme version of anti-Chinese
racism," id, at 909). See generally ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1981); FREDERICK
DOUGLASS ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS (Philip S.Foner ed. 1976).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 47-60.
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Supreme Court usher in an era of "long sleep" for the postwar statutes

and amendments.11 9 We watched as Brown v. Board of Education 120 and
the civil rights movement brought in the Second Reconstruction."'
119. For helpful materials on Reconstruction, see United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United

States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876);

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION,

TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONDITION OF
AFFAIRS IN THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES (1872); D. BELL, supra note 22, at 30-38; BLACK

RECONSTRUCTIONISTS (Emma L. Thornbrough ed. 1972); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Civil Rights
Cases, in 4 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 392 (Philip S. Foner ed. 1950)
(speech at the Civil Rights Mass-Meeting on Oct. 22, 1883); E. FONER, supra note 54; Foner, supra

note 33; Kennedy, supra note 54.
For resources on the post-Reconstruction period, sometimes called "the nadir," see Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); JESSIE D. AMES,
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF LYNCHING: REVIEW OF LYNCHING,

R.

1931-1941 (1942);

MICHAL

BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFLICT IN THE POST-BRowN SOUTH 1-26 (1987); W.E.B. Du BoiS, supra note 43; ROBERT L.
ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980); E. M. Beck, James

L. Massey & Stewart E. Tolnay, The Gallows, the Mob, and the Vote: LethalSanctioningof Blacks in
North Carolina and Georgia, 1882 to 1930, 23 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 317 (1989); William Cohen,
Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A PreliminaryAnalysis, in RACE RELATIONS
AND THE LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 29-60 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1987); Randall Kennedy, Race
RelationsLaw and the Traditionof Celebration:The Case of ProfessorSchmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1622 (1986).
One can also find materials about race in particular localities. I was able to find interesting
material about the "nadir" in my own town in a regional publication. See, e.g., John Egerton, A
Case ofPrejudic" MauriceMays and the Knoxville Race Riot of 1919, SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, July/
Aug. 1983, at 56.
120. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown II"); 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown I"). In conjunction with
Brown we read excerpts from two articles describing the black community's reaction to Brown. See
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 61-66, 117-20
(1988); Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Questfor Equality of Opportunity: A CriticalLegal
Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 309 n.36 (1988).
121. For resources that discuss the transition to the Second Reconstruction, see RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

(1975);

HOWARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS:

THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE: VOLUME

(1978);

MARK V. TUSHNET,
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).

THE

NAACP'S

1: THE DEPRESSION

LEGAL STRATEGY

AGAINST

DECADE

SEGREGATED

For an important caveat about prevailing ways of demarking significant sources of and periods
in the development of the civil rights movement, see Robert Korstad & Nelson Lichtenstein,
Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement, 75 J. AM.
HIsT. 786 (1988).
One of the main goals here was to expose students to the multidirectional relationship between
popular movements and legal change. For contrasting explorations of this theme, see Cook, supra
note 22 (discussing how King mobilized people into organizations and movements and examining
King's use of theoretical deconstruction); Robert J. Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights
MovemenL The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955-1957, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 59 (1991) (arguing that
legal decisions and not popular movements were the dominant causal factors in desegregation);
Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989) (taking the position that law and legal moves have been underrated
by some who stress the efficacy of popular mobilization); Williams, supra note 107 (stressing the
transformative role that can be played by movements of the poor and oppressed in defining legal
rights)-
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The most important and meaningful assignment I gave on the
Second Reconstruction was requiring that the class view the entire sixsegment documentary series Eyes on the Prize, Part . 122 Student
responses to the series were strong and overwhelmingly positive. 123 One
student said:
Every time I had previously studied the civil rights movement in undergraduate and graduate school, it had been by reading a textbook, and the
information was strictly from a policymaker perspective. The written
page can never convey the emotions of the individual struggling for
equality. Eyes on the Prize showed not only the "leaders" of the movement, but the marchers, students, housewives, and children that fought
for equality.... I found myself feeling despair, grief, and hopelessness. I
also felt their triumph, strength and joy. In retrospect, it makes me realize how superficial a study of the civil rights movement is without looking into the emotions, the faces, and the lives of the people behind the
"leaders" of the movement.

122. Eyes on the Prize, Part I (PBS television broadcast, 1987) (produced by Blackside, Inc.).
We scheduled group viewings at the university's audiovisual center, I cancelled two classes during
the weeks the viewings took place to indicate that the assignment was serious and that I recognized
the time commitment involved. Students who could not attend evening viewings could check out
videos from the public library and watch them at home.
Presently, Part II of the series is also available. The second part of the series, like the latter days
of the civil rights movement, raises issues much more divisive for a broader spectrum of Americans
than the first. These programs explore the reemergence in the late 1960s of a long-standing conflict
between nationalism and integrationism in the black community. They probe difficult conflicts
among different leaders and groups within the civil rights coalition.
How I would handle the sheer bulk of material now available in this series, I do not know. But
asking students to encounter the ideas and history of black nationalism is, I believe, extremely
important. After a period of marginalization, the varying ideas associated with different strands of
black nationalism are once again gaining visibility, attracting sizable numbers of followers, and
garnering some scholarly attention. See generally HAROLD CRUSE, PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A
CRITICAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES IN AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY

(1987) (examining

historical roots of the modern civil rights movement); James S. Bowen, Law, Legitimacy and Black
Revolution: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of Contemporary Black Student Protest and Its
Legacyfor Modern America, 1 YALE J.L. & LIBERATION 83 (1989) (reviewing black student protest
movements in the 1960s and relating them to more recent, though less frequent, black student
unrest); David Hall, Paths to Equality: A Constitutional Theory of Collective Rights, 5 HARV.
BLACKLETrER J. 27 (1988) (examining Civil Rights movement and Black Nationalist movement);
Peller, supra note 8 (discussing nationalism in the context of the reappearance and refinement of race
consciousness in critical race scholarship); Michele Collison, 'Fightthe Power: Rap Music Pounds
Out a New Anthem for Many Black Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 14, 1990, at Al
(discussing the current movement toward increased cultural solidarity among black college students
and the conflict between black nationalists and integrationists).
123. However, one student did have a criticism that had some bite. It reflected the troubled
issue of regional identity that almost always plays a role in discussions of race among white students
in the South:
The only criticism of Eyes on the Prize that I would express is the lack of any
sympathetic Southern white people. Granted, there may have been few such people to
focus on, but someone like Richmond Flowers would have been a good example. I think
the film unfairly portrays all Southern whites as belonging to the extremist, racist class.
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After watching Eyes on the Prize, as a white person I found myself
ashamed of my race ....
I found myself trying to understand what
instilled such hate .... I found myself questioning how I would have felt
and acted, if I had been an adult during the civil rights movement....
These are difficult questions that haunted me while watching the
film. I hope that I would have been one of the people that would have
marched and worked to break the racist system.
Another remarked:
The old adage "a picture is worth a thousand words" certainly gets
at my thoughts on Eyes on the Prize I have had at least some awareness
of the Civil Rights struggle for most of my life but the old film footage
brought the movement into focus in a way that words could never do.
The film wreaked havoc on my emotions, which is uncommon for a jaded
law student. Eyes on the Prize should be required viewing in every high
school in America.
Going on to study the origins of the fourteenth amendment, its fate
during and after Reconstruction and into the present, was just as gripping, troubling, and enlightening as the study of the slavery compromise,
and the available materials were similarly rich and filled with controversy.124 Nevertheless, instead of continuing to talk about the topics,
readings, and discussions of the "aboveground" part of the discrimination class, I want now to change focus.
C.

The Underground Classroom

As we read through the materials,125 discussed the issues, and conducted the simulations, new realities unfolded. A law school classroom,
like any classroom, is a multilayered experience. Dynamics of boredom,
curiosity, fear, intimidation, and delight all mingle and intertwine and
are all mediated by race, class, gender, religion, sexual orientation, geog124. For differing opinions on the significance of Reconstruction to the Constitution, see
Herman Belz, Comment, 47 MD. L. REV. 28 (1987) (arguing that the framers of the postwar
amendments did not make a "new constitution. Rather, they confirmed, clarified and extended the
principles.. . embodied in the original Constitution."); M.E. Bradford, "Changed Only a Little"
The Reconstruction Amendments and the Nomocratic Constitution of 1787, 24 WAKE FOREST L.

REv. 573 (1989) (arguing that the Reconstruction amendments did not significantly change the
Constitution); Fein, supra note 108, at 196 (observing that "our Constitution was repeatedly defiled
by the radical Reconstruction Congresses because of attorney indifference to constitutional
principles"); Arthur Kinoy, The ConstitutionalRight of Negro Freedom, 21 RuTGERS L. REV. 387
(1967) (arguing for the postemancipation relevance and racial specificity of the thirteenth
amendment); Wiecek, supra note 102, at 23, 40 (describing the values of black freedom and equality
during the Reconstruction and the present as a "revolutionary change in the original constitutional
system").
125. I guess I owe readers the information that many of my students regularly complained of
too much reading. I have concluded that I am simply too green to evaluate the merits of these
claims. (I have no doubt of their sincerity, but that is a separate matter.)
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raphy, and other factors.126 But I found the subject matter of race as a
curricular focus produced tensions well beyond those we all know and
recognize as part of the normal course of legal education.
Containing, loosening, respecting, and not being cowed or consumed by these dynamics turned out to be a strenuous assignment.
There were tearful office conferences, hallway meetings, some overlapping and some utterly separate grapevines, hurt feelings, outrageously
insensitive remarks, suspicion and distrust, and, yes, some real breakthroughs from all directions.
Certainly some of the tensions arose because the course was methodologically different from the law school norm. 127 But most of the tension
was, I believe, a result of the fact that we were a racially mixed group
trying, at least during large segments of the course, to take a hard, direct
look at the subject of race in the United States in 1989. That was a harrowing thing to do, even in tame and sheltered three-times-a-week doses.
I did a lot of things I should not have done in relation to these
classroom dynamics and failed to do some very simple things I should
have done. I also discovered some things that seemed to help. I will
recount both some of the mistakes and some of the successes.
On several occasions, rather than risk sounding patronizing, I failed
to fill in necessary context for my declarations. I mistakenly assumed
that the students would read subtlety, sophistication, and nuance into my
pronouncements.12 8 One such fumble came during the second day of
class when I told the students that I had a "truth-in-teaching" announcement, a sort of fair warning to give them. I explained that I almost involuntarily devalue a comment that is prefaced with "I am not a racist, but
.." or "I am not a sexist, but ...." I told the class that upon hearing
those particular introductory phrases I tend to conclude that the speaker
has not yet thought very hard about racism or sexism because it seems
clear to me that none of us is beyond or above the wounds, disabilities,
and creeping assumptions rooted in the social categories of race and gender. I explained that in my view we are all racists and sexists to one
degree or another, although each of us deals with that fact differently. I
said that while I believe the ways individuals choose to deal with this
126. Student comments throughout the semester provided glimpses of the unspoken dynamics
of the classroom, as will appear more fully below.
127. Much of the course was entirely traditional, of course, but some of it was noticeably
different from what the students were accustomed to encountering. The stress on history, the
inclusion of nonlegal materials, my own disclosures of partisanship, were, I think, disorienting for
many class members. Some experienced the disorientation as an unexpected pleasure and challenge;
others decidedly did not.
128. When one develops some stake in the notion that one is, after all, a subtle, sophisticated,
nuanced person, these lapses seem to happen. Beware.
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reality makes a difference, escape or immunity is not an available
alternative.
I learned that there was a major gap between what I thought I had
said and what the class heard when students later responded in a series of
reflection papers.1 29 One student asked:
Am I a racist, a bigot, totally unaware of my true feelings or am I a fairminded person who evidently sees things somewhat different from the
majority of my classmates, or at least of the ones that make their feelings
known?
Another student remarked:
"I'm not a racist, but ...
"I'm not a sexist, but ...
...These reflections center, for the most part, around the power of
words. The need to deny one's status as a racist or sexist would seem
prima facie evidence of the negative power that has come to be associated
with those words.
My attitude toward such power being invested in inanimate symbols
runs a gamut from a primordial fear of the shaman pronouncing syllables
laden with magical power to the disgust expressed by Eliza Doolittle in
My FairLady--"Words, words, words. I'm so sick of words ... Show

me now."
•.. I admit to feeling a certain (perhaps perverse?) desire to appro-

priate the labels "sexist" and "racist" to show that. .. "words can never
hurt me" as the child shouts at his tormentors. It is the "sticks and
stones" often attendant to racial ... incidents that worry me far more
than the labels that anyone can fling at another!
But, of course, words can hurt terribly."s' Another student voiced the
129. For an explanation of reflection papers in this class, see supra note 103.
130. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (independent tort action for racial insults is
both permissible and necessary); Matsuda, supra note 53 (victim's response to racist speech and the
impact of that speech on target groups). The word "racist" in our culture carries a special charge of
its own, importantly different from that of a racial epithet but powerful, nonetheless, as my student

so eloquently pointed out. In the creation and packaging of the controversy about "political
correctness" that has erupted since I taught this class, much has been made of the hurt that can
accompany accusations of racism. For a particularly inflated and lurid example of this discourse, see
John Taylor, Are You PoliticallyCorrect?, NEw YORK, Jan. 21, 1991, at 32 (portraying professor as
a victim after black students allegedly accused him of being a racist). For a critique of Taylor's
article, see Jon Wiener, What Happenedat Harvard, NATION, Sept. 30, 1991, at 384 (arguing that
the greatest offense came not from the students).
Argument by name-calling, even when the argument is sincere and deeply felt, is highly
problematic. The use of freighted terms like "racist," when used to label another individual in a
classroom setting, is almost never conducive to intellectual exchange. It blocks rather than promotes
communication, and it fosters sloppy thinking and sloppy feeling. Our classrooms should be places
where discussion does not proceed by epithet.
One of the most memorable teaching moments I have witnessed was an occasion when Derrick
Bell enforced a rule in his class against argument by name-calling. "We will not call each other
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following complaint:
Is it possible to hold conservative views on issues involving race and

not be viewed as a "racist"? To many people in our society today, the
answer to that question is "NO". If a person does not support set-aside

programs for minorities and affirmative action, and lets this position
become publicly known, he or she is often branded... a racist.

I guess you could say I had touched a nerve! I had intended to
touch a nerve, of course, and living with some raw edges and some real
disagreements is part of the deal. In retrospect, however, I think I
should have been more aware of two things. First, I should not presume
that class members will be predisposed or well equipped to supply lots of
nuanced context for my remarks. Why should they be?"' Second, it is
important for a teacher in this situation to make some explicit assurances
racists in this class," he said immediately on the heels of a heated remark. I was struck at the time
with several things: his clarity and calm about the rightness of the rule, his firmness in articulating
it, his demonstrable personal concern for both the person using the epithet and the target of the
remark, and the authority he naturally drew from his own strong and visible record on matters of
racial justice.
I applaud the judgment of that teacher in that setting to declare that certain forms of discourse
were "off limits" in his classroom. All teachers set such limits, though in most instances they are
unconscious and unexamined. After all, law students on the whole are seldom interested in pushing
educational boundaries and are well-enough versed in the law school culture in which they are trying
to succeed that they rarely behave in ways that bring to the surface the implicit boundaries of their
teachers. However, the least reflection will surely reveal that such tacit limits exist.
As racial controversies have begun to grow more heated over the last decade and as some whites
have begun to give stronger voice to a sense of entitlement wrongly thwarted, both explicit and
encoded messages of racial hostility have increased in university settings. Further, as racial
newcomers enter predominantly white institutions and classrooms they have begun to tell us about
the hurtful effects of certain words in certain contexts. Both of these developments have called into
question just what the existing implicit boundaries are and what they should be. I believe that
reports of the harmful effects of language should be taken seriously, whether those reports come
from members of dominant groups who are experiencing the pain of being newly challenged or from
members of subordinate groups who feel the sting of old stereotypes, long-standing attitudes, or
presently unexamined assumptions. The ongoing process of defining and redefining our official and
unofficial boundaries in these matters will be difficult and value-laden, of course. In my own
experience, the boundaries I and my students seem to find acceptable often change over the course of
a semester. The higher the level of trust and mutual respect that has been established in a class, the
wider the unofficial boundaries become.
131. Eventually I tried again to explain myself by circulating a memo to the class. After I
shared some of the student comments with the class and thanked those students for their candor, I
went on to say:
When I say (and I do) that "we are all racists," I probably mean something more subtle or
modulated (perhaps harder to deal with) than many perfectly reasonable people might
assume at first hearing. I do not mean, for instance, that we are all necessarily bigoted in
any stereotypical or obvious way. I do not mean that we are all so stupid or blind that we
are "totally unaware" of our "true feelings," or that we are necessarily ill-intentioned or
possessed by gross stereotypes. . . .What I mean is different, though it is now readily
apparent to me how I might have sounded otherwise in class.
What I mean about us all being racists has more to do with the notion that I don't
think any of us can, in this world, be "free" of race, or "rise above" it, or somehow purge
ourselves of it. Surely we can have experiences of transcendence, sparks and even streams
of connection across these old scarred battlefields, that can give us real tastes of what
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of safety in addition to warning of danger.132 Students have no basis for
trusting the teacher at the beginning of class and the teacher should not
expect them to. Besides, what I was asking them to do-open themselves
to a frank but mutually sensitive discussion of race-related matters in a
racially mixed setting-is something few of us, students or teachers, have
another way can and might be. But on some very real level we cannot once and for all shed
the past and start with a "clean slate."
Most of us, at least after early childhood, and sooner for most blacks than for most
whites, have and bear in our minds and bodies some tension over race.... Race and racism
are not matters we can discuss lightly like the weather, no matter how much we wish we
could. Like (but not the same as) the subject of sex and sexuality, this subject of race taps
into fears, hopes, emotions, wounds, values, resentments, memories, that color and limit
our perception ....
Of course, that should come as no surprise. We live in a society where race has played
such a powerful role over the years, and where the question of future agendas is still
explosive. Tremendous and increasing disparities continue to exist, side-by-side with
increasing opportunities for some, and increasing controversy over how to distribute these
opportunities.
I am still struggling with the advisability of my initial "we-are-all-racists" strategy. Threading
through so many of our efforts to define and combat racism is the tension between the notion of
racism as a crime (a matter of intent and fault) and racism as a disease (a disease that has impact on
subordinate groups, that is institutionalized in our society, and that affects all of us in ways we
certainly do not have to intend and may not even be able to bring to consciousness). (This
distinction tends, of course, to be less salient and significant for those who are on the receiving end of
racial disparities than for those who are not.)
I believe we now have strong (certainly not unanimous) public consensus that the "crime"
version of racism is a bad thing, enough so that the word "racist" will immediately be perceived by
the vast majority of listeners as an accusation and an insult. We do not have such strong public
consensus that the disease of racism is an evil of which the law (or much else) should take
cognizance. Some of us, myself included, believe it is of utmost importance that this kind of
racism-the system of de facto white supremacy-be exposed, studied, and ended. But I do not
believe the average white person will understand the word "racist" to be referring to this type of
racism.
In class, and in my memo, I was, of course, attempting to explain that I was referring in large
part to the "other" kind of racism. I have begun to ask myself whether I have been opportunist in
my approach. It seems to me that I may have wanted to plug into the emotive and majoritarian
power of the widespread public sentiment that rejects the crime of racism, all the while busily
denying that I was making any reference to it. If so, I may not have been fighting fair. I believe that
the two kinds of racism are both openly and subterraneanly connected in ways that whites especially
need to face and understand. They are mutually reinforcing. But it may be that I need to find
cleaner ways of recognizing that two different meanings are likely to be at work.
In any event there is, unfortunately, still more than enough racism of both varieties to go
around and to affect our classrooms deeply. And the widespread compulsion by some people to
deny any racism on their own part calls for some examination. When a crowd of jeering white
demonstrators stands on the sidewalk in Bensonhurst to protest black demonstrators and holds aloft
two emblems-one a sign proclaiming "WE ARE NOT RACISTS" and the other a watermelonthen more on the term "racism" remains to be said. Most students of color will have such images
indelibly imprinted in their memories and that will, and should, affect the way they respond to
assertions by whites that they are not racist.
132. As opposed to my tactic of labeling everyone, some authors suggest careful thought and
planning so as to label no one. See Mary J. Eyster, Analysis ofSexism in Legal Practice:A Clinical
Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183, 185 n.7 (1988) (noting that the terms "feminist" and "feminism"
may have negative connotations); Suellyn Scarnecchia, Gender & Race Bias Against Lawyers: A
Classroom Response, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 322-23 (1990) (describing teaching methodology
that allowed students to engage in frank discussions with little fear of being labeled racist or sexist).
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achieved or experienced in this culture more than fleetingly, if at all.133
Assuming unreasonable amounts of help, context-setting, and nondefensiveness from my audience, then, was one fumble that triggered static in
the underground classroom.
My response to static that was already present, either in reality or in
my imagination, was another type of fumble. In too many instances I
allowed myself to be counterproductively concerned that some students
would perceive me as biased in favor of others. Of course some of them
would, and did. One student observed in the anonymous end-of-the-year
evaluations:
I am sure she doesn't realize it, but she favors "people of color" and their
comments-for instance, more than once a white student and a black
student have said the same thing AND the white student was criticized
and the black student praised.
Allegations of teacher favoritism are serious business to me. But I
believe my job was to be as fair as I could figure out how to be-a complicated proposition in itself-and to avoid feeling intimidated by fears of
backlash from different quarters. If teachers intend to open this scary
space, they need to be ready to make it reasonably safe and bearable for
all members of the enterprise and be willing to take a few lumps in the
process. It was not a comfortable feeling when some students came to
me privately to express their fears of the reaction I might provoke against
myself and against other students if I expressed too many "pro-black" or
"pro-woman" sentiments. Nor was it comfortable for me to contemplate
my own tendency to worry so much about the feelings of students in a
dominant group when they were being challenged by those in a
subordinate group."' But teacher comfort-maintenance is hardly an
educational objective worth embracing.
Some flavor of the varying pushes and pulls will perhaps come
133. At any rate, for those of us who are white, who feel discomfort when the subject of racism
comes up, it is important to listen before we defend and to imagine the costs imposed on a thoughtful
speaker (especially a speaker of color) who ventures to give uncomfortable feedback. Perhaps with
some work, we can model this kind of behavior for our students. See Angela P. Harris, On Doing the
Right Thing: Education Work in the Academy, 15 VT. L. REv. 125 (1990) (encouraging minority
faculty in majority institutions to challenge racism in private as well as in public and explaining for
readers of all colors how this process can feel for the challenger).
134. I knew from experience that such concern on the part of a teacher can lead to burdening
inappropriately those from the subordinate group who are already burdened more than enough and
who should not be asked to center their classroom efforts on sensitivity to others. Certainly all class
members can and should be asked to treat each other with respect. But teachers should be careful to
note their own identifications: whose pain is easiest for us to understand, and therefore whose
sensitivities do we take most care to respect? Whose learning path is most like our own, and
therefore which path are we most likely to work to keep brush free? In my own case I believe my
background makes me especially quick to notice the pain of whites who are being subjected to
varying forms of racial challenge. I hope, of course, that I can put that characteristic of mine to
good use. I also believe, however, that I need to be aware of its biases and dangers so that I can also
be a good, fair, supportive, and challenging teacher for the other students in my classes.
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through in the following anonymous comments from midstream student
evaluations:
This has been one of the very few classes here that has stimulated
independent thinking for me.
The class was simply a forum for blacks to vent their anger. White students' comments were passed over many times... or countered angrily
or laughingly by black students....
[Many whites felt they couldn't
speak because the blacks would become so offended and angry. This
class simply increased the racial tension between the students-instead of
educating the students to differing viewpoints.
A few people dominated the class and the teacher forced her opinion on
the class ....
Maybe she is too concerned about the individual feelings of the class. She
really tries to avoid stepping on toes sometimes to the detriment of the
class and the materials.
Having talked to many students I can say that over 50% of the class
suppressed their true feelings on one or more subjects because of the
intimidation felt in the classroom.
On the whole, this was an interesting course and I think the professor has
a true commitment to anti-discrimination. It must be risky to stand in
front of a class and hear people's opinions that are racist and not
respond, or even harder, to respond. Several times I found it almost
impossible not to jump up and leave because comments were made that
were blatantly racist and should have been nixedl
I feel certain of one thing in this complex situation: the teacher has
a clear responsibility to try to understand how others in the class may
feel when discussion centers on race. White students who have had little
opportunity to think and talk about these issues may be experiencing
high levels of anxiety and conflict. One of my white students told me her
perspective on this:
I have become more comfortable with the overall subject matter that is
explored in this class. Getting off the slavery issue is in no small way
responsible for this more comfortable feeling. I didn't have to examine
myself very deeply to understand why this is true. I didn't have to consider if I am a "closet racist."
I feel that the reason for this is that we are now getting into issues
[of gender and employment law] about which I do not feel totally alienated. I have never been black, therefore, I couldn't possibly know the
feelings of those who are and who feel that their color has played a major
role in keeping them from doing whatever they chose to do. I seemed to
experience the most problems when I did try to put myself in the shoes of
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others and sometimes felt that somewhere, somehow, I should have done
something to try to make the situation better. Then the old guilt feelings
took over and eventually I would become angry with myself and probably with the people for which I had been concerned, and I would think, I
didn't do these things, then why should I feel like I owe anything to
anybody. What emerged here was a vicious cycle of ill feelings, sometimes directed at others and sometimes directed at myself. I wanted to
literally let out a giant WHEW when we moved on.
Similarly, members of racial minorities in a predominantly white
group discussing matters of race often feel in a bind that few white people
have imagined. One of my black students told me about his feelings:
In all candor I chose to take this course by default.... I had little desire
to take a class about discrimination offered by a school where my race
(African-American) comprised a numerical minority.
It has been my experience that most white people are really not very
interested in hearing about the problems that Black people face in this
country because of their blackness. The scenario is an all too familiar
one. First, the subject is opened. Next comes a rush of well-travelled
cliches in an attempt either to prove the absence of bigotry in the speaker,
or to demonstrate a deep understanding of the problem. Finally, conclusory and transitional statements ease the conversation into another
more worthy direction. Attempts to re-open discussion and show that
bigotry wears many faces, sometimes including the face that stares out of
the mirror, are met with pained expressions and impatience ....
These
interfaces, though typically low-key, invariably result in ulcer-like
abdominal pain for the African-American.
My experience has been that most white people aren't really very
interested in hearing about the travails of the African in America. As an
African-American, however, it's difficult for me not to speak about relevant facts in our history....
Most Black people know that most white people aren't particularly
interested in hearing about their struggles. As a result, soon after they
apprehend this, they simply don't initiate conversation on the subject.
No one, Black or white, enjoys having something which they hold in
great esteem minimized.
...And it seemed to me that if I enrolled in Discrimination and the
Law I would be faced with at least 40 days' worth of opportunities to feel
that familiar stab of ulcer-like pain tearing through my viscera.
These comments and others demonstrated that many students were
using the reflection papers to creatively handle and process at least some
of the powerful currents that were affecting the group and that the papers
could prove to be an important way for me to gauge what was happening
in the "underground" classroom. Many students were raising issues,
making arguments, and expressing feelings that they did not want to
raise publicly in class; they were telling stories that were too long or too
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personal for the larger group. 135 Here are some of their reactions to the
course format and materials:
I did not think of the effect that this class would have on me when I
signed up for it. I expected a typical law school class format with civil
rights cases substituted for tort or criminal cases or whatever curriculum
a required law school course would have.... Now, I am very glad that
this course is on my schedule, but I am also somewhat afraid.
I am afraid first of all because I believe that I am going to learn some
things about myself that I may not want to admit. I know that I am not
a racist; of that I am not afraid .... But like everyone else, I do have
prejudices, and I am going to have to admit them to myself....
What I am more afraid of though, is that I am going to discover that
our society is even more imperfect than I ever believed....
Another recorded his reactions to the readings:
The more I read articles on discrimination, the more I look at blacks who
do not know me and think, do they think I have racist feelings like the
articles discuss? This makes me feel more on guard and as a result, it
adds distance.. I am usually less aware of this and thus feel less like a
racist. I feel I am being more racist when I am simultaneously concentrating on why I might be discriminating.
A black student also commented on some of the painful effects of
increased awareness as he described his reaction to the documentary,
Eyes on the Prize:
As I watched the documentary ... I could not help but reflect upon
my "differentness."..... It was difficult to watch because it revealed the
extent of the brutality of racism....
The documentary was also difficult to watch because I could not
keep my eyes on the screen. I was quite mindful of the fact that I was
surrounded by young white southerners. I kept watching them and wondering if their thoughts of me were much different from those of their
grandparents and parents. I kept wondering if I could see it in their
faces, hear it in their laughter, or their sighs.
A white female student wrote:
This [class] is painful. Reflection requires realizing that I have lived
a sheltered existence in the center.
When I began the slavery material, I found that I did not want to
know the details of specific slaves' lives. It is fairly easy to discuss slavery
intellectually, generically, and in the past tense. It is far more difficult to
realize that we come from a society that sold wives away from their husbands and sold mothers away from their children.
135. I should hasten to add that not all the students found them particularly helpful. Questions
of style, taste, and methodology in the classroom can be as highly charged as matters of substance.
One student opened his first effort with these observations: "This assignment is somewhat puzzling

for me. If the purpose is to give my thoughts on the assigned readings, I'm afraid my comments will
be very brief. While I found the readings interesting, they provided me with no new information."
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A black woman observed:
I must admit that initially I was not very receptive to those persons with
views different from my own ....

I'm the type of person who is normally

willing to reach a compromise, but because racial discrimination is such
an important and unsettled issue, I found myself unable to digest much of
the information.
To my surprise, the more I read and the more I listened to you
discuss the issue in class, I began to realize that ignorance is truly not the
answer. I needed to really begin to understand why people have views
other than mine, to put myself in their position....
[B]ased on reading excerpts from the first set of [student reflection]
papers, . . . awareness of the problems posed by race is lacking. This is a

major shock to me, but again I must try to put myself in the position of
others. If nothing else is accomplished from this course, I hope we will
be able to provoke an awareness amongst members of the class in whom
it is lacking and maybe they will carry it beyond the walls of the
classroom.
One student criticized our historical examination of slavery:
[I] would like for this course to be a short history lesson and then get on
to issues that are facing us today. I think that slavery was an atrocity
that should not be repeated and I agree that we must know the past to
understand the present and protect the future, however, I have had this
history in high school classes, undergraduate history, Legal Process I,
and I understand that it will be covered extensively in Constitutional
Law, so I am getting somewhat bored.
In the same round of papers another student observed:
As I listen to the lectures on slavery, I realize how little I know
about the subject. My secondary education included some limited coverage of "Black History," but it never explored the intricacies of slavery.
As I listen, I also wonder how many are in a similar (or worse) position
.... I feel ignorant, deprived, and exploited. I feel imprisoned because
I'm skeptical that I'll ever allow myself to become informed about the
subject of American slavery: I don't have time, I won't make time,
others won't give me time. I feel that it matters to me, but does it really
matter in America? Can a Black man (better-an African-American)
"make it" in America if he places the knowledge of his physical and spiritual past among his priorities?
Racism hurts very much, and I've felt the pain. I want to listen, but
it hurts, because I'm tired of the talk. TALK, TALK, TALK, TALK!
It seems for every step forward, we take another two steps backward ....
Yet another student remarked:
The class materials concerning the emancipation of slaves and
Reconstruction have been educating and frustrating. First, the materials
have given me an opportunity to learn about my people-real and vivid
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accounts of my history. It's exciting to know that those testimonies are
being formally shared in the educational system, especially in the legal
system. Second, the materials have shown me that the law, in the hands
of those who support or tolerate oppression, was and still can be devastating for those who are oppressed. That knowledge gives me the courage and determination necessary to complete my legal education and to
take an active role in vindicating people's human rights.
Beyond discussing reactions to the readings and the class, student
reflection papers also opened a series of individual windows onto the
social experience of race in America, each with its own drama, each
enriched and given context by the others around it. (They also served to
remind me of the real diversity of beliefs and experiences that exists even
in a law school more homogeneous than many.) Consider these comments from a returning woman student with teenage children:
I had hints from Criminal Law I that there was an underlying
motive and message to vagrancy laws. I was shocked to see how they
arose in the Reconstruction South ....
The attitudes of the white people in the Reconstruction era sounded
very similar to the attitudes I heard routinely growing up in West Tennessee-talk of "uppity" blacks not knowing their place, how inherently
inferior they were, basically lazy and "shiftless," untrustworthy and
undependable. White girls like me should be especially fearful for what
black men might do to us! Don't be too friendly; they would get the
wrong idea. It wouldn't do any good to try to help them; they just waste
what you give them and aren't grateful anyway.
I grew up on a farm and worked in the fields with black people but
between work times we split up---to eat and rest. We drank from separate, large water containers! The black people did not like my father for
very justifiable reasons. He maintained a clear air of superiority and created an atmosphere of tension. The black field hands certainly showed
deference to him but I knew there was a world of emotion behind their
faces. To this day my father is a blatant racist, and I have never come to
terms with it. When I go to visit him, the anticipation of his racist
remarks fills me with dread.
Another younger student told his story:
The point I would like to discuss is one which I chose not to make in
class because I was certain that I would be misunderstood .... The flip
side of discrimination for reasons of greed and economic dominance is
reverse discrimination....

When I was in high school, I was told by my basketball teammates
(all black) to quit the team because they hated white people. I understand where blacks and other minorities may be bitter but discrimination
will never end until both sides try. These remarks from my teammates
bothered me because I liked these guys and gave them rides home after
practice! Whites discriminated against them, they discriminated against
me, and I was left to [feel] bitter towards blacks ....
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A man recently out of college offered these remarks:
I am from a southern family and grew up in a southern city .... Unfortunately, most of my family is rather biased and racist towards
blacks.... My aunt, a corporate executive in a Fortune 500 Company,
works with many blacks. But when at home, she refers to blacks as niggers. My uncle and cousin are even worse. Every single problem in our
city is related to the blacks who make up a slight majority of the city.
My cousin vows that blacks are not really humans but are descendants of
monkeys. He claims that blacks will not and cannot be equal to white
people.
I disagree with this view but I do not really express it to these members of my family.... If I do protest, I am attacking my own family and
what they would call our heritage. These institutions (family [and] heritage) are so powerful [and] revered in the South. I have always been
taught never to question the elders in the family. In addition, my family
is so wonderful and supportive that it is difficult. Thus ... the dilemma:
Am I perpetuating racism by not attacking it by attacking my family?...
I do not yet know how to resolve these conflicting but powerful feelings.
Another student observed:
I am persuaded that a key reason for discrimination lies not with anything we have discussed in class but with something much basermoney ....
... I am as guilty as the next white person in terms of discriminating
against the economically disadvantaged. I grew up in Appalachia in a
rather impoverished area....
I don't choose to spend my time with people who are economically
disadvantaged. I've been there. It's no fun. I think my attitude is typical
of many whites who discriminate against Blacks. It is the economic position that many discriminate against, not the skin color. I would be happy
for my children to attend school with Black children, however, I
wouldn't want my children to attend school with children from poor
[inner city neighborhoods] be they Black or White.
Another recalled:
For years, I thought the only blacks in our town were the gardener
and the maid/babysitter that worked for my parents. It sounds silly to
even admit now. I can still clearly recall the day I learned that Columbus (our gardener/handyman) had kids. I remember asking "Why
haven't I ever heard about this before? What are their names? How old
are they? Why haven't I met them at school?"
It's not that my parents ever said anything about discrimination and
race, it's the fact that they purposefully never spoke about the issues at
all. I suppose their actions were based on the loose "Christian" principle
of "if you can't say something nice, don't say anything at all." I think,

also, they believed ...
problem for them ....

that if they ignored it, then it didn't exist as a
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Even though I know that my parents had prejudice . . .against
blacks, I also recall the compassion my parents showed to the few blacks
that were in our lives. Like the time our black gardener walked MILES
to our house after he had been accidentally burned on his face and hands.
I remember him coming to the back door and asking for my Dad. When
I started to open the door and invite him into the kitchen, he stopped me.
I still remember his deep, kindly voice: "I've been burned and I don't
look so good now. I don't want you to get scared by looking at me. A
little girl shouldn't have to see this." His face was burned, and yet he
was concerned about how it would affect me!
It was years later that I realized the white people Columbus had
been working for when the accident happened wouldn't have helped him.
He had walked all the way to our house because he knew that Dad would
take him to the (white) hospital, pay, and see that he got medical
care....
While he was recovering and couldn't work, we took Columbus food
and money each week. This was the first time in my life that I saw the
"other side of town." I was amazed! A whole school full of black kids!
Black churches, and lots and lots of houses, in a big part of town I didn't
even know existed. I remember feeling totally amazed that there could
be THAT MANY KIDS that I didn't even know (after all, I knew ALL
the white kids in town.) I also remember asking, as we passed the black
school, "Who teaches them?" It was the first time I remember hearing
the words "separate but equal."
A white female student told of vivid memories of violent protests
over the singing of "Dixie" at her Tennessee high school and went on to
describe an incident later in her life when a black woman who worked in
the mailroom of her building "grabbed me by the arm, pushed a steel
letter opener to my throat, and let me know very clearly that she hated
me and all white people." The student described her fear during and
after the incident, the shame she felt for the fact that she had never taken
any action against her attacker. She went on to observe:
I believe Eyes on the Prize is a true account of the black's struggle for
equality at the hands of white people. I also believe that where this film
stopped, a new attitude emerged, led by Stokely Carmichael and other
militants, which was destructive and undermined much of the progress
that had been made. In my house, you see, the riots and violence were
"expected." It was just a matter of time.
Several white students had experienced brushes with racism because
friendships with blacks had exposed attitudes in others that would otherwise have remained invisible:
[As a staff worker in a recent presidential campaign], I went to Illinois to supervise the final week of petition gathering necessary to get us
on the ballot in that state. I was staying in the home of some supporters
in Champaign. A black friend of mine from Chicago agreed to come
down and spend a couple of days helping me out. After my hosts met my
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friend. . . it was made clear to me that they would prefer we found
somewhere else to stay. I was simply stunned that two educated people
would be uncomfortable having a black man sleep in their home.
Similarly, another recalled:
Before coming to the University of Tennessee as a junior, I spent
two years at, as Lewis Grizzard would say, "a large Southern University." The school is located in an agrarian setting right in the heart of the
Deep South. There were almost no blacks enrolled at that school of
eighteen thousand students, except of course for the athletes. I was living
in some apartments that bordered campus. Some friends of mine came
down from Nashville for Homecoming my sophomore year. One of
those friends was a former high school football star who also happened to
be black.
For reasons I can't recall, "Charles" decided not to go to the game
on Saturday, choosing to stay in my apartment and watch TV. Given the
importance of football at this school, the apartment complex was virtually empty during the game. At some point during the game Charles
stepped outside to look around a bit. As he was going back in the apartment he was accosted by two local policemen. They came into the apartment, without a warrant, and proceeded to give my friend the third
degree about who he was and what he was doing there. At first they did
not seem to want to believe that Charles was a friend of mine staying the
weekend despite the fact that he had several pieces of identification as
well as the key to my apartment. If I recall correctly, they even went so
far as to level threats against him. After putting him through this humiliation for a while the police finally left.
...
I will never forget how embarrassed and upset I was when I
returned from the game. For his part, I'm not sure that Charles left the
apartment the rest of the weekend. He just wanted to get out of there,
and vowed to never return. As it turned out, I was not far behind him.
Another recalled an incident whose ambiguity has teased her, perhaps
increasingly so as she learned more about the views and experiences of
African-Americans:
My mother was a "working" mother.... My brother, sister, and I had a
series of babysitters/housekeepers. In keeping with the southern 1950's
tradition, they were all black women.
On one particular hot, summer afternoon, my mother came home to
discover her two daughters, five and six years old, blonde and red-haired,
playing outside with the other white neighborhood children with their
heads covered with multiple erect braids ....
My mother was vastly
amused though she did request that in the future our hair remain loose or
confined in a simple barrette. I have wondered on several occasions
about the "feeling" which prompted this woman to adorn us with what
was so obviously a cultural coiffure.
Several years ago, after I recognized that my father was a rather
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obvious racist, I contemplated the possibility of a more sinister reason.
Could this woman, who had for most of her life worked as a domestic for
white families in the south, have intended to subtly insult my parents?
Or engage in some spontaneous mischief not serious enough to result in
her discharge but that could express her recognition of my parents'
apparent sense of superiority?... I am wholly unwilling to accept that
she intended to subject my sister and me to the derision of our
playmates....
The interpretation with which I am most comfortable is that, from
her perspective, it was an attractive and acceptable hair style ....
A woman who had been barely in her teens when chosen with one other
black student to help desegregate a large local school in the upper South
had this to say:
I was captivated by the film series Eyes on the Prize. [The film] catapulted me back into time. I relived sit-ins, the marches, and the school
integration confrontations. I found myself remembering the frequent
rides in the police paddy wagons and the over-crowded jails.
I found myself fighting back tears and trying to control hostile feelings that had suddenly engulfed me. I became frustrated and angry with
myself to find even after all of these years I could be so deeply wounded
over the past. I thought that I had overcome the world and its injustice
with regard to race discrimination. I thought I had truly developed the
tolerance and love necessary to love those who [ ]spitefully misused me.
Eyes on the Prize exposed a part of me that revealed the cracks in my
character that I thought were so minute and undetectable by the outside
world....
* I saw my tormentors, and for the first time in my life, I wanted
to make them feel my hurt, my despair, and my shame ....
A young white man observed:
Segregation still exists today. It exists by choice in both whites and
blacks.... This "choice segregation" is very evident by driving down
[the local college strip] on a Saturday night. Blacks hang out on the east
end of the strip and whites hang out on the west side of the strip. The
Knoxville Journal recently ran a story about "racial tensions" on the
strip. That story was a total crock. I frequently visit the strip and I see
how things work. Blacks don't stay away from the white side because
whites don't want them, blacks stay on their own "end" because they
prefer hanging out with blacks ....White people don't hang out on the
"black end" because they choose to hang out with whites.
Fights do break out between blacks and whites. Fights break out
also however, between whites and whites, blacks and blacks, old and
young ....
As far as racial tensions, more blacks start fights with whites, than
whites start fights with blacks. (Largely due to the fact that blacks "hang

1991]

RACE IN LEGAL EDUCATION

1569

out" in greater numbers.) Ten on four, eight on one. I've seen it and I'm
not going to let the Knoxville Journal make these students in this school
out to be a bunch of bigots.
Another related:
My county is divided into two regions, and [my half] has only one black
resident .... A KKK klavern assembles less than one mile from my
home. When I was in high school we had a cross put in our yard with a
message from the Klan. It seems that they were upset because I played
basketball with and against blacks. Even with all of this happening
around me I never questioned its place in my life. I didn't think of blacks
as inferior, merely separate. It was not until I attended UT that I realized that separate is inferior.
I now try to reason out why [when I had a job where I was supposed
to keep an eye on customers, I watched] blacks closer than whites, or
why I notice when a black enters a room full of whites, or why there has
never been a black man in either my home or my church.
Another recalled:
The county I am from is small. There are only about 18,000 people
there. Less than 5% of the population is black. There are no professional blacks in the work force. There are only two black teachers in the
school system. The blacks all live in two main neighborhoods in town
and do not go to the restaurants or places where the whites go. They stay
to themselves or in the margins. There is no real intermixing of blacks
and whites except within the athletic teams. I have never thought that
the blacks in our town were staying in the margins, but in fact that is
what they were doing.
After I sat for awhile and studied longer about the diagram, I realized that I am one of the people on the margin. Me, an upper middle
class white person who has a college education and is studying to be an
attorney, am on the margin. I am a female trying to move into the
predominantly male oriented world of law. I realized these differences
this summer when I worked at a large firm ...as a clerk. I was the only
female out of seven clerks. I realized I was not treated as an equal when
all the guys got to go play golf one day and no one even invited me....
All of the guys were very nice to me but they never really got to
know me. I heard all their stories all the time but they never really took
the time or seemed to really want to know about me. I was accepted if I
stayed quiet and did not make any waves.
Another said:
I was raised in a family that was as void of racial prejudice as is possible.
My family worked actively for civil rights and lived by their convictions.
I have an adopted brother and sister that are Korean, and my family is
very supportive of my present relationship with a black man. And yet, as
void of prejudice as I am, and as happy as I am with my companion, I
still contemplate whether I am doing the right thing, given the circumstances of my relationship, by planning to marry and have children. I
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recognize that I would not lead a "normal life" and I worry about the

burden we would put on our children. It is in this regard that I look to
the strength, courage and foresight of the abolitionists.

Another student told of a recent incident that had stuck with her:
A week or so before school started, my husband rented the movie,
"Betrayed." It was about an investigation by the CIA into . . . an

attempt by "white supremacists" to annihilate the "undesirables" in
America: Jews, homosexuals, and blacks.... [The movie ends with a

young captured black man delivered in handcuffs by a county deputy and
released like a game animal to be hunted and killed for sport.]
When I returned the movie to the rental store, a black couple was
standing at the counter. The woman commented that she had seen it. I
asked, "What year was this movie?" She said "1989." I thought she was
saying when the movie became available on video and clarified by asking,
"No, what year was this story supposed to be?" She answered as if
explaining to a small child, "When the sun goes down."

After reading the papers I decided they were too interesting for me
to hold a monopoly on them. I allowed students to designate their
papers "not for publication," and a few students did so. All the others,
however, I edited"3 6 and anthologized without attribution and then xer1 37
oxed for distribution to the class.
We repeated this process for a series of later rounds.1 38 Each stu136. Editing criteria gradually evolved to include the following: each person would have
something included; repetitive or less interesting material was omitted; anything designated not for
publication was, of course, culled out, along with any remarks that clearly identified the speaker or
any other class member.
137. I learned that I had to distribute these at the end of the hour or I would lose half the class
members for as long as it took them to read through the handout.
138. The only change I made in the assignment was that for each group's second round of
papers I instituted a system whereby students could turn in their papers anonymously. This was not
for purposes of grading the papers because they were scored simply pass-fail and it would have taken
drastic noncompliance with the assignment to fail. But I was aware (and specifically explained) that
in an assignment of this kind in a course on this subject, some students might feel impelled to curry
favor or avoid censure. One student observed in his first reflection paper:
The most memorable racial discrimination I witnessed was in a fraternity. People I knew
fairly well said a black could rush, but that a black was not going to get a bid. I remember
these people, who would be just as apt to take Discrimination and Law as anyone in this
class, and it makes me very skeptical of the lofty comments classmates make. I believe
some are being hypocritical and that seems like a bigger wall than the racism ....
I feel
they are not saying what they feel, but rather what sounds eloquent, ideal, compassionate,
or what they think you want to hear.
I was not as pessimistic as this student in my reading of class discussions up to that early point
but I certainly took his comments seriously. Although I could not follow up on student comments, I
believe the anonymity was a satisfactory addition and may have elicited a greater range of
comments.
However, one important limitation must be noted. If African-American students wanted to
include reflections on their racial identity or racial experiences, they lost a much greater degree of
insulation from accurate guesses about their identity than did white students because the ratio of
black to white students was less than one to five.
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dent turned in two such papers by the end of the semester, each geared to
a different set of readings and discussions. The edited and circulated ver-

sions then functioned as a kind of anonymous bulletin board or newsletter where class members could air opinions and reactions as we moved

through the course.
For a large class handling a deeply divisive subject, I believe this
method opened opportunities for protected expression and dialogue. In
some ways these notes from the underground classroom will stay with
139
me the longest and may in fact represent the heart of the experience.
They also, I believe, served as a further sign that varying points of view,
perspectives, and contributions were not only tolerated by the instructor

but were an important part of the class.
I intended in Part II to show in concrete terms how one law teacher

approached the teaching of race as a core feature of the American legal
canon. I have paid attention both to the aboveground and underground
aspects of the endeavor because I believe both are important in the actual
planning and teaching of courses. I also think that both aspects weigh
heavily upon our initial decision whether or not to proceed at all." In
the next part of this Essay I want to revisit both Part I and Part II.
139. Cf J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275 (1989) (playing delightfully with
and beyond the idea that footnotes should not be "marginalized" () and that sometimes footnotes
can be more important than the text).
140. In the course of a recent controversy at the University of Texas, for example, some faculty
members planned a freshman writing course whose readings and written assignments would focus in
large part on questions of race. A strong opponent of the plan observed: "If such courses are to be
taught responsibly, they must be taught by trained faculty members from disciplines like sociology,
psychology, or cultural anthropology, not by English teachers. Being passionate about the issues
doesn't confer the expertise to deal with them in the classroom." Maxine C. Hairston, Required
Writing CoursesShould Not Focus on Politically ChargedIssues, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 23, 1991,
at B1, col. 3.
As I suppose is already obvious, I fully acknowledge the explosive and otherwise difficult nature
of race as a topic in the classroom. Nevertheless, I think that Hairston's position is seriously flawed.
She presented race and racism as subjects that should be handled only by experts. If we give up on
our own ability to deal with this subject directly despite its undeniable difficulties and the necessity
for perspicacity and care, then it seems to me we truly have no hope of significantly transcending our
current predicament. See David Schoem, College Students Need Thoughtful, In-DepthStudy ofRace
Relations, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 3, 1991, at A48, col. I (arguing that the academic setting is the
most appropriate for studying race relations in-depth).
Further, I do believe there are concrete pedagogical skills that teachers could learn that would
help us navigate these waters. See, eg., Katherine S. Mangan, Colleges Offer Cultural-Awareness
Programsto Help Professors UnderstandNeeds ofMinority Students, Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 6,
1991, at All, col. 2. At my own institution two black women, with a grant from the Fund for the
Improvement of Post Secondary Education, have developed a series of videotapes on race-charged
student-teacher interactions and are using them to stimulate discussion and reflection among
university teachers. Information is available from Camille Hazeur and Dhyana Ziegler, University
of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996.
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III
RACE IN THE LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM AND IN THE
LEGAL CANON: THE THESIS REVISITED

I began this Essay with a thesis about race and the canon in American legal education. First, I claimed that matters of race are centrally
located in the core texts of American law and should be taught as central
to our legal heritage. Second, I argued that legal educators should be
able to reach common ground about that centrality and to do so with
refreshing ease. Then, in Part II, I told some stories from my own teaching experiences in an effort to ground my thesis in real texts and real
students and to suggest ways that a law teacher might begin to experiment with the undertaking I urge.
Now in Part III I want to complicate the picture by revisiting both
the theoretical canon debate and the concrete realities of practice in the
classroom, this time focusing on some of the thorniest questions. First, I
will revisit Part II, taking up two teaching issues: (1) the presence and
significance of values in the classroom (the "indoctrination issue"); and
(2) the difficulty of negotiating racial dynamics in the classroom in a way
that is both fair to and supportive of all students (doing "the right
thing"). Next I will revisit Part I, probing more deeply into my initial
thesis that legal educators should be able to reach relatively easy consensus on the centrality of race to our tradition.
A.
i.

The Classroom

On Indoctrination

The debate about indoctrination in the classroom is a strand of a
larger debate about the meanings and possibilities of objectivity. That
larger debate has threaded its way through discussions of ethical standards for law teachers. 4 1 It has fueled a major project of feminist juris141. In 1989, in a draft report, The Special Committee on the Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities of Law Professors addressed the problem of objectivity and instructed professors to
avoid using the classroom "to indoctrinate students concerning [their] political or social agenda."
Association of American Law Schools, Draft Report of the Special Committee on the Ethical and
Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors 5 (Jan. 1989) (section entitled "Responsibilities to
Students") (emphasis added). However, the final draft recommended simply that "tleachers should
nurture and protect intellectual freedom for their students and colleagues." Association of
American Law Schools, Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the Discharge of their
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities 5 (Oct. 1989) (also known as the Byse Report).
Commenting on the initial draft repori, Jeffrey Jackson compared "Professor-of-the-Year," a
witty, well-prepared, dynamic teacher of the traditional case method, and "Professor-of-the-Left," a
social critic who openly and eloquently expresses his political views and agenda in class:
Professor-of-the-Year seems as much, if not more of an indoctrinator than Professorof-the-Left. Professor-of-the-Year's indoctrination is more subtle and therefore probably
harder for his students to identify and challenge. His concealment of his agenda, while not
dishonest (indeed, he concealed his agenda because he honestly believed he should not
force his views on his students), did not and will not lead to honest debate about that
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prudence, that of exposing the "male norm" that is the unspoken and

presumptively neutral starting point for so much legal analysis and social
practice.142 It has also provoked a productive turn in feminist discourse

under the leadership of feminist women of color.143
Issues of objectivity and indoctrination also fuel the debate over the
core curriculum with which this Essay began. Since the time I taught the
discrimination class and wrote the first draft of this Essay, the canon
debate has erupted into the nonacademic press and has risen in both vol-

ume and pitch. The question of indoctrination looms large in this latest
turn in the conversation.

14

agenda. On the other hand, Professor-of-the-Left takes his responsibility to act on his
deeply held moral convictions seriously and therefore he spreads his good news for the
benefit of his students. He too is an indoctrinator-but he is more candid about his
agenda....
Indoctrination should not be condemned. Instead it should be acknowledged.
Jeffrey Jackson, Commentary on the Byse Report 5-7 (Aug. 10-12, 1989) (paper delivered to AALS
Southeastern Regional Meeting) (on file with author).
142. Se eg., Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1120 (1986) ("Our legal system... Dlleaves
unquestioned the notion that life patterns and values that are stereotypically male are the norm.").
A story that I believe began as fact but has now passed into legal feminist folklore is the story of
the woman judge who was sitting in a sex discrimination case. Counsel for the defense moved that
she excuse herself because she could not help but be biased since she was a woman! The assumption
by this fabled counsel that a male judge would be neutral appears to be as unconscious as it is
incongruous. Professor Jerome Cuip addressed an analogous, although more complex, example of
this same phenomenon in the context of a black judge who was ordered to excuse himself from a
school desegregation case because of his past involvement as a desegregation advocate. See Culp,
supra note 14, at 58-62.
143. See, eg., B. HOOKS, supra note 42 (feminist theory itself has often fallen prey to a
presumptive white middle-class norm, thus failing to appreciate or address the experiences and needs
of most black women); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981)
(impact of sexism on black women throughout history); GLORIA I. JOSEPH & JILL LEwIS, COMMON
DIFFERENCES: CONFLICTS IN BLACK AND WHITE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES

(1981) (racial and

sexual factors have both contributed to the oppression of women and are often assessed differently by
black and white women); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, THE INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (notion of "woman" in feminist theory often serves to
mask the heterogeneity of women); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITING BY RADICAL
WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfa eds. 1989) (different kinds of women
should listen to each other and learn each other's ways of seeing and being); Harris, supra note 14, at
581 (experience of black women is often ignored in both feminist and legal theory); Elizabeth
Higginbotham, Feminism and the Academy, 2 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD. A.J. 105 (1990) (diversity of
women's experiences needs to be better reflected in feminist scholarship); Marlee Kline, Race,
Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989) (diversity of women's
experience of oppression based on gender and race is often obscured in writings of white feminist
legal scholars). Other sources on the same subject include a number of publications available from
the Center for Research on Women at Memphis State University: Patricia H. Collins, Toward a
New Vision: Race, Class and Gender as Categoriesof Analysis & Connection (May 24, 1989) (keynote
address delivered at a workshop on Integrating Race and Gender into the College Curriculum);
Higginbotham, supra note 5; Lynn W. Cannon, Elizabeth Higginbotham & Marianne L. A. Leung,
Race and Class Bias in Research on Women: A Methodological Note (Res. Paper No. 5, 1987).
144. William J. Bennett, for example, now a senior fellow in cultural-policy studies at the
Heritage Foundation, said "'there are those on campus doing exactly what the American people
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A series of well-placed articles recently has described a "crisis" in
higher education. 145 The articles synthesized previously disparate
have feared and have now discovered-ideological brainwashing.'" Stephen Burd, Bennett: 'I
Mean, It's
a Disaster' Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 23, 1991, at A5, col. 5.
145. See, eg., ArLynn L. Presser, The Politically Correct Law School. Where It's
Right to be
Left, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 52 (reporting that law schools too are involved in this controversy);
Dinesh D'Souza, In the Name of Academic Freedom, Colleges Should Back Professors Against
Students'Demandsfor 'Correct' Views, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 24, 1991, at Bl, col. 2 (voicing
concerns about what author sees as routine intimidation of "politically incorrect" professors); The
Wrong Way to Reduce Campus Tensions A Statement by the National Association of Scholars,
Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 24, 1991, at A15 (advertisement stating that recent university policies
and practices, including the preferential treatment of ethnic minorities, undermine tolerance and
fairness); William A. Henry III, Upside Down in the Groves ofAcademe, TIME, Apr. 1, 1991, at 66
(reporting that "a new intolerance is on the rise," and sharing "[b]ulletins from the P.C. [f]ront");
Dinesh D'Souza, IlliberalEducation, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1991, at 51 [hereinafter D'Souza,
Illiberal Education] (containing a lengthy preview of Dinesh D'Souza's book of the same name
which has since been released and become a best seller); NEW REPUBLIc, Feb. 19, 1991 (devoted
almost entirely to the subject of race on campus, reporting what it sees as a pathological racial
unease fueled by multiculturalism gone awry); Taylor, supra note 130 (examining the tensions that
the so-called politically correct movement has caused); NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1990 (criticizing the
"New McCarthyism" of political correctness).
Responses, both positive and negative, to these and similar articles, and now to D'Souza's book,
have not been long in coming. See, eg., Daphne Patai, Minority Status and the Stigma of 'Surplus
Visibility' Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 30, 1991, at A52, col. 1 (arguing that much of the heat in the
antimulticulturalist campaign can be attributed to the fact that "[flor those who long have been in
positions of dominance, any space that minorities occupy appears excessive and the voices they raise
sound loud and offensive"); Patricia J. Williams, Blockbusting the Canon, Ms., Sept./Oct. 1991, at
59 (criticizing and describing the sometimes chilling effects of attacks on multiculturalism); Maurice
Isserman, Travels with Dinesh (Book Review), TIKKUN, Sept./Oct. 1991, at 81 (reviewing D'Souza's
IlliberalEducation and criticizing his methodology and conclusions); Catharine R. Stimpson, Big
Man on Campus, NATON, Sept. 30, 1991, at 378 (criticizing D'Souza's book for inaccuracies and
self-serving omissions); Wiener, supra note 130 (criticizing as grossly inaccurate the treatment of an
incident at Harvard by both D'Souza and Taylor); G. Calvin Mackenzie, Fallaciesof PC, Chron.
Higher Educ., Sept. 4, 1991, at Bl, col. 2 (arguing that the campaign against political correctness is
inappropriately alarmist); C. Vann Woodward, Freedom & the Universities, N.Y. Review of Books,
Jul. 18, 1991, at 32 (sympathetically reviewing IlliberalEducation); Peter Erickson, Rather Than
Reject a Common Culture, Multiculturalism Advocates a More Complicated Route by Which to
Achieve It, Chron. Higher Educ., June 26, 1991, at Bl, col. 2 (calling upon multiculturalists to
respond to recent attacks by explaining that a common culture must be continually "created anew by
engaging the cultural differences that are part of American life," id. at B2, col. 4); Bob Beyers,
MachiavelliLoses Ground at Stanford; Bible Holds Its Own, Chron. Higher Educ., June 19, 1991, at
B2, col. 1 (critically responding to D'Souza); Michael Berube, Public Image Limited: Political
Correctnessand the Media's Big Lie, Village Voice, June 18, 1991, at 31, col. 1 (critically reviewing
books by Alan Bloom and Roger Kimball, Taylor's New York article, and the Atlantic's preview of
D'Souza's Illiberal Education); Richard Goldstein, The Politics of Political Correctness, Village
Voice, June 18, 1991, at 39, col. 1 (criticizing the campaign against "P.C." as giving people an excuse
to avoid difficult questions about race and gender); Stephen Greenblatt, The Best Way to Kill Our
Literary Inheritance Is to Turn It into a Decorous Celebration of the New World Order, Chron.
Higher Educ., June 12, 1991, at B1, col. 2 (responding to article by George Will that criticized
professors of literature who examine racial, gender, and social issues in literature); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Some FactualCorrectnessAbout PoliticalCorrectness, Wall St. J., June 6, 1991, at A17, col.
3 (law professor at Duke University criticizing campaign against "P.C." for mischaracterizing the
movement and failing to address the important substantive issues underlying controversy);
Catharine R. Stimpson, New 'Politically Correct' Metaphors Insult History and Our Campuses,
Chron. Higher Educ., May 29, 1991, at A40, col. I (describing history of antimulticulturalism
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themes, weaving them together into an expose and warning.146 The
authors portrayed the integrity of the American university as threatened
by a tangle of destructive attitudes and practices, one of which is an
oppressive new orthodoxy of multiculturalism. This spate of articles
demonstrates a new turn in the canon debate, not only in the success of
its attempt to project the debate beyond academia, 4 7 and not only in the

troublingly nasty tone of some of the recent pronouncements, 148 but also
in the characterization of "the problem" in broader terms. Now the dancampaign and accusing it of "sloppiness about the facts," "selective use of evidence," and
"manipulation of fear"); Eugene Genovese, Heresy, Yes-Sensitivity, No: An Argument for
Counterterrorismin the Academy, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 1991, at 30 (seconding D'Souza's views
on the corrosive effects of multiculturalism); Paula Rothenberg, Critics of Attempts to Democratize
the CurriculumAre Waging a Campaign to Misrepresentthe Work ofResponsible Professors; Chron.
Higher Educ., Apr. 10, 1991, at Bi, col. 2 (responding to Newsweek and other articles that had
reported disapprovingly on her 1988 book Racism and Sexism: An Integrated Study).
146. The original spate of "anti-P.C." articles described what the authors saw as
multiculturalist excess and deplored the proliferation of "politically correct" students, professors,
and administrators whom they portrayed as a dominant force on most campuses. ('Politically
correct" is a phrase originally coined by the left, usually levelled as a mocking criticism of fellow
critics who had become too narrowly and rigidly bound to some position or principle whose
significance they overrated. Appropriated by the right, it has now permeated all parts of the
spectrum as a solemn buzzword in the controversy.) See, eg., NEw REPUBLIc, Feb. 18, 1991. Most
sensationalist, perhaps, was an article that opened with a full-page collage of Chinese Red Guards
punishing dissenters and gloating Nazis burning books during the 1930s. See Taylor, supra note
130, at 33. One of the most troubling features of these reports is their frequent implication that those
questioning the traditional canon, pushing for diversity, or advocating multicultural experiences in
the classroom take a kind of diabolical pleasure in attacking all that others hold dear. For some
sense of how painful the act of criticism can be, even for the critic herself, see ADRIENNE RICH,
Twenty-One Love Poems, in THE DREAM OF A COMMON LANGUAGE: POEMS 1974-1977, at 27
(1978) ("[olnce open the books, you have to face the underside of everything you've loved").
147. Dinesh D'Souza, for example, spoke of wanting to "mend" the "troubling ignorance" of
the American public regarding the "revolution" that allegedly had taken place in our universities.
See D'Souza, Illiberal Education, supra note 145. And in fact the controversy has to an amazing
degree become a matter of popular polemics, with contributions from conservative columnists (for
example, James Kilpatrick, Intellectual Virus Newly Fashionable Multiculturalism Threatens
Fundamental Western Values, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Feb. 11, 1991, at A6, col. 1; George Will,
PoliticalIndoctrinationSupplantsEducation, Knoxville J., Sept. 27, 1990, at 16A, col. 3); and even
the President (for example, Christopher Myers, Many Praise Bush for Lashing Out at 'Political
Correctness' Concept, but OthersSee Misrepresentation,Chron. Higher Edue., May 15, 1991, at A23,
col. 1; John E. Yang, PresidentAssails Silencing of UnpopularViewpoints: Speech Denounces 'Politics
of Division' Wash. Post, May 5, 1991, at A8, col. 5).
148. Boston University President John Silber, attending a conference sponsored by the Madison
Center, reportedly "called upon speakers to discredit scholars whose work they considered
politicized or shoddy. 'Why be so civil? Why be so cordial?' he said, adding that such scholars
could be discredited 'if they were subjected to the ridicule they so richly deserve.'" Carolyn J.
Mooney, Scholars Decry Campus Hostility to Western Culture at a Time When More Nations
Embrace Its Values, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 30, 1991, at A16, col. 1.
The tone of these complaints startles me. The people I know who are the most interested in
multiculturalism are (a) not totalitarian zealots and (b) seldom in positions of significant power.
Frankly, it is difficult for a person in my position (new, female, untenured, committed to race as a
central issue for the law and for legal education) not to feel alarmed at this rhetoric. The approach
to legal education I have described and advocated in this Essay would surely subject me to
accusations of indoctrination from these canon defenders.
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ger is cast not simply as one of canon erosion but rather as the infiltration
into the university of a whole web of destructive beliefs and practices that
are ostensibly involved in multiculturalism. 14 9 One of the practices of

which multiculturalists are accused is the use of the classroom as a site
for indoctrination.
From my vantage point, it is not the conservative critics but scholars
and teachers calling for a newly inclusive academy who have the most
reasonable grounds for fear. 150 When I look around at the institutions of
149.

One of the distinctive features of this new turn is its "multi-issue" theme. Some of the

strands knitted together in the campaign against the "politically correct" are: (1) defense of a
traditional western (although now somewhat modulated) canon; (2) the celebration of meritocracy
(undergirded by a strong faith that we once enjoyed such a system and could define it again by a set
of relatively unproblematic neutral standards); (3) the denunciation of affirmative action in hiring
and admissions as both unfair and ineffective; (4) the embrace of scholarly objectivity and rejection
of relativism; and (5) the charge that advocates of an expanded canon and a more inclusive
university have ironically created an atmosphere where freedom of speech and thought are stifled
rather than nourished. See sources cited supra note 145. This is a broad agenda indeed-and an

important one.
Exemplifying this multifaceted vision, one commentator has stated: "The debates are linked
.... The real issues-the ones underlying a wide range of campus debates-include the assumption
by many that Western values are inherently oppressive, that the chief purpose of education is
political transformation, and that all standards are arbitrary." D'Souza, IlliberalEducation,supra
note 145, at 51 (editor's introduction) (emphasis in original).
I do not believe that either the tone or the individual components of this synthesis will prove
persuasive to many in academia. As to affirmative action, though for healthy functioning it needs
more close attention and concrete care in administration than it sometimes receives, too many of us
know too well the reasons why it has developed and the debilitating costs that would follow its
abandonment. As to multiculturalist expansion of texts and subjects studied, too many of us are too
excited at what newcomer texts and newcomer voices are bringing to university offices and
classrooms and are also too aware of continuing racial disparities and divisions and of demographic
trends to feel that we can or should put the challenges of multiculturalism aside. As to the ideal of
neutrality, too many of us are too much children of the twentieth century to rally to purist calls for a
return to unproblematic "objectivity."
There will, of course, be many spirited disagreements about what kinds of affirmative action we
should implement on whose behalf, about what kinds of canon expansion we should undertake, and
about what kinds of strategies and principles we can employ to challenge and evaluate our own and
others' claims in a world where we can no longer assert the objectivity of values. But this is precisely
the stuff of an exciting intellectual and institutional life.
150. One source of this fear has to do with the difficulty of dialogue in the atmosphere created
by the "anti-P.C." campaign. The way canon defenders have structured their critique (branding
multiculturalists as people bent upon bringing their own zealous agendas into academic discourse
and pushing their own values down the throats of powerless and disoriented students) has a
peculiarly potent ability to stop or to poison further conversation. Those who attack
multiculturalism have called foul about what they see as the conversation-stopping quality of some
multiculturalist discourse. This is a complaint I believe must be taken seriously. If the canon
defenders wish to be even minimally consistent or fair, however, they should examine their own
moves.
A second source of this fear has to do with the tone of some of the attacks already mentioned
above. Likely neither side has a monopoly on name-calling or on truth. But when I see that a
conference keynoted by the chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities also featured
speakers who decried "radical anti-Americanism" and "agreed it was important to 'name names'
(Mooney, supra note 148), or when I hear one critic of multiculturalism opining that "w]e are again
witnessing the growth of conspiratorial forms of campus radicalism" (Fred Siegel, The Cult of
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which I am a part, it appears to me that traditional patterns of race and
gender distribution remain largely intact. Changes have occurred but the
progress is uneven, uncertain, and slow. And at least in my environment,
the notion that multiculturalism has grown sick on its own power sounds
bizarre."' 1
Of course my interpretation is contestable. It is a strange feature of
these debates that people on both sides speak as though they feel vulnerable and powerless. Dinesh D'Souza said, "Most university presidents
and deans cooperate with the project to transform liberal education in
the name of minority victims" and described advocates for inclusiveness
as "in many places dominant."15 2 A professor speaking at the University
Multiculturalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 34, 35), then I shiver. When I pick up my local
campus newspaper and see the following description of the threat posed to the university by people
like me, I believe that its author has misperceived the threat:
PC refers to a revolutionary movement within American universities all across the
country. PC is a way of thinking, and this way of thinking leads to authoritarian
conclusions about what the goals and methods of universities ought to be. It is a serious
threat to American universities and the students who will be studying there ....
...Many of [the PC] conclude that Western culture is inherently inferior ....
They also formulate the content of the courses and present their course material in a
way to further their political agenda. Books are chosen on the basis only of the race or
gender of the author and the anti-Western message they promote ....
The PC also take a hostile stance toward individual freedom ....
... My department, political science, has been convicted of racism without a trial
because it lacks a black faculty member. The mere assertion is conviction, no argument or
proof required. This absurd method represents the McCarthyistic tactics of the PC-yes,
they're even here at U.T.
Stephen Clark, New McCarthyism Threatens Campus, Daily Beacon, Mar. 7, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
151. Although this is hard to document, a few scattered facts may provide some flavor if not
concrete support. Fewer than 10% of our students are nonwhite. There is not a single gay or
lesbian law student on our campus who has yet made his or her sexual orientation known to the law
school community at large. Until last fall, there was no course that dealt in any significant way with
feminist legal theory. We have no courses on comparative law.
I do not recite these facts in order to assign blame. Multiple factors contribute to the
atmosphere here, which is not unlike that at many other fine law schools. Remembering the specifics
of a real institution can, however, cast a somewhat different light on the crisis of "Multiculturalism
Triumphant" as it is depicted in some recent articles.
The substantive charges of attempted thought-control and coerced conformity that the same
articles level against those who are pressing for the greater inclusion of "outsider" texts and people
in the academy are a similar distortion. I urge both my colleagues and my students to measure the
charges carefully against their own experience and against the facts because I believe if they do so,
they must fairly conclude that the attack is profoundly off the mark.
152. D'Souza, Illiberal Education, supra note 145, at 55, 57. In my own view the generous
resources that have been visited upon Mr. D'Souza himself are worth noting in this regard. Of
course, it is quite proper for people and corporations and foundations of all stripes to fund and
groom thinkers and activists of whom they approve. Likewise, however, it is helpful for all
concerned to be aware of the players who have involved themselves in particular controversies.
During his Ivy League undergraduate days, Mr. D'Souza was editor-in-chief of the Dartmouth
Review, one of a network of conservative newspapers that began to emerge on college campuses early
in the 1980s, supported by conservative funders like the Olin Foundation. He went on to edit a
Heritage Foundation quarterly, to serve as a domestic policy analyst in the Reagan White House,
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of Pennsylvania apparently felt so embattled that he called upon his traditionalist colleagues to help create "the monasteries of a new dark ages,
preserving what is worth preserving amid the barbaric ravages in the
countrysides and towns of academe." '53 On the other hand, a young
faculty member from another university observed that "'[just as these
voices are being heard, they're being bashed as robotic arbiters of political correctness. It's an effective tool, the powerful presenting themselves

as powerless.' "154
At any rate, the controversy now raging about the canon, diversity,
and the mission of the university creates a highly charged environment in
which to be struggling with the indoctrination issue. My own sense is
that for a good teacher there would be some degree of irreducible
dilemma even if the "P.C. Wars" had not begun. I will address that
dilemma in the remarks that follow.
First, I find it relatively easy (perhaps because it seems to me so
inescapably necessary) to reject aspirations to pure objectivity or neutrality. None of us is capable of having a God's-eye view of the world or its
people, and the result of aspiring to achieve such a fiction is an unacknowledged point of view, surely more pernicious and misleading than a
committed but acknowledged one.1 55 As one participant in the curriculum debate observed:
and to join the American Enterprise Institute. See Denise K. Magner, Piercingthe 'Posturingand
Taboo' of Debate on Campus Reforms, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 10, 1991, at A3, col. 2.
153. Debra E. Blum, Scholars Who See Colleges in the Thrall of Politics Meet to Plan a
Counterattack, Chron. Higher Educ., June 20, 1990, at A16, col. 5. The professor spoke at a
meeting of the National Association of Scholars that was called to address what its members claimed
was an increasingly hostile environment for scholars who hold traditional views on academic
matters. Id at A15, col. 3. The Association held its third annual meeting in fall 1991. Denise K.
Magner, Gathering to Assess Battle Against 'PoliticalCorrectness,' Scholars Look for New Ways to
Resist 'IlliberalRadicals' Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 30, 1991, at A17, col. 2. The National
Association of Scholars is only one of the organizations now focusing its energies on this
controversy. See Mooney, supra note 148, at A16, col. 3 (reporting that former secretary of
education William J. Bennett and Professor Allan Bloom of the University of Chicago are involved
with an organization that has held two widely publicized conferences, plans an "academic guide to
colleges," and runs a "network for student newspapers founded to provide an alternative-more
conservative-voice to mainstream student publications"); see also Carolyn J. Mooney, Academic
Group Fightingthe 'PoliticallyCorrectLeft' Gains Momentum, Chron. Higher Educ., Dec. 12, 1990,
at Al, col. 2; Scott Heller, Colleges Becoming Havens of 'PoliticalCorrectness,'Some Scholars Say,
Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 21, 1990, at A14, col. 2. The New York Times recently reported that
canon expanders are also organizing and have formed a new group called Teachers for a Democratic
Culture. Anthony DePalma, In Battle on Political Correctness,Scholars Begin a Counteroffensive,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
154. Heller, supra, note 153, at A14, col. 1 (quoting Associate Professor of English at the
University of California at Berkeley, Susan Schweiber).
155. See generally Minow, supra note 41 ("[wMhat initially may seem to be an objective stance
may appear partial from another point of view.... Regardless of which perspective ultimately seems
persuasive, the possibility of multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows
how claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims." Id. at 14); see also Jackson,
supra note 141, at 7 (arguing that indoctrination should be acknowledged rather than condemned).
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[Those arguing for inclusion of African-American literature in a

core curriculum] face the outraged reactions of those custodians of Western culture who protest that the canon, that transparent decanter of

Western values, may become-breathe the word-politicized. That people can maintain a straight face while they protest the irruption of poli-

tics into something that has always been political-well, it says
something about how remarkably successful official literary histories

have been in presenting
themselves as natural objects, untainted by
15 6
worldly interests.

I view as naive the notion that a law school course like mine is
biased if it tries to be antiracist or makes persistent efforts to entertain the
perspective of people "on the margin." On the contrary, conscious inclu-

sion of multiple perspectives is called for on objectivist terms in the sense
that such inclusion and awareness should help students come closer to

perceiving a "relatively truer truth" than one wedded to an unacknowledged viewpoint.1

7

In the service of this "truer truth" students need to encounter force-

fully stated arguments from a range of viewpoints on the issues they
study. They need to learn to recognize different approaches to legal

problems, especially approaches that are rooted in our national narratives and dilemmas. In furtherance of this goal they need to be exposed
to strong writers who differ markedly with each other. So a syllabus

should include representatives of varying positions, and class discussions
should give serious attention to these differences.
All these lofty descriptions fit nicely with the notion that a teacher
should not be an indoctrinator but should respect the autonomy and

integrity of her students. They support my hope that in the classes I
lead, all of us will be deeply challenged and forced into unanticipated

self-examinations and will be enabled to see our own previous knowledge
and convictions from new and unsettling angles. I believe that I should
take as many risks as I ask my students to take and I should be ready and
156. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Whose Canon Is It Anyway? (Book Review), N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1989, § 7, at 45, col. 1.
157. Objectivity is no simple term, and the most astute scholars refuse to accept a clear
dichotomy between objectivity and relativism. Historian Linda Gordon, for example, observed at a
recent meeting of the American Historical Association that "[a]ttention to the craft of historical
scholarship shows that few historians claim to be either purely objective or relativist." Karen J.
Winkler, ChallengingTraditional Views, Some HistoriansSay Their Scholarship May Not Be Truly
Objective, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 16, 1991, at A5, col. 1. She said that conservative academics
who oppose affirmative action and oppose expansion of the canon "'claim to be objectivists
defending the academy against relativists. In fact, the other side do not consider themselves to be
relativists at all. ... They are advocating their own, more complex form of an objectivist position.'"
Id. at A6, col. 1; cf Mooney, supra note 148, at A16, col. I (quoting Boston University President
John Silber saying that higher education is suffering from "profound relativism"); D'Souza, Illiberal
Education,supra note 145, at 76 ("[t]he new critics go beyond the assertion of contingent knowledge
to suggest that the very ideal of objectivity is a mirage").
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willing to have my own ideas publicly subjected to searching criticism.
Teachers should empower students to pursue their own future learning,

not teach them to sit quietly in order to be filled with present information. If we cannot be neutral, we can try to foster classrooms that are
challengingly and liberatingly plural.
There is, however, another problem, which is why there is a
dilemma. It is relatively easy to conclude that a teacher should offer
students a variety of perspectives, but less so to define what role the

teacher's own values should play in the classroom. My aim is not to
convert students to my own personal positions on various issues. But I

must confess to feeling certain that my own positions on some issues are
right,158 and in some cases I do want to change my students. I am sure,

for example, that more people in the United States need to learn the history of racism in America and the profound way it has shaped our legal
institutions, our culture, and our daily lives.
Further, if I encounter in a student, male or female, black or white,
what I consider to be racist or sexist assumptions, I would hope that

experiences in a class I lead might help the student to question or unseat
such assumptions. And if a student decides as a result of a class I lead

that he or she would like to do something to fight the effects of racism in
society, or to work at dividing the chores in his or her household or law

firm more equitably, or to search for a more congenial career path, that
would make me very happy. Moreover, I find profoundly disturbing any
philosophy of education that would say my orientation should be otherwise on this score.15 9 These views of mine by necessity place me in a
158. In the current climate I find myself fearful that if I attempt to expose students to various
views but also make it clear where my own values lie, I will appear to be proving the traditionalists'
charge that all us multicultural zealots are bent on indoctrination. The very act of initiating
dialogues with my students on matters I take to be of human and social importance, especially if I
am asking them to question previously unexamined assumptions, I now fear may be interpreted by
some of those students or some of my colleagues as an authoritarian imposition of my own point of
view. Patricia Williams puts it this way in the context of deciding how to respond to certain
challenges:
The dilemma I face at this moment in the academic world is: if I respond to or open
discussion about offensive remarks from students in my classes, I am called "PC" and
accused of forcing my opinions down the throats of my students-and of not teaching

them the real subject matter. If I respond with no matter what degree of clear, dignified
control, I become a militant black female who terrifies "moderate" students. If I follow the
prevalent advice of "just ignoring it," then I am perceived as weak, humiliated, ineffectual,
a doormat.
Williams, supra note 145, at 63.
159. Thinking about how inescapably normative these matters are, I am reminded of a
memorable outburst of Arthur Leff's. In a commentary on law and economics Leff observed the
paradoxical unavoidability of normative judgments in a world where "the knowledge of good and
evil as an intellectual subject [has been] systematically and effectively destroyed.., a fact of modem
intellectual life so well and painfully known as to be one of the few which is simultaneously
horrifying and banal." Arthur A. Leff, Commentary: Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv.451, 454-55 (1974). He finally concludes:
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certain relationship to the subject.matter of a course on race, for example, and in some tension with the "indoctrination critique."'"
Further, even if one could resolve this dilemma on the level of highminded abstractions, the life of the classroom is fraught with the concrete

frailties of real people in real settings. In my own case, fear of conflict
and self-absorbed enthusiasm for my own views are both ever-present
enemies. I too easily find myself suppressing useful outcroppings of conflict in the classroom. 161 I too seldom pose arguments I despise in their
I don't know how one talks about it, but napalming babies is bad, and so is letting them or
even their culpable parents starve, freeze, or merely suffer plain miserable discomfort while
other people, more "valuable" than they are or not, freely choose snowmobiles and
whipped cream.... And "the law" has always known it; that is the source of its tension and
complexity.
Id at 481 (emphasis in original). I am not at all certain that most of my students would recognize
Leff's first observation as well known or banal, but the force of his exclamation is not thereby
diminished.
160. To illustrate, I recently read a news report about different colleges and universities that
were beginning to include courses on race and/or ethnicity as part of their general education
requirements. Two philosophy professors at one such institution were disturbed at the new
requirement and had circulated a statement in protest. They observed: "'As we all know, the
course in question was introduced with the intention of changing students' attitudes about race
relations .... [Jndoctrination[is] starkly inappropriate.'" Denise K. Magner, Difflcult Questions
Face Colleges That Require Students to Take Courses That Explore Issues Relating to Race, Chron.
Higher Educ., Mar. 28, 1990, at A20, col. 1 (emphasis added). This conflation of the "intention of
changing student attitudes" with "starkly inappropriate indoctrination" is almost unintelligible to
me. It simply makes no sense to argue that it is indoctrination to try to change students' racist,
sexist, or elitist attitudes but not indoctrination to encourage students to see the value in respecting
the rights of the accused, to train them to think "like lawyers," to counsel female students against
emotionalism in class discussions of rape, or to urge student reconciliation and adjustment to a tort
system that imposes no duty to rescue on a stranger. All these endeavors in fact go on in law schools
all the time. The value and meaning of each such endeavor, both in theory and as practiced, is
debatable on its merits. Each is also deeply value-laden and political.
161. One student offered a criticism: "I think that it would be beneficial if you or another
student agreed to play 'devil's advocate' for controversial issues in class. I think that class would be
much more productive if it didn't just assume one point of view without full debate." The notion
that these class sessions represented only one point of view is very far from my own perception. I
believe some students see sameness where professors see difference because of the difficulty they (and
all of us) have in distinguishing between two things that are unfamiliar. See generally Jared
Diamond, The Ethnobiologist's Dilemma, NAT. HIsT., June 1989, at 26 (how different cultures
perceive and organize information); Jared Diamond, This-Fellow Frog,Name Belong-Him Dakwo,
NAT. HIsT., Apr. 1989, at 16 (different cultures vary in the factors they use to identify things). But
receiving an observation and suggestion of this kind makes me reexamine my classroom practices.
There were times in the Discrimination class when I think I smoothed over conflicts or blunted
interactions that would have been more fruitful if allowed to proceed. Usually the smoothing and
blunting activity was fairly subtle, and usually it was well under way before I even recognized what I
was up to. Further, it was reasonable for me to be concerned about individuals getting hurt: the
subjects under discussion were often difficult. But I believe I need to increase my own conflict
threshold and to have more faith that student thresholds will be high enough to tolerate creative
discord as well.
Since teaching the course I have read thoughtful explorations of the almost involuntary ways
teachers can stifle the very kinds of interactions they most desire. See Howard Lesnick, Reassessing
Law Schooling: The Sterling Forest Group, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 561, 565 (1978) (insider analysis of
reactions that discouraged rather than encouraged class participation); see also Toni Pickard,
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best and toughest form. One way to avoid having one's own view
predominate is to structure classes or topics as debates and to include
readings from both sides. This is an important, maybe indispensable,
approach. Upper-division law students are already familiar with the
adversarial structure and feel comfortable (perhaps too comfortable)
with it.1 62
On the other hand, some topics are distorted and diminished when
presented as either/or controversies, and some important kinds of learning and listening are eliminated in the adversarial mode. Care in presenting both sides is therefore only a partial answer.
If the class is not formally structured as a two-sided, equal-time
exercise, and instead storyreading, storytelling, and other methods are

used, other problems may arise. Every student of every background
should be able to count on personal validation, space, and regard from
the teacher in the classroom. Evidence strongly indicates that many

members of racial minorities and women of all races frequently cannot
count on such an atmosphere.

63

However, efforts to alter the usual

Experience as Teacher: Discovering the Politics of Law Teaching, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 279 (1983)
(searching exploration of efforts to alter power dynamics and the locus of initiative in a law school

classroom).
162.

Two-sided class formats that I have tried with varying success include simulated

congressional debates, see supra text accompanying note 114, testimony at mock legislative hearings,
presentations to a fictional school board, moot court arguments in fictional or real pending cases,
informal debates between known or fictional personalities in a television talk show format, and a
method known as structured controversy where teams are given a universe of materials on a
structured issue, argue both sides to each other, and then drop role to join in hammering out "the
best" resolution. For a discussion of the advantages of using structured controversy in the
classroom, see David W. Johnson, Roger T. Johnson & Karl A. Smith, Academic Conflict Among
Students: Controversy and Learning, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EDUCATION: CURRENT
RESEARCH AND THEORY 199-231 (Robert S.Feldman ed. 1986).

163. See Taunya L. Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988)
(misprints in text and footnotes corrected in Errata,38 J. LEGAL EDuc. No. 3 (1988)); Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Black Students in White Law Schools. The Ordeal and the Opportunity, 1970 U. TOL. L.
REV. 539; Leslie G. Espinoza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law Student Support
Programs: Constructing Affirmative Action, 22 J.L. REFORM 281 (1989); Donald K. Hill, Law
School, Legal Education and the Black Law Student, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 457 (1987); Dawn
Ross, Program Offers Minority Survival Kit, HARV. L. REC., Sept. 30, 1989, at 3; Dorene R.
Sarnoski, The Law Review Selection Process: An Analysis of Its Disparate Impact on Minority
Students, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 459 (1989); Ted Silvers, Students Tell Faculty About Silencing
Concerns, HARVARD LAW RECORD, Spring 1989, at 391; Nerissa B. Skillman, Misperceptions Which

Operateas Barriersto the EducationofMinority Law Students, 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 553 (1986); Vicky
Spelman, Combatting the Marginalizationof Black Women in the Classroom, 10 WOMEN'S STUD. Q.
15 (1982), reprintedin GENDERED SUBJECTS: THE DYNAMICS OF FEMINIST TEACHING 240 (Margo

Culley & Catherine Portuges eds. 1985); Gerald Torres, Teaching and Writing: Curriculum Reform
as an Exercise in CriticalEducation, 10 NOVA L.J. 867, 875 (1986); Stephanie M. Wildman, The
Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation,38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988);
Katina Leodas, Women in Law Schools: The View From the Margins (unpublished paper on file with
the author). I believe that the problems, analyses, and methodologies conveyed by most of these
sources describe a very different version of reality than that conveyed by the descriptions that typify
recent attacks on multiculturalism.
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classroom climate may be perceived as departing from the presumptively
neutral norm and therefore as biased. Members of traditionally more
privileged groups may well feel themselves displaced by the entry of
unfamiliar narratives and may experience unpleasant sensations of demotion or blame. The same questions of "objectivity" that can arise in how
the teacher selects readings, or how she presents her own and others'
views, can also arise in how she treats students.
I do not pretend to have learned to dance these knife-edges with the
grace, wisdom, and fairness to which I aspire. 1 I am certain, however,
that they cannot be avoided through "neutrality" or "objectivity."
Attempts to do so will only obscure the dilemma.
2.

On Doing the Right Thing

In addition to the indoctrination issue there are questions of teacher
morale and commitment that may deter us from the race-conscious classroom. Even if we in legal education do succeed in reaching the consensus I maintain is within our grasp, difficult teaching issues will remain.
Those who take up this task will need to be patient, persistent, and brave

in the face of some intractable but not impossible problems.
As I encouraged students, especially black students, to share with
me and with others their experiences of life at a predominantly white law
school, I began to read and hear story after story of hurt. Students
reported incidents in class, in the halls, on the lawn at graduation, in the
dormitories, on the sidewalk, and in the stadium. These incidents ranged
from aggressive racial epithets hurled in circumstances where the threat
of physical violence was quite real to the wounds felt by a student when
she perceived her professor to be consistently avoiding eye contact with
the black students in his classroom.
164. I was, however, gratified to read the following anonymous student comment:
[A]fter having taken this class, my attitudes towards women's rights have quite changed. I
am quite a conservative person and am not into "rights movements". But after having
listened to the lectures and presentations, and after reading the materials, I really do
believe that women deserve a greater piece of the pie in our society. I, for some reason,
never really thought of women the same as I would think of minorities, in that I never
considered that women's rights have been deprived.
Something happened to me about a week ago. I was in another class talking to a
friend, a girl, who is also in our Discrimination class. I told her that I felt our
Discrimination class was being taught in a biased manner. She asked me how so and I told
her that in the context of women's rights, the class was taught almost exclusively from the
viewpoint of a female. She said to me, "We as women, have lived with bias for hundreds of
years; maybe it's time that you (men) felt it too." That statement really opened my eyes.
This student's new posture as listener should not become permanent, of course, and his woman
friend's victim status should not become institutionalized into a right to monopolize all future
conversations. But exchanging positions-altering who talks and who listens-is grand. And when
those doing the exchanging come from positions of significant inequality to begin with, then the
exchanging of positions, while it should be shared and mutual, can never be symmetrical. For a
discussion of epistomological asymmetries of the center and the margin, see Harris, supra note 133.
See also supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (indoctrination discussion).
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Interestingly, my initial reaction to most of these stories was incredibly self-absorbed. At least with regard to stories about classroom interactions, my immediate response was to begin thinking about how I could
avoid such behavior myself in the future. My reaction contained a distinct thread of self-protection.
So, for example, when I heard that one student was angry and
resentful at being cast as "Mr. Equal Protection" in a constitutional law
class at another institution, when I heard what pressure and humiliation
he felt at being repeatedly forced to perform as sole spokesperson for the
black race, I resolved to avoid at all costs succumbing to any knee-jerk
impulses to turn to a black student for racial perspective on some problem a class was discussing.
But I soon ran into a problem. When I heard that another black
student was deeply offended at not being called on more often, that she
felt her professor assumed she was ill-prepared and incapable, that all the
messages she received told her she had no value in the classroom, and
that she most especially resented it when the professor pointedly ignored
her during a lengthy discussion of a racial question, I became anxious.
How would I be able to figure out and then do the right thing? One
student wanted more attention, the other less. One wanted to be a
spokesperson for her race, the other did not.
If you are a teacher of students in a predominantly white but desegregating institution, you cannot consistently do the right thing no matter
how hard you try, if by the right thing you mean behavior that makes the
average student of color feel equally as welcomed and personally validated as the average white student. Nor can you consistently do the
right thing if by that you mean behavior that allows the average white
student to avoid any feeling of being personally accused or defensive
when matters of race are discussed. Nor can you consistently do the
right thing if by that you mean behavior that results in the average student of any race feeling enthusiastic and competent when encountering
ideas that force that student to examine his or her own privileges,
shames, and resentments.
Achieving such goals with any regularity is not an available option
because the present realities of race in American higher education are
comprised of many different factors that are working against such goals.
And most of those factors are not within a teacher's control. "The right
thing," if defined in this way, is a snare and a delusion. Neither teachers
nor students are superheroes. And we have precious few role models for
productively discussing matters of race across racial lines.
Nevertheless, if you cannot always do the right thing, you can sometimes do a right thing. Progress will not come from having discovered
"the" right behavior for each situation and then donning it like moral
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armor. Instead, it will come by establishing a steady pattern of repeated
effort and openness and by engaging in interactions that cumulatively
help you begin to cure the ignorance that teachers and students
alike
165
almost certainly bring to a race-conscious educational setting.
As one benefit of this process, teachers may work themselves into a
better position to discern racism and to support students of color in productively reacting to it. Second, teachers may become better able to discern the needs and problems of all students who are entitled to (that
elusive concept) a fair share of professional time and attention. Third,
teachers may become better able to discern situations in which students
of color are having problems that they inaccurately or disproportionately
attribute to racism and then to support those students in productively
handling and reexamining those situations. The ability to do all of these
things is important to the welfare of all students and to the future quality
of racial integration in our institutions.
Sometimes, of course, teachers will fail miserably because of their
own limitations and those of their students as well. 16 6 Despite the failures that will certainly occur, I suppose it is obvious by now that I
believe the undeniable difficulties, pains, and dangers of a class that consciously focuses on race are worth enduring. 6 Until we can begin to
forge ways to talk deeply with each other about these matters across
165. A particularly challenging and sophisticated take on the issue of race in the law school
classroom was offered by Regina Austin at the plenary session of the American Association of Law
Schools in January, 1990. Austin asked her audience to consider and put first the educational needs
of students of color when matters of race are touched upon in the classroom. She noted with sharp
irony and concern that a more familiar pattern in too many well-intentioned discussions is the use of
black students as providers of "curricular material" for their white classmates.
In these instances, Austin says, the experiences and insights of black students function primarily
as vehicles to aid the teacher in her primary goal of educating her white students. This endeavor
may or may not have salutary effects for white students but does precious little to challenge the
understandings or advance the empowerment of black class members as law students, as
intellectuals, or as future citizen-lawyers.
166. For ways of improving classroom environments for black students, see ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN COLLEGES FUND FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION, WHITE
FACULTY, BLACK STUDENIS: EXPLORING ASSUMPTIONS AND PRAcricEs (1984) (whose title

should not be taken to suggest that faculty members of color do not face many identical and similar
problems).
167. After the class was over, one student offered the following observations:
In fifteen short weeks, a group of law students learned that racism and sexism can be
identified, analyzed and understood. Not powerful, elusive, innate forces, they are learned
and therefore can be remedied.
The remedial work meant that students were sometimes placed in awkward positions.
We had to rehash a history that made us uncomfortable. We had to read cases and
discriminatory laws most despaired in reading. We had to respectfully listen to and
consider comments made by classmates from various racial and economic backgrounds.
We had to empathize. And ultimately, we came to respect and understand each other a bit
more.
This fall 1989 class was particularly unique in that most of us were in our mid to late
twenties and had come of age during our country's most recent women's and minority
movements. The busing and ERA issues were especially enlightening. Many classmates
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profound differences, despite the hurt involved, we cannot seriously hope
to resolve the long-standing problems of race that continue to confront
us as we proceed into our third century as a nation. Nor will we have
opportunities to experience the delight that surely and unpredictably will
grace us at times when connecting and communicating are not as unattainable as we had feared. The rewards of the underground classroom
can also be real.
B.

The Canon

At the beginning of this Essay I said that those of us in legal education are in a special position with regard to the current debate raging
over the canon and curriculum reform. It was my thesis that at least
with regard to race, legal educators should be able to acknowledge quite
readily the central role played by race at numerous critical junctures in
our constitutional history, and therefore should be able to agree that
matters of race deserve central focus in the law school curriculum. I now
wish to revisit and reexamine that basic proposition. Clearly the reality
of the matter is more complex and problematic than the original thesis
suggested, and any strongly exceptionalist argument for legal education
would probably be naive.
In the first place, if agreement on this core knowledge were all that
easy and self-evident, then surely it already would be in place and functioning. Such is not the case.16 While I assume all law school curricula
involve some exposure to the postwar amendments and Brown v. Board
of Education,169 1 have encountered third-year law students who were
hazy on the roots of the fourteenth amendment and its relationship to
slavery, emancipation, and Reconstruction. I have yet to meet a black
law student who seemed to feel that the achievements or contributions of
had attended schools where this had occurred and could offer insight. Several women had
worked for ERA ratification and recalled their disappointment at its defeat.
Race is still such a dynamic topic in the United States, that courses such as this are

essential. It was important to analyze civil rights acts from their inception until today.

During Christmas break, I received cards from class members. Many inscriptions
noted the racially motivated killings of a white federal judge and a black attorney due to
their work on discrimination cases. The saga continues.
Discrimination and the Law should remain a part of the law school curriculum.
Future generations of lawyers will need this training.
168. Sanford Levinson remarked in a bicentennial talk that
surely one of the most difficult problems presented those who would celebrate the
Constitution [is] chattel slavery. An ever-present temptation revealed, among other places,
in the contents of most casebooks on constitutional law is basically to ignore chattel slavery
as a constitutionally legitimized presence in American history. To put it mildly, that does
not seem to be a satisfactory solution, any more than is the mindless celebration of Western

humanism or Christian sensibility which ignores the Holocaust's arising in a land of

unusually high culture and piety.
Sanford Levinson, PledgingFaith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the Constitution? 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 113, 129 (1987).
169. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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African-Americans to constitutional law were regularly and explicitly
recognized during the course of his or her legal education. There are
several factors that prevent legal educators from reaching an easy consensus about the centrality of race in constitutional history.
First, any decision to underscore race in the law school curriculum
cannot come easily in part because all matters of race are so divisive in
American society.170 The messages from the underground classroom
provide evidence of these divisions. Higher education, far from being
above controversies over race, is deeply enmeshed in them. In fact,
higher education is sometimes at center stage. 17 1 These differences and
170.

For an eclectic assortment of materials on the current racial divide, see NATIONAL

RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes

& Robin M. Williams eds. 1989) (empirical evidence about the state of contemporary race relations
and conditions of life for black Americans); Thomas B. Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Race, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, May 1991, at 53 (debate over racial policy); Julian Bond, The Civil Rights Act: White
Men's Hope, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1990, § 4, at 21, col. 2 (hilarious op-ed piece on preferential race
treatment); Peter A. Brown, Issue of RacialHiring Quotas Reaches Center Stage in PoliticalArena,
Knoxville News-Sentinel, June 24, 1990, at A5, col. 1 (resentment over racial hiring quotas and
federal civil rights bill); The Assault on Equality: Race Rights and the New Orthodoxy, special issue
of NATION, Dec. 9, 1991 (Adolph Reed, Jr. & Julian Bond eds.) (series of articles criticizing recent
efforts, especially by Democrats, to move beyond race); Don Wycliff, Blacks Debate the Costs of
Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1990, § 4, at 3, col. 1 (misgivings about affirmative action);
Walter Shapiro, Unfinished Business TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 12 (discussing findings of National
Research Council and arguing that racial issues continue significantly to divide blacks and whites
and have led to the deterioration of race relations).
171. The upsurge of racial and religious attacks on college campuses is probably the most visible
mark of higher education's involvement. See Steve France, Hate Goes to College, A.B.A. J., July
1990, at 44; Courtney Leatherman, More Anti-Semitism Is Being Reported on Campuses, but
EducatorsDisagree on How to Respond to It, Chron. Higher Fduc., Feb. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 3;
OfficialsStep Up Efforts to EradicateRacistIncidents on Campus, Black Issues in Higher Educ., Jan.
18, 1990, at 32, col. 1; Joseph Berger, Deep RacialDivisions Persist in New Generationat College,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 1. But problems short of physical violence also persist and
may be increasing. See Carolyn J. Mooney, Stanford Panel Reports Strained Campus Race
Relations; U of Michigan Faculty Rejects Required Course on Racism, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr.
12, 1989, at A15, col. 2 (noting that at Stanford many minority students feel subtle but pervasive
forms of prejudice). Strong controversy attends efforts of universities to stem or blunt this upsurge,
especially when such efforts involve regulatiofi of speech. The hate-speech controversy is beyond the
scope of this paper but clearly involves many of the issues I try to deal with here.
In addition, differences over affirmative action in admissions and hiring are rampant in
undergraduate and graduate programs as well. See, e-g., Robin Wilson, Article Critical of Black
Students' QualificationsRolls Georgetown U. Law Center, Chron. Higher Educ., Apr. 24, 1991 at
A33, col. 2 (discussing angry reaction of some administrators and students to essay alleging that
black students admitted to the law school were less qualified than white students); Dinesh D'Souza,
Sins of Admission: Affirmative Action on Campus, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 30 (examining
and criticizing universities' affirmative action); A Class Sends Message to HarvardLaw School, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 21, 1990, at Bl, col. 3 (reporting on student-initiated lawsuit over faculty diversity);
Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black and Other Tales RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 6 (black law
professor from Yale criticizing affirmative action at the undergraduate and graduate levels); Fox
Butterfield, Old Rights CampaignerLeads a HarvardBattle N.Y. Times, May 21, 1990, at A18, col.
1 (reporting black professor's protest over Harvard's failure to hire black woman law professor); Lisa
G. Markoff, Berkeley PressureGroup's Stand Draws Some Anger, Some Praise, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 9,
1990, at 4 (reporting on student protests over lack of diversity in faculty hiring); Shelby Steele, The
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tensions will necessarily affect discussions about race in the law school

curriculum. Participants in such discussions cannot and should not converse in a vacuum, but the alternative to a vacuum may well be a highly
charged atmosphere that makes many of us uncomfortable both in dis72
cussions among faculty and in discussions in classrooms.1
There is a second reason why it will be difficult to embrace a raceconscious curriculum in legal education. The foregoing suggests that

while the centrality of race to American legal history may be undeniable,
the interpretation of that fact is likely to prove a matter of serious disagreement, t73 just as matters of interpretation divide adversaries about the
canon in other disciplines.17 4
For example, those offended by Marshall's critique of the 1787 ConRecoloring of Campus Life, HARPER'S, Feb. 1989, at 47 (a black English professor criticizing the
tone of contemporary racial interactions and affirmative action); Michael A. Olivas, Latino Faculty
at the Border: IncreasingNumbers Key to More Hispanic Access, CHANGE, May/June 1988, at 6
(arguing for more affirmative action in relation to Latino law professors); Jeri Spann, Achieving
Faculty Diversity: A Sourcebook of Ideas and Success Stories (1988) (brochure available from the
University of Wisconsin System, Office of Equal Opportunity Programs and Policy Studies)
(observing in the preface that "[a]chieving diversity in higher education is an imperative that will
directly affect our future economic well-being, our capacity to educate and govern in a truly
democratic way and to create a cultural pluralism that celebrates difference," id. at vii).
172. I sympathize with this discomfort. As the earlier discussion of my classes should make
clear, my own reactions and on-the-spot decisions in a class where I was consciously trying to tackle
the race issue were often driven by a need to diminish my own tension level.
However, I am convinced that more serious dangers attend silence and avoidance. These
dangers were made apparent in my own hometown when a local principal decided that a scheduled
television newscast on the history of race relations in America was too inflammatory to be shown to
high school students. See Jesse Bond, Doyle High Exercises 'Right,' Blacks Out Channel One
Segment, Knoxville J., May 19, 1990, at 4A, col. I (school officials were particularly concerned
about segment containing a historical overview of racism in America); Roger Harris, Doyle High
Refuses to Air Segment of ChannelOne: Report on PrejudiceJudged Inflammatory, Knoxville NewsSentinel, May 18, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (the principal observed: "'I didn't see it myself, but [my
committee] told me they just felt it was something we shouldn't watch.... They said it was too
much on prejudice and would stir up some people' "). Meanwhile, a white supremacist bookstore,
with a special outreach program for youth, was opening across town. See David Keim, Far-Right
PoliticalGroup to Open Knox Bookstore, Knoxville News-Sentinel, June 18, 1990, at A3, col. 1. It
appears that young people in the 1990s in Knoxville and elsewhere will be having plenty of
discussions about race. The question is whether those responsible for their education will be
participating in those conversations. Official silence will not make racial tensions go away.
173. Robert Burt, for example, while treating Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), as central, argued that it should be read as a story about judicial activism, not primarily as a
story about race. Robert A. Burt, What Was Wrong With Dred Scott, What's Right About Brown,
42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1985).
174. The echoes across disciplines are startling at times. For a hint of the scene in the fine arts,
see Michael Brenson, Is 'Quality'An Idea Whose Time Has Gone?, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990, § 2
(Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. I (discussing debate over the quality issue, which includes questions
about the virtues of "form versus content, Western values versus non-Western values, men versus
women"). For a glimpse at a related historiographic debate, see Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalLaw
and Himmelfarb on Social History (Book Review), 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 864 (1988) (examining
controversy over "new social history," which focuses on social forces).
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stitution 7 5 argue that he took too narrow a view, fixating on the document's flaws and failing to deal appropriately with its strengths and
enduring achievements. William Bradford Reynolds, for example, complained that "Justice Marshall's... thesis is gerry-built on a regrettable
overstatement of perceived flaws in the Constitution without so much as
a passing reference to the qualities that have endured for the past two
176
hundred years."
This criticism echoes those voices in the larger canon debate that

complain about a reductionist attitude that criticizes but never celebrates
the western tradition. One such voice belongs to Lynne Cheney:
[A] crucial consideration is how great books are taught. Do we hold up
Milton simply to display his sexism, as the A.C.L.S. essay does, or do we
also help students to see the powerful and enduring questions he raises
about pride and sin and salvation? Do we study the great books of the
past solely in terms of errors perceived in the present, or do we also seek
to understand why 1successive
generations have found these books speak77
ing to them anew?

I simply do not hear the voices advocating multiculturalism as carping or reductionist in the way both Reynolds and Cheney seemed to suggest. When Thurgood Marshall and similar newcomers speak, I hear
them in many instances sharing new stories and criticizing familiar ones
in ways that open avenues of debate, celebrate commonalities among
humans, and enrich our understanding of where we have been and where
we might be headed. Clearly some in the legal academy will disagree
with me, however. Some are willing to concede that race played a central role at some points in our constitutional history but conclude that we
175. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
176. Reynolds, supra note 74, at 1350. One student in my class made a similar criticism of my
own approach:
As I sat in class during the discussions on race and slavery, one underlying aspect kept
plaguing my thought-NEGATIVISM. I became so frustrated in hearing only negative
sides of the racial issues....
I am not proposing that we look only to the positive aspects because it is true that we
learn from our mistakes. [lit is clear the mistakes this country has made in the realm of
racial issues, but the country has made tremendous progres& This progress should be as
important as the barriers and obstacles which stood in its way.
177. Cheney, supra note 4, at A40, col. 1 (criticizing essay calling for more inclusive core
curriculum). Ms. Cheney, current chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities, is a highprofile player in the canon controversy and is married to the current Secretary of Defense, a "spousal
fact" that in this context I believe is pertinent.
In parallel fashion the editors of The New Republic announced: "We are opposed to the current
'multiculturalist' trend, then, not because we believe that accounting for sexual, racial, and political
bias in texts is not a worthwhile (though limited) intellectual exercise, but because we believe that it
is not the only worthwhile intellectual exercise." The Derisory Tower, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18,
1991, at 5, 6 [hereinafter The Derisory Tower] (emphasis in original). The unasserted assertion here,
of course, is that multiculturalists believe that accounting for bias in texts is the only worthwhile
intellectual exercise. The assertion is not supportable.
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have moved beyond racial roots to color-blind universals and properly
SO.
If our notions of equality, liberty, due process, and federalism were
all forged in important ways in the heat of struggles over slavery, what
we make of that legacy and heritage is still open to contest. The continued instability, even incoherence, of affirmative action doctrine is only
one indication of how unsettled is national legal opinion about this central issue of race and the Constitution.17 1 Should we interpret our core
constitutional values concerning race as centering on and deriving their
deepest inspiration from a historical, contextual rejection of actual and
deeply rooted white supremacy, or as creating a color-blind affirmation
of timeless, universal human equality, or as some dialectical relation
between these two visions? This is not an easy question.
A third reason why race in legal education's core curriculum may
not be a subject of easy consensus is rooted in patterns of institutional
inertia and concerns about teacher autonomy. It is costly for teachers to
change the ways they teach; time spent developing new materials and
approaches is time not spent on all the other things that professors do.
These are not trivial obstacles. Institutional recognition of the costs of
curricular change to individual faculty members and the development of
ways to avoid penalizing those who undertake curriculum integration
17 9
projects are key to a fair and effective effort.
178. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny and holding that city's set-aside program for minority businesses was unconstitutional) with
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (upholding a congressional scheme
awarding preferences to minority-owned applicants for broadcast licenses).
179. Costs of any action are, of course, relative to the benefits of the action and to the costs of
inaction. A theme of those pressing for greater hiring and curricular diversity is the need to prepare
for an increasingly multiracial society. See WILLIAM B. JOHNSTON & ARNOLD E. PACKER,
WORKFORCE

2000: WORK

AND WORKERS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRsT CENTURY

75-76, 105 (1987).

Johnston and Packer predicted that by the year 2000 the growth rate of the workforce will slow, its
age will rise, the participation of women and minorities will increase, and immigrants will represent
the largest share of workforce growth since World War I, see id at 75-76, and urged the integration
of black and hispanic workers into the economy, see id. at 105. These commentators emphasized the
drastic costs of inaction. See also Peggy Schmidt, Women andMinorities:Is Industry Ready?, N.Y.
Times, § 3 (Magazine), Oct. 16, 1988, at 25, col. 2 (reporting that industries will face a competitive
disadvantage if they fail to provide career-development services for minorities and women).
This news is in some ways heartening for those interested in the welfare of people of color. If
those with power and influence believe it to be in their own interest for nonwhite youth to get useful
schooling, perhaps useful schooling will become more available to nonwhite youth. As students of
Derrick Bell's interest-convergence hypothesis will recognize, however, there is an inherent
weakness in any strategy built on this foundation. Reforms won by virtue of someone else's selfinterest have a way of evaporating as times change. See Derrick Bell, Brown and the Interest.
Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES, OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
91 (Derrick Bell ed. 1980) (arguing that school desegregation has failed and suggesting that most
meaningful remedies have only been imposed when they converged with the interests of whites). But
if these demographic changes are accompanied by increased organizing within the nonwhite
commmunity, they could lead to change in power. Numbers alone, of course, make little difference,
as any resident of the black belt or South Africa could tell you.
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In some instances the costs of curriculum integration have been
properly recognized. For example, the Higher Education Extension Service, in a review of reports on multiculturalism issued by twelve different
colleges and universities, noted:
At many institutions [a] strategy is to give faculty time and support to
make their existing courses less Eurocentric. Though harder to institute
[than faculty seminars or separate course requirements] because of
faculty reluctance, this is obviously a preferred solution, since it both
makes the college curriculum genuinely pluralist, rather than merely
"multicultural" at the margins, at the same time as it prevents the
resegregation of minority students into ethnic studies-related courses.180
In addition to problems of inertia and the costs of innovation, issues
of teacher autonomy pose problems. Professors are rightly jealous of
their freedom to teach what and how they think best and may perceive
efforts at curriculum expansion as the imposition of a different but
equally oppressive brand of monoculture on the educational project.
This perspective has been taken up by the defenders of the canon in the
larger university context to oppose the introduction of new required elements to the core curriculum. Alan Kors, at a conference on the restoration of American education, reportedly warned that "'[u]nder the guise
of liberation, people are trading one set of masters for another.' "181
Kors agreed that political differences and competing cultural theories
should be integrated into classroom discussions but he was also highly
critical of a "radical fringe" that in his opinion dominates noncurricular
programs. In his view, members of this fringe
establish an official history of America, an official agenda of moral priorities, an official view of race, gender, and class, and-most patronizing
and evil of all-an official set of voices for what are, in fact, the wondrously diversified and individuated
communities of America's African
182
Americans, women, and gays.
180. Ensuring a Rainbow, supra note 37, at 7. These remarks suggest another, related
controversy. Some critics of the traditional canon have parted ways over the relative merits of
separate programs (for example, in women's studies or African-American studies) and curriculum
integration. Issues of ghettoization, dilution, and resource allocation abound. These debates are
important and have obvious implications for curriculum reform but they are beyond the scope of this
paper.
181.

Heller, Pressfor Campus Diversity, supra note 3, at 22.

182. Id. Criticism of new canon formation comes from the left as well. A recent development is
the spectacle of "new canonizers" trying to cut a path between defenders of the old order who
believe previously excluded candidates for admission to the core are unworthy of inclusion and
advocates of a new day who are wary of the ossifying and limiting results of attempts to define any
new core, with the unavoidable implied complement of a new margin. Two feminist anthologizers,
for example, complained of being caught between "influential conservatives [who] cannot imagine
that the texts we have chosen might be either strong or representative" and "[s]ome feminists [who]
argue that any act of canon-formation is a regressive one, while others judge our inclusions and
exclusions on grounds of political 'correctness.'" Sandra M. Gilbert & Susan Gubar, A New
Anthology of Literature by Women: Does it Define a Canon orMerely 'Baptize a Kangaroo?' Chron.
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These observations in some ways parallel ideas advanced by Randall
Kennedy, a black professor at Harvard Law School, who recently criti-

cized three scholars of color working in the evolving area of critical race
theory. He described them as representing a dangerous trend in minority
legal scholarship.1 83 Like Kors, Kennedy deplored what he saw as a new

orthodoxy, a perceived insistence by these scholars that there is a monolithic black or of-color experience that should be voiced and included84
both in the American law school curriculum and in American society.
Like Kors, Kennedy implicitly counterposed to this allegedly homogenized and essentialist vision an individualist pluralism that he feared will
Higher Educ., Nov. 22, 1989, at B3, col. 3 (emphasis in original). Similarly, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
editor of The Norton Anthology o/Afro-American Literature, which was published in 1990, observed:
The editing of this anthology has been a great dream of mine for a long time, and it
represents, in the most concrete way, the project of black canon formation. But my pursuit
of this project has required me to negotiate a position between those on the cultural right
who claim that black literature can have no canon, no masterpieces, and those on the
cultural left who wonder why anyone wants to establish the existence of a canon, any
canon, in the first place.
Gates, supra note 156, at 44, col. 3.
183. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745
(1989) (critiquing work by Derrick Bell, see supra note 22, Richard Delgado, see supra note 37, and
Mari Matsuda, see supra note 15).
184. Id at 1787. Those who are alarmed by multiculturalism in the larger university have
noted Kennedy's entry into this debate. He is cited with approval by Linda Chavez, Ronald
Reagan's Director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, as one of a group of "black intellectuals
[who] have criticized at least some forms of racial preference." Linda Chavez, The RealAim of the
Promotersof CulturalDiversityIs to Exclude Certain People and to ForecloseDebate, Chron. Higher
Educ., July 18, 1990, at B2, col. 3. Chavez's list also included Shelby Steele, Thomas Sowell, Glenn
Loury, Walter Williams, Julius Lester, and Stephen Carter, a law professor at Yale, whose 1991 bestselling book, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY, has since been released. Id.; see
also Denise K. Magner, Black IntellectualsBroaden Debateon Effects ofAffirmative Action, Chron.
Higher Educ., Oct. 16, 1991, at A17, col. 4 (describing a new group of "[b]lack scholars who
criticize or oppose racial preferences" and who "are profoundly influencing the national debate").
Chavez did not at that time mention Clarence Thomas, but in light of later developments his would
obviously be an important name to add to this list. Interestingly, Chavez also failed to mention
Kennedy's article defending affirmative action, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327 (1986).
This conversation promises to continue. See Stephen L. Carter, Loving the Messenger (Book
Review), 1 YALE J.L. & HuM. 317 (1989) (favorably reviewing Julius Lester's 1988 book, Lovesong:
Becoming a Jew, which criticized black leaders for appropriating suffering as something unique to
blacks). For direct and indirect commentary on Randall Kennedy's views of the new critical race
theory, see Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 1855
(1990); Barnes, supra note 8; Scott Brewer, Colloquy: Introduction: Choosing Sides in the Racial
Critiques Debate, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1844 (1990); Carter, supra note t; Richard Delgado, Mindset
and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1872 (1990); Delgado, supra note 8; Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks
and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARM. L. REV. 1878 (1990); Johnson, supra
note 8; Kennedy, supra note 8. For news coverage, see Charles Rothfeld, Minority Critic Stirs
Debate on Minority Writing, N.Y. Times (Law), Jan. 5, 1990, at B6, col. 3; Jon Weiner, Law Profs
Fight the Power, NATION, Sept. 4, 1989, at 246. Perhaps the rich veins of race-related history and
doctrine that Randall Kennedy continues to explore are proof that my optimistic thesis is true: we
in legal academia should be able to reach consensus about the centrality of race despite vigorous
disagreements about its meaning.
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be smothered if the new race theorists prevail. 1 85
In my own view, Kors was wrong to say these new voices are significantly silencing others and Kennedy was wrong in his charge of essentialism. Likewise, the argument I make here does not envision the
enthroning of a new orthodoxy. It does not require problematic inroads
on teacher autonomy. I simply argue that we should agree that our constitutional heritage is one that turns profoundly on race. We should read
about this, think about it, and talk about it. Individual teachers should,
with enthusiastic support from their institutions, experiment with teaching about race in the American legal system and should share their
experiences with others. Individual law schools should discuss the centrality of race as they discuss the centrality of other curricular values.
When this discussion occurs, it seems inevitable that curricular and pedagogical consequences will follow and that they will be diverse.
C. Conclusion
My colleagues in legal education may decide that the hyperbole of
the canon debates and the controversies over multiculturalism are filled
more with heat than light and have little to offer law schools. Indeed,
there is a tempest-in-a-teapot quality to some of the larger canon conversation. As I read the recent round of attacks on multiculturalism, I
found myself recalling Mark Tushnet's quip about a traditionalist history
professor's diatribe against the new social history: "[Her] essays are filled
with apocalyptic imagery, which leads a reader not engaged as [she] is in
intradisciplinary polemics to want to say, 'Lighten up.' "186
Nor is the disease of hyperbole confined to one side of the debate.
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., remarked at a recent American Studies Association meeting that the multiculturalists themselves suffer at times from "a
windily apocalyptic rhetoric that had nowhere to go when its putative
demands were granted."' 8 7
Meanwhile, observers on both sides have pointed to the irony that
while the academic debate rages, the social problems and power relations
of the real world continue apace. Sometimes those involved in the fray
can lose sight of the reality for the pleasures of the debate. Occasionally
they may conflate the two. Gates wryly observed about his fellow curriculum expanders:
[O]ur rhetoric sometimes depicts the high canonical as the reading matter of the power elite. You have to imagine James Baker curling up with
185.

See Kennedy, supra note 183, at 1782.

186. Tushnet, supra note 174, at 864.
187. Karen J. Winkler, Proponentsof 'Multiculturalist'Humanities Research Callfor a Critical
Look at Its Achievements, Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 28, 1990, at A8, col. 5.
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the Pisan Cantos, Dan Quayle leafing through The Princess Casamassima. ...
...The recent turn toward politics and history in literary studies
has turned the analysis of texts into a marionette theater of the political,
to which we bring all the passions of our real-world commitments....
We pay homage to the marginalized and demonized, and it feels almost
as if we've righted an actual injustice....
...
Yet it sometimes seems that blacks are doing better in the college
curriculum than they are in the streets or even on the campuses....
...[We should be clear about when we've swatted a fly and when
we've toppled a giant. 188
In supporting the canon defenders, editors of The New Republic likewise
noted that "[t]he furor over affirmative action in admissions and hiring in
our universities and over a 'multicultural' curriculum is, in fact, a bitterly
ironic distraction from the battle against racial injustice in our society at
1 89
large."
Both of these observations carry weight and give me some pause in
my own time-consuming pursuit of these matters. Nevertheless, establishing places in the university where the history and dynamics of racial
subordination are studied, and establishing places in the university where
African-American intellectuals can be nourished and empowered, are not
"distraction[s] from the battle against racial injustice" but indispensable
necessities for its successful outcome. African-American communities,
like other subordinated communities, need intellectuals who feel tied to
and partisan about them, who can bring the wisdom and experience of
those communities into the academy and enlist the resources of the academy to work on the problems of those communities.190
There are differences between the critics and defenders that reflect
more than hyperbolic jousting and miscommunication. Whether the
present tendency toward polarization offers the healthiest climate for discovering and fighting over the best definitions of these differences is an
open question. Certainly the false polarities are maddening. The real
dichotomies are, I believe, still coming to light, and the recent attacks on
multiculturalism, despite their tendency to exaggerate, even their occasional viciousness, may end up playing an important part in helping them
to emerge.
First, these attacks have underscored some real questions about the
results of multiculturalist practice, real dangers and dilemmas facing
188. Gates, supra note 156, at 44, col. 2.
189.

The Dersory Tower, supra note 177, at 6.

190. See Kennedy, supra note 8,at 707, passim. It almost goes without saying that not all
African-American scholars will choose to play this role. But it is vitally important that some of
them can and do.
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educational institutions that are attempting to invent ways for their
faculty and students to talk and grow across difference in a society still
19 1 These
characterized by profound inequities in power and resources.
issues are already the subject of debate and discussion within the multiculturalist camp. Cornel West, a black leftist theologian, observed at a
recent American Studies Association meeting that research on race,
class, and gender had led to "'vast balkanization and fragmentation'"
and called for scholars" 'to go beyond the academic politics of difference
"192
to look at these [societal] issues.'
One accusation of those opposed to multicultural education is that
emphasizing difference leads to despair and cynicism about "different"
193 These and related
individuals ever communicating with each other.
concerns are powerful and real. However, to speak as though advocates
of multiculturalism are indifferent to the difficulties of simultaneously
1 94
affirming difference and finding commonalities is just plain wrong.
191. The racial hierarchy in society makes racial difference in the classroom, dormitory, or
fraternity house a loaded, contested, and tense difference, which no amount of universalist sentiment
can dispel. We cannot turn that difference into a candy-coated UNICEF world any more than we
can remove it from history. On the other hand, there are many ways that people deal with charged
and tense differences, and methodologies surely have some effect. We need to be exploring what
such methodologies might be, comparing notes on how we are doing, and learning from our
mistakes. See Spelman, supra note 163 (women's studies professor discussing problems with class
discussions and considering how to improve classroom dialogue); Tamar Jacoby, Psyched Out, NEw
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 28 (describing the cynicism of both black and white students in a
seminar on the history of race relations); Jacob Weisberg, Thin Skins, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18,
1991, at 22 (describing the divisions among students at a small liberal arts college); see alsoAmid the
Diversity, RacialIsolation Remains at Berkeley, Chron. Higher Educ., Nov. 14, 1990, at A37, col. 2
(discussing students' tendency to segregate themselves into racial and ethnic enclaves).
At any rate, it seems implausible in the extreme to attribute racial/cultural tensions or distances
primarily to the marching advance of multiculturalism. Such an analysis would write off too much
of what we know about the past and present both inside and outside of the academy.
192. Winkler, supra note 187, at A9, col. 1.
193. See The Derisory Tower, supra note 177, at 6 ("The real danger is that the 'multicultural'
orthodoxy is itself a disguise for an indifference ....It whispers in our ears that the barriers of race
are unbridgeable; that thought cannot undo them; that education cannot mitigate them ....").
194. Patricia Hill Collins (a leading proponent of multiculturalism), for example, raised these
issues in a 1989 speech:
In extreme cases, members of privileged groups can erase the very presence of the less
privileged. When I first moved to Cincinnati, my family and I went on a picnic at a local
park. Picnicking next to us was a family of White Appalachians. When I went to push my
daughter on the swings, several of the children came over. They had missing, yellowed and
broken teeth, they wore old clothing-their poverty was evident. I was shocked. Growing
up in a large eastern city, I had never seen such awful poverty among Whites. The
segregated neighborhoods in which I grew up made White poverty all but invisible. More
importantly, the privileges attached to my newly acquired social class position allowed me
to
to ignore and minimize the poverty among Whites that I did encounter. My reactions
those children made me realize how confining phrases such as "Well, at least they're not
Black," had become for me. In learning to grant human subjectivity to the Black victims
of poverty, I had simultaneously learned to demean White victims of poverty. By applying
categories of race to the objective conditions confronting me, I was quantifying and
ranking oppressions and missing the very real suffering which, in fact, is the real issue.
Collins, supra note 143, at 16-17.
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Further, the dangers of recognizing and exploring difference, though real
and thorny enough, are not in themselves any justification for continuing
to suppress difference and to silence voices from the margin. In any case,
the questions remain unsettled, and sharp criticism from traditionalists
could help move them forward if those of us in the multiculturalist camp
can be humble, savvy, and tough enough to draw out the lessons.
Both students and faculty in the legal academy will approach these
matters in many different ways. In talking with some of my colleagues
who do not count themselves as partisans in these debates, it has struck
me recently that our disagreements probably rest less on what texts we
wish to include on our reading lists, or even on our vision of the university, than on our understanding of the larger society in which we live.
Our society and our culture have both strengths and weaknesses
that arise from historical moments of great pride and great shame. I
recognize and give weight to both. Nevertheless, when I look at regional,
national, and global conditions, I see injustice and destruction looming
very large. Further, these problems appear to me to be in important part
unnecessary. My view of the world-the fact that I see substantial injustice and believe that the structures of that injustice are susceptible to
change-profoundly influences my outlook toward many issues in the
university. I know that for some the inequities and injustices simply do
not appear as pressing. Others may see that serious problems abound but
lack confidence in the efficacy of any imaginable solutions. For still
others the call for any but the most marginal of reforms, well-intentioned
though it may be, threatens a slide into totalitarianism. It is important to
remember that these differences over the justice or injustice of present
arrangements and over the possibility of meaningful change will affect
the way many of us assess the canon wars. 195
Perhaps we can soon start to probe more meaningful differences
than the false dichotomies that have played such a role in canon polemics. For example, when the National Association of Scholars says that
affirmative action hiring is bad because it "encourag[es] the belief that it
is the assertion of group power instead of the pursuit of individual
achievement that reaps the most abundant rewards,"' 9 6 I think they may
195. Perhaps what I am getting at about our different visions is something like the "overall
perspectives" and "world-views" Howard Lesnick has so fascinatingly discussed. See Howard
Lesnick, The Wellsprings ofLegal Responses to Inequality: A Perspectiveon Perspectives, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 413. Lesnick defined world-view as "'a set of ordering perceptions, priorities, and premises'
that shapes one's answers to specific questions." Id. at 413 n.3 (quoting Howard Lesnick, The
Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor Law, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 842
(1984)).
196. The Wrong Way to Reduce Campus Tensions: A Statement by the NationalAssociation of
Scholars, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 31 (advertisement).
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have discovered a real dichotomy, a contradiction worth exploring and
fighting about.
What I have tried to suggest in this Essay is the idea that even
across a fairly wide range of perspectives, we in legal education should be
able to agree that, in American law schools and in American legal doctrine, race is a central matter. It is at the core of our received tradition.
Its themes and demands trouble the extracurricular life of our institutions; its questions challenge our society's future. We should recognize
these realities and devote to them the conscious attention, both inside
and outside our curriculum, that they so strongly demand of us.

